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place for my thoughts, energies, and hopes to flourish. In particular, I would like to thank my 
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and the various manuscripts I produced from it.  Professor Matzner continuously engaged with 
my work, helping me situate my field material with exciting concepts I would not have 
discovered on my own. I found that whenever I had a vaguely formed thought that could not 
quite push itself to be articulated, Professor Matzner stated it exactly, eloquently and concisely.  
Professor Matzner guided and encouraged me from writing my first grant applications, to 
navigating the field, to presenting my work, to creating an ethnography, and to looking to my 
future.  I cannot imagine having the support of a more dedicated team of scholars.
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interlocutors who graciously shared with me their lives.  Although not many of them will be able 
to read this thesis, I hope that I have faithfully translated their own words and that I have 
preserved their agency of self-representation.
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Introduction
On a morning in mid-June, 2011, I sat with my translator, Tenzin Tsering, in front of a large 
lecture room at the Tibetan Transit School (TTS), a residential school for Tibetan refugees aged 
eighteen to thirty-four who have fled Chinese-controlled Tibet for the center of Tibet-in-exile 
across the Himalayas in Dharamsala, India.  Like other institutions managing the refugee 
population in Dharamsala, TTS houses a number of refugees who remained in a liminal state 
after leaving their homes in Tibet.  I had begun to see such institutions as key sites for the 
formation of Tibetan refugee subjectivities.  After meeting a number of adults and young adults 
living in Dharamsala who had graduated from TTS, I had decided to visit the school and seek out 
informants who could speak to their experiences of socialization in Dharamsala.  I contacted the 
director, and I had been expecting to do one-on-one interviews with available students.  At this 
point in my research, I could communicate in basic Tibetan, and could make out parts of 
complex and extensive speech.  Since the students at TTS were not yet proficient in English, I 
asked enlisted Tenzin Tsering's help for the interviews.  When I arrived at TTS, however, a 
school administrator brought us tea from the “canteen,” ushered us upstairs into classroom, and 
explained that the students would arrive for class shortly.  The administrator left.  A teacher 
arrived and greeted us in English, and students began to trickle in.  About thirty students, male 
and female, filled the desks lined in front of me.  Most seemed about my age (early twenties), but 
a few revealed faces weathered with wrinkles that made me assume they were in their thirties.  I  
wondered exactly what the teacher and students expected me to do.  Had my intentions to “speak 
with students about their lives” (as I had described my research agenda to the director) somehow 
been miscommunicated?  How had these intentions been communicated?  I was sitting in front of 
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a room of students, so was I supposed to be teaching a class?  The teacher began addressing the 
students in Tibetan, saying something about me, the foreign girl (bdyin ji'i pu mo), then invited 
me, in English, to start asking questions.
I began asking the set of open-ended promptings I had developed over the course of my 
research to initiate conversation during interviews (see Appendix Three).  I asked, “Why did you 
come to India?”  The teacher responded, in English, “To meet the Dalai Lama.  The second thing 
is to study, because the school fee is expensive in Tibet.”  The students were silent.  I asked, 
looking towards the students, if they had gone to school in Tibet, and three students raised their 
hands, reporting (through Tenzin Tsering) between four and five years of schooling before 
coming to India.  
I said, “Does anyone have family in India?”  Two students responded, one who has an 
older brother in India, another who had migrated with his nuclear family, including his younger 
brother and his mother and father.  Up to this point in my exploration of refugee life stories, 
human rights literature, and other sources of discursive narrative production about refugee 
experiences and reproduction broadly defined, I had encountered discussions of family size and 
population in a variety of contexts.  Since the student's explanation of his family composition 
seemed to open the doorway to this discussion, I asked about the average family size in Tibet, 
and the teacher responded, in Tibetan, “Earlier, it was much larger, but now it has been reduced  
to four total family members.  If you work in the government you can only have one baby.” 1 A 
student added, in Tibetan, “Five family members is the maximum number.”  I wondered why the 
teacher had switched to speak in Tibetan.  He had addressed me earlier in English, and seemed to 
be responding directly to my question.  Throughout the rest of the hour-long class, however, he 
1 Throughout the thesis,  I have marked responses translated from Tibetan to English in italics.
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continued to address me, through Tenzin Tsering, in Tibetan.  This may have signaled that he 
was, in fact, speaking to his students more than to me.
It was silent again, so I asked, “How do you feel about these policies?”  The teacher 
responded, in Tibetan, “They are meant to check the Tibetan population from growing.  For  
China, they have population, but we hardly have six million people, so it is definitely to reduce  
the number of Tibetans.”
“Did you know about these policies in Tibet?” I asked.  A student responded, “China's  
population is the highest in the world.  The Chinese population is very huge and they want to  
reduce the Tibetan population.”  Another student added, “It is directed solely towards Tibetans.” 
The teacher said, “The Chinese government says it is totally for your own good—to keep only  
one to two children—but the motivation is to totally get rid of Tibetans.”  
“In Tibet, what was your understanding of the situation?” I asked.  The teacher responded 
vehemently, “I was an ex-political prisoner, and I know that there is a huge contrast between  
what they [the Chinese] say and do.  They forcibly make farmers grow wheat and corn, and give  
them income to do so.  But, now they have stopped giving them income.  Nomads used to have on  
average seventy to one hundred yaks.  Now, the government has reduced the maximum to five  
cattle per head, and you have to pay a tax to the government for any other animals you own.  
Instances like this have made us realize that the Chinese are not in Tibet for the reasons they say  
they are.”  I noted a number of nodding heads among the students as the teacher continued. 
“And, most importantly, in educational institutions, there is a systematic attempt to crush  
Tibetan identity.  All the good schools are in China, not Tibet, and if there is a brilliant Tibetan  
student, he will be given a job so he doesn't pursue further studies.  And, there are damages to  
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the environment, like cutting trees and diverting rivers.” 
 I wanted to hear from the students, so I asked if their families were engaged in farming 
activities.  Most raised their hands in affirmation, and the teacher said, “The students here are  
quite young, so they ventured to seek jobs outside the home...”  A student interjected, “But, if  
help was required at home, we would help.  If not, we would seek an outside source of income--” 
The teacher broke in, “Even when you go out to work, if your colleague is Chinese, there is a  
different pay scale implemented on the grounds that he is a skilled laborer and you are not.”  
Trying to get beyond the teacher's descriptions of China's violation of Tibet and Chinese 
discrimination against Tibetans, I asked “When you were in Tibet, what did you think it meant to 
be Tibetan?”  A student answered, “When I was in Tibet, I didn't imagine I was Tibetan.  I was  
very young, and I didn't go to school.  I actually thought I'm Tibetan, but I was a nomad and was  
just living in the country, so I didn't know about the Tibet situation.”  Another responded, “When 
I was young, I didn't know about it, but when I was about ten to twelve years old, my parents told  
me that we are Tibetans, that there was a massacre that had been done to the older generation,  
and then 2008 happened.”  The teacher solemnly added, “We all know.  Our parents witnessed  
how the Chinese had come, the destruction of our culture and religion.  When the students were  
born, the Chinese were already there.  What has become history, they don't know because it is  
not taught to them.”  With this statement, the teacher seemed to be trying to summarize for me 
his students' sentiments.  Rather than summarizing, however, he seemed to speak for them, first 
explicitly discounting the students' previous statements, replacing “I didn't know” with “we all 
know”, and then explaining why “they don't know.”  The teacher seemed to take it as his duty to 
teach “what has become history” to the students, so that they “would know.”   I had encountered 
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similar narratives from representatives of institutions before.  And, the manner in which the 
teacher interacted with his students confirmed my previous impressions of Tibetan exile 
institutions in Dharamsala.  Namely, institutions seem to shape a consistent refugee subjectivity,  
oriented around key tropes involving opposition to the Chinese, oppression, and nationalism in 
exile.  Refugees housed at such institutions articulate their life stories through sets of discursive 
resources, portraying their socialization in India as a process of self-realization.
Back at TTS, still hoping to understand the what in “what has become history” referred, I 
keyed into the teacher's statement that “our parents” had “witnessed” the Chinese arrival.  I asked 
“What did your parents tell you?”  A student responded, “There were a lot of monks back then.  
Some rinpoches [Buddhist teachers] had ten thousand students, but they destroyed two thousand  
monks' quarters and said you cannot keep any more monks.”   Another added, “I had never seen 
the flag before, I never knew that Tibet belongs to Tibetans or why women were forced to have  
sterilizations.”  With this last statement, the student communicated a connection between the 
definition of the Tibetan nation and women's reproductive capacities.  The student presented 
forced sterilization of Tibetan women, like the flag, as an icon of the Tibetan nation.  Throughout 
my reading, interviews, and daily life in Dharamsala, I encountered recurring discussions of 
female reproduction in multiple settings.  It seemed, in fact, that the notion of reproduction 
contributed to the production of refugee subjectivity.  During formal and subtle socialization at  
institutions like TTS, Tibetan refugees come to narrate their own experiences, and to 
metaphorically link themselves to the experiences of the Tibetan nation under Chinese control,  
through the trope of reproduction.
This thesis, then, is my attempt to grapple with the complex inundation of narratives of 
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suffering and violence I encountered in Dharamsala through the lens of gender and reproduction. 
The thesis charts what I consider to be genres in women's narratives of suffering, unified by the 
common plots of migration, political imprisonment, reproductive suffering, and kinship 
formation. My experience in the classroom at TTS typifies the sorts of knowledge my informants 
expressed to me in narrative form.  “Tibetans from Tibet” seem to insist that they “did not know 
about Tibet” before migrating.  This knowledge, that many of my informants report encountering 
only in exile, centers on the violation of “Tibet” by “China.”  Tibetans in Dharamsala 
communicated this knowledge to me through what seemed to be generic, normative narratives 
that had even become institutionalized.  Like the teacher at TTS, representatives of institutions  
that house and care for refugees in Dharamsala (all of which are run through the exile 
government and/or through foreign, especially American, donations) tell stories about the 
suffering of the Tibetan people that seem to follow specific plot lines.  As I interviewed 
individuals, asking broad questions about their life experiences, they reiterated these same plot 
lines in their own life stories (without my prompting).  I also encountered these plots in English 
language human rights literature, towards which my informants explicitly pointed me, and with 
which I had gained familiarity before entering the field.
Through this ethnography of narratives, I argue that speech and discourse reveal common 
understandings of the Tibetan collectivity.  In writing of the narratives of female resistance 
fighters in Tibet, Carole McGranahan (2010b) explains that,
thinking of one's life as a story, as something that can be narrated, involves 
social processes and conventions...Narrating one's life, then, is to situate oneself 
and to be situated in dialogue with society...such narration signals possession of 
shared structures of possibility, including normative understandings of history, 
memory, knowledge, and truth [768].
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As McGranahan asserts, examining individual life stories can help illuminate shared 
understandings, which are often culturally specific.  In this way, individual women's narratives in 
Dharamsala provide insight into normative understandings of the nation that seemed to be 
cultivated in exile.  These normative understandings presented unified collective and personal 
histories of suffering.  It seemed that my informants formulated both the self—a singular Tibetan 
refugee—and the collectivity—the Tibetan community in Dharamsala and, more broadly, the 
Tibetan diaspora—through notions of shared suffering.
As my interaction at TTS suggests, institutional settings in Dharamsala inculcate refugees 
with these narratives of suffering.  Indeed, through the encouragement of a consistent set of 
narratives of refugee experience and of the Tibetan nation, these sites shape what I refer to as 
“Tibetan subjectivity”.  Foucault (1982) describes the role of institutions in employing 
“techniques of power” that define subjectivity.  He argues that institutions operate according to a 
form of power that “applies itself to immediate everyday life [and] categorizes the individual,  
marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on 
him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him.  It is a form of power 
which makes individuals subjects” (781).  Institutionalized power imposes the self- and social 
awareness that produces subjectivity.  The normative understandings—that is, knowledge—of 
Tibet and Tibetans that my informants reiterate in personal narrative seem to arise through 
similar dynamics of power in the exile government's institutions.  
Due to the role of such institutions in shaping Tibetan refugee subjectivity, personal 
educational histories seem to lead to significant social differences in Dharamsala.  The amount of 
time that refugees have been schooled in India and/or Tibet, and the age at which they became 
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socialized  in Dharamsala serves to define the extent of their understanding of Tibetanness. 
Ironically, this understanding seemed inversely related to the amount of time that Tibetans had 
spent in Tibet.  As Tenzin Tsering and I were having coffee one day before we set out to conduct 
interviews, she spoke of this social difference.  Tenzin Tsering explained,
I know Tibetans who were born and raised in Tibet.  They were not taught the 
Tibetan alphabet in their schools, only when they came here they came to know. 
They didn't know about Tibetan history, they don't know the Dalai Lama, they 
have heard the Dalai Lama's name only on several occasions in a very hushed 
tone.  So, the very attempt is to blur their identity in a way that they don't feel 
Tibetan, they don't feel the Tibetan pride, so if they don't have a pride in being 
Tibetan, why would you be involved in a movement for Tibet?
Tenzin Tsering suggests that the political climate in Tibet inhibits the development of Tibetan 
subjectivity.  She asserts that, since Tibetans from Tibet have been deprived of a sense of “pride” 
in their Tibetanness, they also lack the political consciousness that motivates the Tibetan freedom 
movement.  Tenzin Tsering points to an understanding that also arises in the personal narratives 
of Tibetans born in Tibet.  Tibetans born in Tibet explain a profound shift in political 
consciousness and historical understanding.  Migration, then, involves an enculturation in the 
exile community that redefines the migrant as a Tibetan refugee subject.  
 These anecdotes serve to demonstrate that Tibetans' initial enculturation in the diaspora 
takes place largely in institutional settings.  And, following this enculturation, individuals  
perform their new-found refugee subjectivity in narrative form.  This performance occurs across 
a landscape of institutions in greater Dharamsala.  After crossing the border from Tibet to Nepal, 
all migrants must first stay at reception centers in Kathmandu, Delhi, and finally, Dharamsala 
(Fig. 1).  From the reception center in Dharamsala, the exile government places refugees in 
monasteries or nunneries, an old-age home, or various schools based upon their ages.  During my 
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time in Dharamsala, I explored TTS and the Tibetan Reception Center. (TRC)  I also visited 
Education Support Trust (ES Trust), a small, privately-funded residential school providing 
continuing education to TTS graduates.  These institutions lie along dusty roads below the 
mountains.  The tourist infrastructure in Dharamsala centers on the Dalai Lama's temple, located 
above in the hill station known as McLeod Ganj.  McLeod Ganj consists of three winding 
mountain roads packed with restaurants, coffee shops, hotels, NGO headquarters, and the exile 
government's offices.  Houses and apartments spill down across the hillsides (Fig. 2).  Murals, 
statues, and posters call for Tibetan independence (Fig. 3).  Almost all permanent residents of 
McLeod Ganj are Tibetan.  Tourists, mainly Indian and Euro-American, flood the streets.  But, 
apart from beggars, taxi drivers, and a few Kashmiri shop owners, most Indians work and live on 
the sprawling foothills below.  Whereas Indian houses, farms, and tourist lodgings seem more 
evenly spaced across the mountain side (in spontaneous, almost mutinous risings of buildings 
that stretch the long distance between Dharamsala and the cities of Chandigarh, Amritsar, and 
Delhi), Tibetans live in concentrated enclaves in the greater Dharamsala area.  The Tibetan 
community remains relatively distinct from their Indian hosts.  Apart from those living in 
isolated institutions, Tibetans congregate solely in McLeod Ganj and in apartment complexes 
near the Norbulinka Institute, a Tibetan religious and cultural organization located about twelve 
kilometers down the mountain (Fig. 4).  
It seems that Tibetans' topographic location in greater Dharamsala's mountains correlates 
with cultural and economic capital.  Whereas McLeod Ganj offers a cosmopolitan audience for 
the performance of the Tibetan nation (and tourist prices for food and, sometimes even for locals, 
housing), residential institutions below isolate recently arrived refugees throughout their 
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socialization. This layout suggests that migrant communities produce marginality among 
themselves and in their interactions with surrounding societies.  Tsing (2000) asserts that “The 
key feature of the global era is the 'implosion' of center and periphery...Spatial and cultural 
discriminations become impossible in a world of global flows, and nonunitary migrant subjects 
are formed in the interstices of past classificatory principles” (343).  I argue against this 
understanding of migration and circulation, which supposes a sort of naturalized mixing among 
heterogeneous populations.  Rather, my Tibetan informants interact differentially with Tibetans 
from other regions, Tibetans born in India, Euro-Americans, and Indians.  And, institutions that 
operate through the exile government classify those born in Tibet as refugees in a global order. 
Through this classification, refugees are categorized by their exclusion from nation-states.  In 
Dharamsala, it seems that migration does not overthrow a politics of marginality, but rather,  
mutates into new patterns of social interaction and exclusion that correlate with nationality, a  
classificatory principle fundamental to the principle of the nation-state.
Given my interest in reproduction, and IRB constraints that limited my research methods 
to interviews and focus groups, I began my fieldwork in McLeod Ganj interviewing medical 
professionals about reproductive health services at Delek hospital, a donation-based biomedical 
hospital serving primarily the Tibetan community in Dharamsala, as well as at Rajendra Prasad 
Medical College, an Indian government hospital (see Fig. 5 for locations relative to McLeod 
Ganj).  Then, I continued to interview people with whom I came in contact in my daily life.  My 
informants come from all regions of Tibet, and a few were born in India.  Given my social 
network and a dynamic in Dharamasala where Tibetans tend to socialize with and live in 
proximity to those from the same region, the majority of my informants whom I met in McLeod 
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Ganj are from Amdo, one of Tibet's three regions.  These Amdo Tibetans lived in a congregated 
“Amdo village” in McLeod Ganj, as well as in apartments near the Norbulinka Institute (Fig. 6). 
The Tibetans I met in McLeod Ganj and at Norbulinka all had attended schools in the 
Dharamsala area, including TTS, the Tibetan Children's Village (TCV), and ES Trust and had 
lived at the reception center.  It seemed that these institutional sites presented ideal venues in  
which to continue my research.  My informants in McLeod Ganj articulated that they had 
acquired a new-found sense of self through their stays in these institutions.  When I went to 
investigate, I found that in institutions, Tibetans from Tibet come into contact with normative 
framings of Tibet, Tibetan history, and Tibetanness that privilege a politicized knowledge of 
collective Tibetan suffering.  As the teacher from TTS articulated, his students “do not know” 
about the history of injustices that China has perpetrated against Tibet.  Although Tibetans from 
Tibet lived under the regime responsible for Tibetan suffering (as described by my informants), 
they must be educated about the nature of their experiences in Tibet.  The process of 
enculturation in institutions seems to suppose that Tibetans from Tibet misrecognize their life 
experiences, and it reframes the ways that they view their lives in Tibet through a normative 
framework that emphasizes shared suffering.
As exemplified in the multiple narratives of suffering that the students and teacher at TTS 
reported, normative experiences of suffering take a variety of forms.  I encountered common, 
remarkably consistent narrative formulae through which refugee Tibetans came to narrate their  
experience.  Each chapter traces narratives I have grouped into common genres of suffering. 
These genres include the plots of migration, imprisonment, reproductive suffering, and kinship 
formation.  These narratives demonstrate shifts in Tibetan subjectivity related to the process of 
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enculturation.  For example, enculturation builds a collective memory of atrocity that seems to  
color the ways that individuals reflect upon their personal history, as well as upon their present 
circumstances and their plans for the future.  In addition, I encountered a persistent narrative 
emphasis on female reproduction across narrative plots.  At times, gender seemed to present a 
sort of hidden social infrastructure, with shaded references to violence against women, especially 
during the journey between Tibet and India.  However, in recounting memories of imprisonment, 
women also spoke openly of sexual violence, only to negate its gendered nature moments later. 
In other contexts, women and men alike stressed gender differences, often reiterating the 
biological and spiritual capacities of gendered incarnations articulated in Buddhist philosophy.  
By examining these diverse figurations of gender, I hope to shed light on women's subjectivity.  I 
seek to explore how individual women respond to and internalize representations of gendered 
suffering in narrative.  McGranahan (2010a, 2010b) has noted that the Tibetan exile community 
overlooks, and to some extent, silences women's narratives of political resistance.  I found, 
however, that certain gendered narratives are privileged in Dharamsala, including those of 
political imprisonment and reproductive rights violations.  How, then, do women engage with 
such narratives of gendered suffering, when their voices are silenced in other political contexts?
A Semiotic Approach to Cultural Reproduction
These consistent, gendered narrative formulae necessitated an interpretive approach.  Geertz 
(1973) defines the interpretive outlook by explaining that since “man is an animal suspended in 
webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to 
be...an interpretive [science] in search of meaning” (5).  In searching for cultural meaning, 
Geertz argues that “what we call our data are really our own constructions of other people's 
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constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to” (ibid: 9).  I view my informants' 
narratives similarly, as constructions of Tibetan exilic subjectivity.  More recent scholarship has 
amended Geertz's interpretive approach, arguing for an understanding of culture as unstable, 
emergent, and contested.  Culture is not fixed in webs of meaning.  Rather, individuals produce 
meaning in their interactions.  Applying this model to my field site, Tibetans construct 
Tibetanness as they narrate. The view of culture that my field material portrays captures the 
construction of Tibetanness aimed at a specific audience—an American ethnographer.  To this 
end, I consider Tibetan narratives to be performances of Tibetanness for an international 
audience, which sheds light on the positioning of Tibetans in the world order of nation-states.  I 
have taken Nany Ries' Russian Talk (1997), an ethnography on conversation among Moscow's 
intelligentsia in the time of Perestroika, to guide my approach to exploring Tibetan narrative 
performance.  Ries explains that “in talk, various conceptual patterns and value systems are 
encapsulated in narrative, even mythic form, comprising models for life as much as models of it” 
(3).  That is, talk constructs collective meanings which serve to direct action, and cultural  
reproduction occurs as individuals navigate within these collective meanings and implied 
actions.  Ries analyzes Russian talk by highlighting key symbolic elements that occur throughout 
her informants' conversations.  Speakers linked these key symbolic elements to the poverty of 
Perestroika, performing their own hardship in routinized ways.  Talk became an important 
register for the performance and production of value in the face of material deprivation, and 
served to proclaim the collective suffering of the narod—the Russian people.
My Tibetan informants likewise linguistically performed a specific form of suffering, 
produced in a liminal phase of refugee subject formation.  They affirmed suffering as an essential 
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character of the Tibetan people.  Although Ries' fieldwork is removed in time, space, and 
political context from my own, our informants seemed to communicate collective belonging in a  
manner that led narratives of suffering to produce symbolic capital.  Ries explains that 
“Suffering, enhanced through discourse, can socially exonerate those who suffer and even 
sacralize them.  In Russia, in particular, spiritual merit has been associated with hardship and 
poverty” (ibid: 126).  Tibetans' narratives can likewise be understood in the context of a 
culturally specific valorization of suffering.  For example, Tibetan representations of the freedom 
struggle deploy the suffering of the Tibetan people at the hands of the Chinese as a call for 
autonomy.  Likewise, aspects of Tibetan religion, including (but not limited to) karma, link 
suffering to spiritual merit.  In a study of happiness among ethnic Tibetans in Nepal and India, 
Lichter and Epstein (1983) encountered the belief that by experiencing suffering, individuals 
could live out karmic consequences that would allow for future happiness (234-235).  My 
informants have had varying exposure to textual Buddhism, but nonetheless seemed to espouse 
similar associations between suffering and potential happiness.  Like Ries, I argue for unique 
links between suffering and morality which play out in the discursive production of collective 
identity.
In tracing the production of collective belonging, like Ries, I mobilize Ortner's (1973) 
treatise on symbolic anthropology.  Ortner describes “key symbols” as elements of a culture 
which “are crucial to its distinctive organization” (1338).  Ortner provides a scheme of the types 
and functions of these key symbols.  She identifies “summarizing symbols” which involve “the 
cultural conversion of complex ideas into various kinds of relatively undifferentiated 
commitment—patriotism, for example, or faith” (ibid: 1344).  I locate summarizing symbols 
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through which Tibetans communicate the significance of religion and the nation, such as the 
Dalai Lama and the Tibetan flag, which speakers consistently invoke in narratives.  Ortner also 
writes of “key scenarios,” which consist of “dramatistic modes of analysis...concerning the 
restructuring of attitudes and relationships as a result of enacting particular culturally provided 
sequences of stylized actions” (ibid: 1344-1345).  In Dharamsala, migration, political resistance, 
and physical reproduction represent such key scenarios.  As individuals recount their experiences 
of and attitudes towards these scenarios, they seem to formulate strategies of cultural survival. 
These key scenarios framed the plot lines of many narratives, and correspond to the thesis' 
chapters (with Chapters Three and Four encompassing physical reproduction).  I attempt to 
demonstrate the function of key symbols in communicating the importance of and strategies for 
reproducing the Tibetan collectivity.
History and Circumstances of the Tibetan Diaspora
My informants' current position in India results from specific historical circumstances, which 
have led “Tibet” to be defined as a nation in exile.  McGranahan (2010a: 1-52) and Avedon 
(1984: 12-21) describe historical Tibet as a series of small-scale societies, loosely held together 
by monastic rule emanating from Lhasa.  Since 1642, ethnic Tibetans have shown allegiance to 
the Dalai Lama lineage as rulers of Tibet (McGranahan 2010a: 14).  Chinese incursions into 
Tibet began in the late 1940s (McGranahan 2010a: 1).  Following these incursions, the Dalai 
Lama appealed to the United States and Great Britain to support their planned request for 
membership in the United Nations (ibid: 45).  Given that Britain was political embroiled with a 
newly independent India, and that the United States was entering a war against the Chinese in 
Korea, both governments rejected the Dalai Lama's appeal (ibid).  The Dalai Lama continued to 
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negotiate with the Chinese government until 1956, when a series of bombings led him to seek 
American military assistance (ibid: 1, 46).  The United States complied, deploying the CIA to 
train Tibetan guerrilla soldiers (ibid: 46).  March 10, 1959 marks a turning point in the political 
conflict between China and Tibet.  In early March, the Dalai Lama had received an invitation 
from the PLA to attend a theatrical show, and the date was set for March 10 th (Avedon 1984: 49-
50).  The PLA had extended similar invitations to other prominent lamas, who had been 
imprisoned and executed once they arrived at the performances (ibid).  Since the Tibetan 
population in Lhasa was aware of these events, they formed a barricade around the Dalai Lama's 
residence on March 10, seeking to prevent the Dalai Lama's attendance at the show.  Riots began. 
On March 17, 1959, the PLA dropped two mortar shells near the Dalai Lama's residence, and he 
decided to flee to India with his family.  The official emergence of the Tibetan nation coincided 
with the Dalai Lama's flight into exile.  The Dalai Lama constituted the government-in-exile on  
April 19, 1959 (McGranahan 2010a: 14).  By the end of June, 1959, almost 20,000 Tibetans had 
fled to India (Avedon 1984: 72).  The Tibetan nation was thus defined through a large-scale 
exodus, at a time when incipient independence movements across Asia, Africa, and South 
America focused attention on post-coloniality and the rise of independent nation-states.
Today, “Tibet” generally refers to a space demarcated by geographic borders asserted by 
either the PRC or the exile government.  The PRC gave provincial status to “the Tibet 
Autonomous Region” in 1965, and classified outlying Tibetan territories as “Autonomous 
Prefectures” and “Autonomous Counties”  (ibid: 48).  The exile government, however, adheres to 
a “three region” (chol kha gsum) model of Tibet, encompassing Kham, Amdo, and Utzang (ibid: 
50-51).  The Tibet Autonomous Region, in contrast, encompasses all of Utzang and parts of 
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eastern Kham (Fig. 7).  In Dharamsala, individuals describe their heritage according to the three 
region model.  Following the lead of my informants, when writing of “Tibet” throughout the 
thesis, I refer to the three region model.  The Tibetan diaspora in South Asia encompasses fifty-
seven settlements in India, Nepal, and Bhutan.2  Dharamsala, which represents one of these 
settlements, functions as the capital of diaspora.  Many migrants frequently travel between 
settlements.  Even exiled families comprised of multiple settled generations move across the 
subcontinent.  And, young migrants who have journeyed to India without their families 
sometimes travel multiple times between Tibet and South Asia.  The diaspora is not fixed. 
Rather, it is renewed through perpetual movements within and between Tibet, South Asia, and 
beyond.
These historical circumstances, leading to globally dispersed but concentrated 
communities of Tibetans, have positioned the exile nation within the international community.  
Likewise, the development of the exile nation and of its associated schools and institutions that  
manage the refugee population, has coincided with the production of national sentiment.  Both 
the infrastructure of the Tibetan nation-state and the imagining of the Tibetan nation have 
occurred in exile.  National sentiment has produced an imagined homeland in Tibet, to which 
individuals would theoretically return once it was freed.  The Dalai Lama states that he does not 
seek political independence, but rather, political and cultural autonomy, for greater Tibet  
(McGranahan 2010a: 38).  I thus refer to the goals underlying Tibetan nationalism as “freedom” 
and the actions taken to mobilize for these goals as the “freedom movement.”  I have employed 
anthropological scholarship on globalization and diaspora to understand this complex 
relationship between the global positioning of the Tibetan population and its imagined homeland.
2 http://tibet.net/home/about-us/settlements-in-india/
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In the early 1990s, cultural studies extended post-modern scholarship which had 
abandoned positivist understandings of culture.  Scholars began to consider culture as contested 
and unstable, especially as people and populations moved across the globe.  Appadurai 
(2003[1990]) notes the “schizophrenic social formations” of the post-post-modern world, arguing 
for a model of the global political economy based upon disjunctive circulations of people, media,  
finances, and ideas.  Tsing (2000) explains that such models of circulation challenge the 
conceptualization of cultures as discrete units.  Not only do individuals migrate, but “diasporas 
circulate, bringing the wealth of their cultural heritage to new locations” (337).  The circulation 
of Tibetan people to South Asia and beyond, which began at a moment of articulation between 
the Cold War and post-colonial independence movements, allowed for an appreciation of Tibetan 
culture around the world.  Tibetan traditions of Buddhist monasticism have been exported 
beyond South Asia, in particular, to Europe and North America.  At the same time, Euro-
American Buddhist practitioners have been imported to Tibetan settlements across South Asia 
and to Tibet itself as travelers, pilgrims, converted monastics, and political activists.  The 
involvement of Tibet in a globalized world seems to exemplify the complex flows that scholars 
of globalization have introduced.  Likewise, the national sentiment that shapes my informants' 
subjectivities results from a humanitarian framing of the political conflict in Tibet. 3   In the 
1960s, the continued rise of an international humanitarian regime, as well as Tibet's location 
within this regime, seem linked to new imaginings of the global that mirrored the shift in cultural  
studies.4  Tibet's involvement in a globalized world seems to exemplify the complex flows that 
3 Cold War politics influenced this humanitarian framing, since the government in exile relied upon the United 
States, who held a primary commitment to placate the PRC (McGranahan 2010a: 46).
4 Scholars have noted the importance of developing environmental movements in the 1960s to imaginings of the 
global.  Tsing (2000) explains that in the 1960s, imaging technology produced the first photographs of the Earth 
as seen from space, which “brought together the universalist morality of 1960s social justice politics and the 
transboundary expertise of an emergent ecological science” (331).  These new developments in  
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scholars of globalization have introduced.
In this vein, transnational mobilization for Tibetan freedom has produced unstable 
imaginings of “Tibet” itself.  Appadurai (2003[1990]) argues that “As group pasts become 
increasingly parts of...national and transnational spectacles, culture becomes...an arena for 
conscious choice, justification, and representation, the latter often to multiple and spatially  
dislocated audiences” (42).  The case of Tibet necessitates a similar understanding of culture, as a 
field in which individuals navigate a multiplicity of possible interpersonal affiliations and self-
representations.  Simply stated, as my informants migrate from Tibet to South Asia, they report 
encountering the unfamiliar representation of Tibet as a nation and of Tibetans as victims of 
human rights abuses.  These representations of the nation and Tibetan victim circulate in Western 
media and politics (Barnett 2001).  In coming into contact with new communities and media, my 
informants understandings of their own culture shift, and they seem to espouse a politicized 
understanding of Tibet and a humanitarian framing of Tibetan freedom.  As explained above, 
residential institutions seem to contribute to this new-found “knowledge” of Tibetan culture.  The 
performance of Tibetan refugee subjectivity, then, involves processes of disjuncture and 
difference within a migrant, globally situated community.
Along with its emergence in the realm of international humanitarianism, the issue of Tibet 
arose in diaspora studies in the late 20th century.  The Tibetan intelligentsia adopted the notion of 
environmentalism resonated with “another image of the global, in which globality represented the goal of a 
process of building transnational political and cultural ties” (ibid).  The Tibet movement exemplifies this meeting 
of environmentalism and transnational exchange.  Barnett (2001) explains that representations of Tibet outside of 
China portray a violated “Zone of Specialness,” playing on the intersection of primordial romanticism and 
environmental concerns.  The Dalai Lama, for example, wrote “Prior to Chinese invasion, Tibet was an 
unspoiled wilderness sanctuary in a unique natural environment...What little is left in Tibet must be protected 
and efforts must be made to restore the environment to its balanced state” (as cited in Barnett 2001:276).  That is,  
both Western and Tibetan mobilization for freedom seem to have been inspired and influenced by emerging 
environmentalism in the mid- to late 20th century.
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“diaspora” to describe the Tibetan exile population while the term gained popularity in post-
colonial studies (Anand 2003: 215-216).  Since attention to diaspora developed in the context of 
post-modern understandings of the fluidity of space and culture, scholarship did not pin down a 
specific definition of diaspora.  Rather, scholars considered diasporas to be bundles of certain 
interrelated characteristics, including geographic displacement and nostalgic imaginings of return  
to the homeland (Axel 2004: 27, Clifford 1994: 302).  Tibetan communities in South Asia and 
beyond share such characteristics.  However, in the case of Tibet, the diaspora seems defined by 
the possibility—in fact, the moral imperative—of return.  Clifford (1994) argues that, “Whatever 
their eschatological longings, diaspora communities are 'not-here' to stay.  Diaspora cultures thus 
mediate, in a lived tension, the experiences of separation and entanglement of living here and 
remembering/desiring another place” (311).  The status of the Tibetan nation in exile heightens 
these tensions, challenging Clifford's definition of the diasporic state as one of fixed 
displacement.  Tibet-in-exile is seemingly more solidified than other diasporas, by virtue of its 
quasi-state infrastructure centered in Dharamsala.  From this vantage point, Tibet exemplifies an 
exilic population rather than a diaspora.  Anand explains that scholars such as Clifford have 
considered diasporas to be “incommensurate with nationalism” (2003:224).  The Tibetan 
freedom movement fuels a pan-Tibetan identity based on the notion of nationality.  And, the 
freedom movement involves highly organized protests, frequently leading to violence, which 
seems to contrast sharply from other dispersed immigrants' sentiments towards their homelands.
And yet, Tibetans' perpetual dispersion across the globe, and deep-rooted relationships 
with people of other nationalities, pushes exilic existence to the realm of diaspora.  In a sense, 
the notion of diaspora undermines the lived realities of the Tibetan people's suffering.  Scholarly 
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focus on nostalgic remembering presents an aesthetic that contrasts with the intense affect of 
shared suffering my informants communicate in their narratives.  And yet, the deployment of 
narrative performances of suffering, in the human rights literature and media which infiltrate 
daily life in Dharamsala, suggests Orientalist imaginings.  Tibetan nationalism is predicated upon 
shared suffering.  Tibetan nationalist calls for a “free Tibet” seem characteristic of exile rather  
than diaspora.  Shared experiences of profound suffering suggest an affect more characteristic of 
a refugee community, and my informants' official status in the international world order is that of 
“refugee.”  NGO networks in Dharamsala, and, in fact, the exile government itself, seem to cater 
to needy refugee subjects.  Narrative performances of shared suffering, however, mediate 
between “diaspora,” “exile,” and “refugee.”  Crafted towards nationalist goals, performances of 
suffering nonetheless romanticize the tension between lived displacement and nostalgia for the 
homeland which scholars have identified as a key characteristic of diasporic imaginings.  And, 
given Dharamsala's cosmopolitanism, Tibetan refugees mix readily with foreigners and tourists. 
Although, like refugees, they remain isolated from their Indian host community, like inhabitants  
of a diaspora, they create ties with a global audience who visits Dharamsala.  I therefore switch 
between the three terms when discussing Tibetan subjectivities and the theater of Dharamsala.
My informants continue to move throughout South Asia and beyond, which presents a 
striking contrast to the freedom struggle's stated goals.  As described above, Tibetan individuals 
and institutions defined the nation at the moment of deterritorialization.  In discussing the 
influence of communication systems on globalization, Levy (2000) asserts that individuals 
cultivate “a global discourse of diasporicity or nationalism, one that transcends locality while 
creating a new 'locality', a unique locality that transcends immediate spaces and shared 
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landscapes” (150).  The Tibetan freedom movement speaks to these contrasting localities. 
“Freedom” would involve a reconciliation between the diasporic Tibetan population and the 
territorial nation—a reterritorialization.  And yet, my informants frequently explained that they 
sought further opportunities for migration, for example, through obtaining citizenship in Europe 
or America.  Meanwhile, internal migrations and “population transfers” (as Tibet activists 
describe) of Han Chinese into Tibet further blur the boundaries of the physical space towards 
which Tibetans direct the freedom struggle.  Tibet's future thus seems caught in a continued 
process of  literal deterritorialization, while Tibetans continue to affirm their nationality.  In her 
analysis of the contemporary world order, Tsing speaks of similar contradictions between 
migration and territory.  She defines “flow” as the migration catalyzed by the political economy 
and institutional ties between pathways of movement, explaining, “if flow itself always involves 
making terrain, there can be no territorial distinctions between the 'global' transcending of place 
and the 'local' making of places.  Instead, there is place making” (338).  That is, individuals 
practice “place making” through their imaginings of territory, globality, and locality as they 
move through geographic space; they endow certain spaces with meaning, creating a sense of 
place, and situate themselves within these places.  Tsing's argument carries implications for the 
experience of migration from Tibet and for refugee life in Dharamsala.  Tibetans' understandings 
of the freedom struggle and personal hopes for continued migration seem to conflict.  However, 
the ethnographic inquiry shifts from attempts to reconcile literal and metaphoric—as well as  
collective and personal—goals, to an examination of individual meaning-making in the face of  
these central contradictions in Tibetan diasporic imaginings of the nation.
The narratives I have collected from young Tibetan women deal centrally with their 
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personal experiences of place-making in exile.  I examine the ways that my informants make 
sense of social and geographic displacement, while emplacing themselves within the exile 
community.  In this process of place-making, my informants articulate a concern with cultural  
reproduction, which leads to them to discussions of kinship formation and physical reproduction. 
Appadurai argues that, “As the shapes of cultures grow themselves less bounded and tacit, more 
fluid and politicized, the work of cultural reproduction becomes a daily hazard” (Appadurai 
2003:43).  According to Appadurai, therefore, culture's decentralization through global 
circulations produces anxieties about cultural reproduction. Many of my informants have left 
their families as they migrated to India and expressed personal concern with cultural survival that  
they attributed to the uncertain nature of diasporic life.  This concern over cultural survival 
seems to have led to the politicization of Tibetan discourses on reproduction, and motivates my 
semiotic approach.  This thesis seeks to join scholarship on diaspora to an interpretation of the 
role of gender and reproduction in Tibetan subject-formation.
Methods of Fieldwork and Analysis
The fieldwork for this thesis came about as an extension of an independent research project I 
conducted with the School for International Training's (SIT) program, “Tibetan and Himalayan 
Peoples.”  With SIT, I lived with a Tibetan host family in Kathmandu and participated in daily 
language classes and other lectures from January to early April, 2011.  As part of the 
requirements for my semester, I completed four weeks of independent research in April, 2011. 
For this research period, students could remain in Kathmandu or travel to another ethnically 
Tibetan area of India, Nepal, or Bhutan.  I chose to travel to Dharamsala, India.  As will be 
further described in Chapter Three, my academic work had brought me in contact with 
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declarations of the “genocide” of the Tibetan people.  Works that I studied through SIT, such as 
John Avedon's (1984) journalistic history of Tibet, In Exile from the Land of Snows, as well as 
lectures organized through SIT, including multiple talks with Avedon's ex-wife, herself an 
American activist for Tibet, consistently reiterated these accounts of genocide.  The Tibetans 
employed by SIT, all of whom were raised in India and Nepal, likewise narrated testimony of 
genocide.  My host family, however, and other Tibetans living in Kathmandu were silent about 
political conflict—both within Nepal and in Tibet—even when I explicitly asked their opinions.  
Meanwhile, the Tibetans working for SIT asserted that Nepal's cooperation with China 
(especially following its 2008 Communist revolution) stifled Tibetans' vibrant political 
sentiments, which emanated from the capital of Dharamsala.
My previous experience in Nepal has given me insight into the uniqueness of Dharamsala 
among the sites along the Tibetan refugee circuit.  Marcus (1995) describes late 20 th century 
ethnographic trends toward “multi-sited” research projects, including a method he terms 
“following the people.”  Within the umbrella of “following the people,” Marcus describes certain 
studies that present an ethnography of a single field with “with multiple sites evoked [as] 'off-
stage' knowledge, so to speak, of what happens to their subjects in the other sites” (106).  While 
this thesis, itself, does not draw on material from Kathmandu, my understanding of Dharamsala 
as a theater for the performance of Tibetan subjectivity has been shaped by my own embodied 
experience of travel between the Tibetan communities in Kathmandu, Delhi, and Dharamsala.
The ethnographic encounters with which this thesis deals come entirely from Dharamsala. 
The majority of these ethnographic encounters took the form of scheduled interviews.  Through 
these interviews in Dharamsala, I collected life stories from forty-two refugees (thirty-one 
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women and eleven men), and interviewed twelve NGO and hospital employees.  My informants 
come from diverse backgrounds, but most are young adults between the ages of eighteen to 
thirty-four who have migrated to India within the past seven years.  A few were born in India, 
and a few had migrated to India as children.  When I approached informants and asked them to 
share with me their lives, I told them that I hoped to hear anything they wished to tell me. 
Conversations usually proceeded fairly naturally, but when they did not, I employed a set of 
common prompts I had adapted to gather information about specific aspects of refugee life (see 
Appendix Three).  As described above, I sought out informants for interviews in McLeod Ganj 
and Norbulinka, as well as at three institutions, the Tibetan Transit School (TTS), Educational 
Support Trust (ES Trust), and the Tibetan Reception Center (TRC), each located about an hour 
outside of Dharamsala by bus.  The unpaved roads leading to these institutions filled my lungs 
with hot dust in April and May and flooded during the summer monsoon, making travel 
unpleasant, both by foot and by vehicle.  
About half of my informants (nineteen) were fluent in English.  Tibetans born in India 
and the students at ES Trust have high levels of English proficiency.  Students at TTS have just 
begun learning English, and Tibetans living at the reception center do not speak English.  When I 
traveled to TTS and the reception center, therefore, I enlisted the help of three translators, Tenzin 
Tsering, Jangchup Choetso, and Lhamo Tso.  Tenzin Youdon, SIT”s program assistant also 
translated my first two interviews conducted in early April.  Tenzin Tsering, Jangchup Choetso, 
and Lhamo Tso also helped with a few interviews in McLeod and Norbulinka with individuals 
who were not confident in their English.  I have italicized statements that were originally 
articulated in Tibetan.  My Tibetan translators often took care of me as a foreigner.  In attempting 
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to help me navigate the Tibetan community, their authoritative knowledge of Tibetans sometimes  
influenced the ways they asked questions or communicated information.  For example, there 
was, on a number of occasions, confusion about how to communicate the word “Buddhist.”  On 
one occasion, when the informant did not understand the word, the translator responded, “All 
Tibetans are Buddhists except for a few who are Muslims.”  I often attempted to present myself 
as a cultural novice, to avoid assuming that any single explanation I had encountered or inferred 
was representative or universal.  By asking every interviewee to explain for me the same 
phenomena, I hoped to grasp a range of formulations and to get a sense of commonality and 
idiosyncrasy.  As a foreigner, who presumably knew nothing about Tibet, my translators 
sometimes inserted their own knowledge of what the answer should be.  After studying Tibetan 
every day for two months through SIT and living with Tibetans in Nepal and India for a total of 
six months, I was able to understand enough Tibetan to catch obvious inconsistencies.  If I was 
not confident in the accuracy of any translated expression, I asked for clarification and took note 
of any statements about which I remained unclear.  The study is highly limited, since it involves 
an analysis of linguistic expression that took place in two languages (and multiple dialects) by an 
ethnographer who is not fluent in Tibetan.  I am confident, however, that with my limited 
Tibetan, the help of my translators, and my informants' knowledge of English, I effectively 
grasped the intended sentiments and key vocabularies of each narrative.  Throughout the thesis, 
certain key vocabularies are transliterated according to the Wylie (1959) system of romanized 
Tibetan transcription.
The written transcripts of my formal interviews are made up of extensive dictations that I 
wrote by hand during the interviews and typed in the evenings afterward.  I audio-taped and 
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transcribed in full some of the first interviews.  However, I found that my informants became 
uncomfortable when I asked to record their voices.  Some even explicitly asked me not to record 
them.  Additionally, I was advised by SIT to delete all of the recordings after they had been 
transcribed in order to protect informants' confidentiality.  Such concern over confidentiality 
seems to result both from China's continued repression of knowledge about the Tibetan exile 
community and from specific anxieties arising from Dharamsala's cosmopolitanism.  Due to 
close monitoring of phone calls and media, Tibetans living abroad who make statements that 
threaten China's territorial control over the region can expect their families in Tibet to face 
harassment from the authorities.  In addition, my informants described a number of negative 
experiences involving unethical appropriation of their culture and personal lives that resulted 
from Euro-American interest with Tibetans.  For example, a friend told me that her elderly 
mother was shocked when, on a trip to Delhi, she encountered a postcard that featured her 
circumambulating the Dalai Lama's temple, when she had not even been aware that she had been 
photographed.  Hoping to position myself apart from these exploitative practices, I  chose to rely 
on my ability to take faithful notes throughout most of the interviews.  As a result, I left the field 
with exclusively English linguistic material, except when I took note of the original Tibetan in  
my dictations.  And, this linguistic material was imperfectly translated, literally from English to  
Tibetan and through my (well-developed but inherently flawed) ability to capture speech by 
hand.  Despite ethical concerns, I greatly regret both deleting the audio recordings I had and not 
recording more extensively.  It was only once I began to analyze the English linguistic material  
with my adviser, Deborah Matzner, that it became clear that fine-grained linguistic analysis could 
have contributed to the project.
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In addition to collecting life stories, I participated as much as possible in daily life in 
Dharamsala, which, as described above seemed to function as a sort of theater for the inculcation 
and performance of Tibetan exile subjectivity.  I spent my mornings in coffee houses and chatted 
with the employees, who sometimes gave me English language human rights literature and even, 
on one occasion, a documentary film, about Tibet.  I volunteered at a number of English 
“conversation classes,” and led a few, by request, on my own.  NGOs in Dharamsala organized 
these daily English conversation classes which seemed, to me, a means of entertaining the hordes 
of tourists who came to Dharamsala, half-expecting Shangri-la, only to find a few winding roads. 
The students would sometimes ask me to tea after class, hoping that I could make them fluent in 
English while they articulated over and over the hardship of the Tibetan people.  As will be 
further described in Chapter Two, NGOs also provided entertainment through such narratives of 
hardship, including weekly lectures (accompanied by free dinner) with former political prisoners. 
Although my interview transcripts form the bulk of ethnographic data for this project, I took 
extensive field notes on these and many more interactions.  The thesis thus synthesizes my 
interview data with ethnographic encounters during everyday life in Dharamsala, as well as with 
human rights literature towards which my informants pointed me.  The thesis employs specific 
women's narratives as focal points, and brings in other narrative fragments and descriptions of 
spontaneous ethnographic encounters to demonstrate patterns, inconsistencies, and complexities 
that were not illuminated by a single informant.  I often spoke with my informants in multiple 




As described above, the thesis charts four common narrative plot lines, migration, political 
imprisonment, physical reproduction, and kinship formation, which shed light on the ways that 
Tibetans engage with and reproduce collective national identity in the diaspora.  Five women's 
narratives of migration provide the framework for Chapter One.  In describing personal 
experiences of migration, and, in the case of one woman born in exile, familial experiences of 
migration, Tibetans communicate the process of acquiring refugee status.  Through statements 
about gender, women communicate a dual displacement, geographic and social, which arises 
from leaving their families and the physical Tibetan nation.  At the same time, enacting migration  
serves as a rite of passage into the diasporic nation.  Through this rite of passage, women connect 
themselves to the history of the diaspora, blurring historically contingent catalysts for migration 
into a single framing of the political conflict, which insists upon the moral imperative of freeing 
the Tibetan people from Chinese oppression.
Chapter Two recounts the narratives of three women who were imprisoned in Tibet 
following their participation in political protests.  This chapter explores the key scenario of 
political resistance, demonstrating that suffering for Tibetan freedom—that is, for the political  
status of the Tibetan nation—affirms national identity.  Experiences of torture, the primary form 
of suffering associated with imprisonment, represent collective suffering.  Such narratives of 
torture seem strikingly normative, presenting what I consider to be a clear genre of stories about 
Tibet.  I name this genre “the prison narrative,” charting its recurrence in life stories as well as in 
human rights literature.  While Chapter One describes a shift in subjectivity resulting from 
migration, Chapter Two demonstrates the hegemony of a certain subjectivity—the Tibetan 
prisoner—among refugees in Dharamsala.  I explore the factors which seem to produce this 
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hegemony, including international interest in political imprisonment and institutional support for  
victims of torture.
Chapter Three opens by exploring the connections between torture and reproductive 
regulation.  Through these conceptual connections, women's reproductive capacities symbolize 
political strife.  The chapter continues by juxtaposing narratives of women's memories of 
childbirth in Tibet with experiences of childbirth in exile, describing the ways that women 
interpret political and familial belonging through the metaphor of reproduction.  In India, women 
seek biomedical care during pregnancy and birth, but in Tibet, most women give birth at home. 
This dynamic is shaped by forces of biomedical hegemony, kinship, and citizenship.  Memories 
of coercive reproduction regulation in Tibet, enacted through biomedical intervention, shape 
conceptual links between life, death, and medicalized reproduction.  In Tibet, a mistrust of 
Chinese doctors and hospitals seems to discourage women from accessing biomedical obstetric 
care.  However, anxiety about Chinese biomedicine comes into tension with experiences of 
familial death due to birth complications at home.  In India, this tension is somewhat eased, since 
women emphasize their “freedom” to access reproductive health care.  And, given the absence of 
kin networks to aid women throughout labor, the vast majority choose to give birth in hospitals.
Chapter Four furthers this exploration of the metaphorical facets of physical reproduction 
by describing the ways that women reconcile the future of the Tibetan nation and their personal 
life goals.  I put the narratives of two women born in Tibet into conversation with that of a 
woman born in Dharamsala.  All women comment upon the shared ideal of a heteronormative 
life path resulting in physical reproduction of Tibetan children.  In this way, they suggest that, 
due to the representations of a genocide enacted through reproductive regulation, women carry 
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the burden to reproduce the Tibetan collectivity.  However, they also emphasize the importance 
of education before marriage, suggesting that institutional life in exile has reframed the 
normative life course.  The woman born in Dharamsala seemed more willing to depart from this 
normative course, articulating other possibilities for the reproduction of the Tibetan people.
In the Conclusion, I summarize my findings and ask questions for possible future 
research based on the flare-up of political activism among Tibetans in India in recent months.  I  
attend to the ways that the performance of refugee subjectivity seems to be undergoing a 
heightened social drama.
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Chapter 1: Tracing the Path to India: Migration in Personal and Collective History
Introduction: The Social Drama of Migration
This chapter explores five women's narratives of migration, which demonstrate complex 
dynamics between shifting personal and social identities.  The specific geographic and social 
locations through which Tibetans pass as they move between Tibet and Dharamasala make 
migration a ritual undertaking; the act of migration is a repetitive social practice, often performed  
multiple times by the same individual (if not between Tibet and South Asia, at least between 
Tibetan settlements within South Asia), that is fraught with symbolic meaning.  The narratives in 
this chapter suggest that, as Tibetans migrate, they encounter changing physical and social 
landscapes which provoke a process of re-enculturation; novel encounters re-shape individuals' 
understanding of the world's order and their sense of place within this order, from kinship units, 
to exile societies, to the global community of nation-states.  Due to a continuous movement of 
Tibetans out of Tibet, a sort of infrastructure has developed around the borderlands of Tibet and 
Nepal, where human traffickers are paid to work as guides, relaying people across the divide 
between China, in which Chinese minorities are oppressed, and South Asia, in which Tibetan 
refugees are free.  In order to avoid arrest, Tibetans participate in this infrastructure, following 
predetermined pathways from greater Tibet, to Lhasa, to the border (most often, Dram, a small 
town located between Nepal and Tibet), to Kathmandu, to Dharamsala, by way of Delhi (see Fig. 
1).  Kathmandu, Dharamsala, and Delhi each host a Tibetan Refugee Reception Center, funded 
by the UNHCR and other international aid organizations,5 where refugees live for the first 
months following migration.  In order to gain legal residency in India, all refugees must pass 
5 The reception center in Dharamsala was recently renovated.  The new compound was inaugurated by the US  
Ambassador to India in February, 2011 because the renovations were funded by the US State Department, and 
the Tibet Fund, an American NGO.
35
through the reception center in Dharamsala, where they are issued a Registration Certificate 
(RC).  Regardless of where in India Tibetans are living, they must update their RCs each year at 
the Office of Foreign Registration in Dharamsala.6  
Once registered, refugees can proceed to their final destinations, which are determined 
according to age and occupation.  Regardless of whether or not they migrated with their families, 
children ages six to thirteen are sent to Mussoorie to live and study at the Tibetan Children's 
Village (TCV) or the Tibetan Homes Foundation (THF).  Children ages fourteen to eighteen are 
sent to another residential branch of the Tibetan Children's Village, TCV Suja, located about 150 
km southeast of Dharamsala.  Refugees ages eighteen to thirty-four who wish to receive secular 
education may live and matriculate for up to five years at the Tibetan Transit School (TTS) in 
Dharamsala.  Monks and nuns choose a monastery or nunnery to join, regardless of age.  And, 
the elderly and other adults who are not self-sufficient may live at an old-age home near the 
Dalai Lama's temple in Dharamsala.
The motivation to migrate in the first place seems to arise from the knowledge about the 
exile community that is disseminated and constructed through kinship networks and the media. 
“Hearing about” exiled Tibetans from friends and relatives, and “seeing” Tibetans in India on the 
television, constructs migration as a reasonable path on which to embark.  As Appadurai 
(2003[1990]) asserts, due to the circulation of people, media, technology, finances, and ideas, 
“the new  global cultural economy has to be seen as a complex, overlapping disjunctive order” in 
which “imagined worlds, that is, the multiple worlds which are constituted by the historically 
situated imaginations of persons and groups spread across the globe” are created, contested, and 
6 It was unclear as to whether or not Tibetans residing in Nepal were legally obligated to carry an RC.  It seemed 
that only Tibetans who traveled between India and Nepal possessed updated certificates.
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recreated (31).  My informants' geographic movements shed light on a specific moment of this 
disjunctive circulation, which can be traced through their reflections on migration.  Social  
rupture and the establishment of kinship ties in exile, along with changing political identities, as  
well as exposure to Dharamsala's “ethnoscapes” of foreign tourists, Indians, and Tibetans born 
and raised across the globe, lead to a radically re-imagined world in which my informants locate 
themselves by affirming their belonging to a unique Tibetan collectivity.
 The disjunctive forces that produce the desire to migrate seem to result from a tense 
cultural climate where notions of modernity and tradition are linked to programs of political  
oppression.  According to my informants, “the Chinese” attempt to legitimize intervention in  
Tibet through a discourse of development.  Propaganda paints for younger generations an image 
of a “traditional” Tibet mired in “lamaism” and the “backwardness” of rural life, while older 
generations, who “remember” Tibet before Chinese political involvement, discern systematic 
attempts to mold Tibetan public sentiment towards assimilation.  However, attempts at  
assimilation seem to have failed, since rural inhabitants lack opportunities for schooling, 
employment, and socioeconomic advancement; ultimately Chinese political propaganda remains  
disconnected from the realities of Tibetan life and does not inspire large-scale public support.  
Facing resistance to sinicization, the Chinese government employs blatant political oppression to  
enforce assimilation.7
Political oppression produces a dynamic in which the social rupture experienced upon 
migration becomes a means of asserting Tibetanness.  Through social disarticulation, migrants 
7 Much scholarly attention has been placed on China's assimilationist policies towards minorities (Gladney 1994, 
Mullaney & Anderson 2010, Rossabi 2004).  Many studies posit that, throughout history, different governing 
bodies in China have asserted control over vast territories in a scheme of concentric circles, where circles farther  
from the center represent peoples who are “wilder” and less assimilated (Wang Mingming 2010).  In these 
outlying areas, assimilationist policies and population transfers are forcibly enacted to demonstrate the Chinese 
state's territorial integrity.
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become articulated within the Tibetan collectivity, which exists openly only outside the physical  
territory of Tibet.  The ritual of migration, and its associated dynamics of disarticulation and 
articulation, can be contextualized according to the stages of Turner's social drama.  From my 
informants' accounts, Tibetans in Tibet seem to be immersed in a political climate where breach 
is inherent.  Chinese development projects interfere with the traditional subsistence strategies of  
farming and nomadism, driving families to seek financial support and educational opportunities 
for their children beyond their natal communities.  The domestic political economy thus places  
stress upon kinship relations even within Tibet, since individuals, especially youth and young 
adults, are displaced internally as they seek employment and education in urban centers. Crisis 
seems to arise when individuals become aware of opportunities in exile, and begin to question 
the social, economic, and political systems that mire Tibetan societies in constant opposition to  
the Chinese government.  My informants point, in particular, to the lack of access to quality 
education and religious repression, which they describe as deliberate attempts by the Chinese 
government to “ruin” the Tibetan people.
  From analysis of my informants' narratives, it thus seems that, upon entering the diaspora, 
Tibetan subjectivity shifts.  Whereas individuals were once “Chinese minorities,” they become 
“Tibetan refugees,” in both self- and bureaucratic identification.  Once emplaced in the diaspora 
with a new-found refugee identity, they are reintegrated into a Tibetan collectivity. 8 And yet, my 
informants also recognize the schism between their current refugee status and their previous 
identity in Tibet.  This schism seems to give rise to ubiquitous cultural anxieties about the future 
of Tibet and Tibetans.  Tibetans describe the collectivity as a population and culture under attack.  
8 Nowak (1984) provides an ethnographic examination of the ways that the exile government's education system 
contributes to such Tibetan migrant youth's changing identities.
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A discourse of “genocide,” both literal and “cultural,” enters Tibetan vocabulary, as individuals 
revise their understandings of personal and political history; they look back on their lives in 
Tibet, and contextualize their experiences within  a discourse of collective suffering.  Through 
migration, my informants seem to become conscious of a pan-Tibetan ethnic identity that has 
been systematically oppressed and forcibly dissociated from the physical territory of greater 
Tibet.
The following women's narratives demonstrate that certain events, individuals, and 
experiences figure as common symbols that arise in stories of the ritual of Tibetan migration. 
These common symbols point to “a system...of shared or consensual meaning” (Turner 1980: 
156) through which Tibetans seem to understand their present circumstances, as well as their 
personal and collective pasts.  A hermeneutic reading of these narratives warrants the adoption of 
Turner's concept of shared meaning, because specific “key symbols” seem to arise consistently 
and function similarly across diverse life stories.  In this way, I join Ortner's treatise (1973) to 
Turner's social drama in charting the semiotics of common symbols that women's narratives of 
migration reveal.
Personal History, Unified Flight: Stories of Migration
Dolma Dechen
Dolma Dechen and I met through a mutual friend, when she had come to McLeod Ganj on her 
day off from her studies at Education Support Trust, a nearby residential school providing two 
years of intensive English language instruction to twenty four graduates of the Tibetan Transit 
School and TCV Suja.  The three of us were eating lunch in a restaurant, and Dolma Dechen 
offered to speak with me when I explained that I was seeking to “learn about Tibet” by 
39
conducting interviews with Tibetan women.  As we finished our food, the monsoon clouds began 
to gather, and we rushed to my room to avoid the impending downpour.  As soon as we arrived, 
we sat down and Dolma Dechen began to “share her story” with me.  We sat in my room for 
more than five hours, and Dolma Dechen talked almost continuously.  Her narrative nonetheless 
remained highly focused, primarily describing the events surrounding her migration and her first 
years in India.  She wove these events into a plot of re-birth through the acquisition of 
knowledge.
Now twenty-six years old, Dolma Dechen migrated to India at age nineteen, from a 
village in Utzang.  Soon after we begin talking, Dolma Dechen says, “In Tibet, I didn't get the 
chance to go to school.  I was like a blind person.  I couldn't read and write, even in Tibetan.” 
This figuration of illiteracy as “blindness” correlates with a cultural logic that connects migration  
with opportunity through education; it exemplifies a narrative pattern in which the lack of 
educational opportunities in Tibet impels migration.  Representatives of institutions also 
demonstrate this narrative pattern.  Mingyur, the director of the Tibetan Reception Center in 
Dharamsala, explained that new arrivals migrate in response to collective concerns.  She stressed 
that “there are two reasons for coming to India: the first is to see the Dalai Lama and the second 
is to get proper modern and traditional education.”  As a spokesperson for the institution that 
hosts the most recent arrivals from Tibet, Mingyur presents an authoritative perspective on 
migration that plays a role in producing normative knowledge about the collective Tibetan 
experience.  She suggests that Tibetans choose to migrate based on specific, collective logics that 
align the prospect of education and “seeing” the Dalai Lama with the opportunity for a more 
fulfilling life.
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Dolma Dechen's narrative reflects Mingyur's representation of two common motivations 
for migration.  However, as she speaks, Dolma Dechen expresses her choice to migrate in a more 
nuanced manner, revealing gendered family relationships as a key force in her journey.  Dolma 
Dechen grew up in a polygamous household, in which her mother and aunt “shared” a husband. 
Her mother gave birth to four sons in addition to Dolma Dechen, one of whom passed away in 
infancy.  Her aunt gave birth to four sons and one daughter, and three of her sons survived past 
infancy.  Dolma Dechen's father died when she was twelve years old, after which her mother and 
aunt raised their children together.  Dolma Dechen consistently emphasizes the gendered social  
dynamics of her family when discussing the events leading up to her departure to India.  She says 
that, after telling her family she wanted to leave Tibet,
At first, my mother didn't agree because I am the only daughter and when I 
separated [before], she was sad...In Lhasa, I was a babysitter for two months 
after my father died...I was really homesick, I always cried at night, I couldn't 
sleep.  I didn't want to stay there...there were four people in the family: the 
mother and father and one daughter who got married and had a baby.  The 
daughter was really jealous.  Her husband taught me how to watch tv, wear 
clothes, and do housework, so she was jealous and I didn't know why...When we 
would get together and have dinner and breakfast, she said to her husband, “You 
are so bad, why are you spending time with her?” So, then, I really didn't want 
to stay there.  When someone dies, we do prayers after one month, one year...So, 
after one year, we did a big prayer for my father, and I lied to the family and told 
them that my mother told me to come home because I am the only daughter and 
the whole family needs to pray together.
Dolma Dechen asserts a unique connection with her mother, because she is the only daughter in 
the family.9  And, Dolma Dechen says that her employers viewed her presence as an incursion 
into the relationship between the child's mother and father because of the mother's “jealousy.” 
Her gender posed a threat to the family's integrity.  Therefore, Dolma Dechen's time in Lhasa 
9 From my informants' descriptions, it seems that families feel it is important to have both daughters and sons. 
According to my informants, male children who are the only sons also hold a privileged place within families.
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leaves her disarticulated; she is physically separated from her mother, and barred from 
acceptance into the family with whom she is living.  Dolma Dechen's gender heightens this 
disarticulation; she and her mother share an unusually strong bond because she is the only 
daughter.  But, her position as the only daughter also allows for her reintegration, because it 
provides an understandable justification for leaving Lhasa.
Dolma Dechen continues to describe the closeness she feels to her mother.  Dolma 
Dechen expresses the social rupture she experienced upon moving to Lhasa through statements 
about her mother's emotions.  She says,
When I got home, my mother was very happy.  She said that she always dreamt 
about me.  And, some dreams are true, you know.  She said that she dreamt that 
the woman took a knife and tried to beat me.  She said she felt so much regret 
because I was the only girl and I went there and had a difficult situation.
In this excerpt, Dolma Dechen socially situates herself through an idiom of female relationships. 
Dolma Dechen's narrative thus suggests that Tibetan refugee women interpret social connection 
and disconnection through the lens of gender, and that gender influences affective experiences of 
kinship in Tibetan society.
Also, it seems apparent that gender shapes Tibetan understandings of the population 
movements which perpetuate the diaspora.  For example, Dolma Dechen's experiences in Lhasa 
serve as a precursor to her migration to India.  She says,
So, at first when I told my mom I wanted to come to India, she felt very sad 
because she was lonely when I went to Lhasa.  When I was at home, I was 
always with her.  But, she looked at my life [through astrology from an oracle] 
and said if your future is good, you should go.  And, my future was good so she 
didn't stop me.
Dolma Dechen thus presents two parallel stories of migration—to Lhasa and to India.  She 
articulates both through her relationship with her mother, stressing her position as the only 
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daughter in the family.  Despite their absence in the normative migration narrative, affective  
kinship ties seem to drive patterns of movement.  Dolma Dechen's decision to migrate was not a 
simple response to a lack of educational opportunities, although she frames it in these terms at 
the outset of her narrative.  Rather, she seems to migrate due to a liminal state provoked by social  
rupture; her father dies, prompting her to move to Lhasa where she is separated from her mother 
and experiences social conflict.  And, she makes sense of this liminal state through the gendered 
relationships of her family, since her mother's emotions, dreams, and insights from the oracle 
drive her movements between her village, Lhasa, and India.
That Dolma Dechen's mother seeks assistance from the supernatural forces of dreams and 
oracles further demonstrates the strength of gendered kinship ties.  The employment of the 
supernatural as a means of gaining clarity about specific personal and interpersonal struggles 
forms part of a religious practice that shows congruence between Buddhist philosophies and 
Tibetan social experiences.  Tenzin Yangzom, a young nun living at the reception center whose 
narrative we will examine next, told me that seeking the advice of an oracle is “a custom, 
followed by Tibetans from all over Tibet.  It is part of a Buddhist way of thinking that when you 
are at your wit's end you consult the oracle.”  Among my informants, the practice seemed to 
occur only in the context of the nuclear family, most often with parents interpreting their own 
dreams or initiating contact with a Buddhist oracle.  Families seem to employ the supernatural as  
a tool to assess and ensure the safety of their kin.  And, my informants link the supernatural to 
Buddhist philosophy and institutions, since the oracles are monks and nuns, for the most part. 
Tibetan engagement with dreams and oracles points to the ways that Buddhism influences social 
life.  Since relationships among female family members are particularly strong, gender seems to 
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underly interpretations of liminality, including those that arise through Buddhist practices.
Dolma Dechen speaks to a narrative pattern in which kinship impels participation in the 
social drama of migration.  At the same time, gender seems to provide a lens through which 
women understand the social disarticulation intrinsic to exile. When reiterating the normative 
narrative of migration, Dolma Dechen at first obliterates kinship by employing opaque 
descriptions of “the Dalai Lama” and “education.”  Turner (1980) writes that, in analyzing the 
social drama, “certain entrenched features of a given society's social structure influence both the 
course of conduct in observable social events and the scenarios of its genres of cultural 
performance” (142).   Close readings of individual narratives, such as Dolma Dechen's, suggest 
that gender and kinship represent entrenched features, since they usher individuals into a liminal 
state.  Individuals then address this liminality by performing the ritual of migration.  And, in 
another genre of cultural performance, women narrate their experiences of migration through a 
normative framework that privileges education and the Dalai Lama—distinct features of the 
nation-state in exile—over the entrenched features of kinship and gender.
Dolma Dechen remains in a liminal state until she obtains official refugee status.  She 
explains,
I stayed in Nepal for five months.  There were lots of people, and it was very 
difficult—1800 people, I think.  And people just slept outside without a room. 
Then, the Nepali king and queen died.  They said that the family had been killed 
together.  Then, the Tibetan officers announced, “Maybe we can't go to 
Dharamsala, we might have to go back to Tibet.”  Then, that would be really 
bad, to have to go back after we had come all this way.  I was just waiting for 
what the officer would say, and finally he said we could go.  We needed a 
Registration Certificate, so the Tibetan government gave us a white book so we 
could get into India.
Political forces profoundly influence Dolma Dechen's journey.  Her travel to India is suspended 
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indefinitely, which provokes further uncertainty.  This uncertainty figures as a sort of rite of 
passage that ends when Dolma Dechen acquires refugee status in India.  The reception center's 
(lack of) facilities present a literal homelessness that highlighted the refugee's displacement.  
Once the political situation in Nepal stabilized, bureaucratic identification of the refugees could  
continue, and Dolma Dechen could proceed to her destination in India.
Education further solidifies Dolma Dechen's inclusion within Tibetan diaspora.  Dolma 
Dechen explains,
Then, I went to the Tibetan Transit School, because I was old [over age 
eighteen].  Like grandmother, grandfather, we went to TTS.  I didn't know how 
to write my name, even in Tibetan.  I didn't know Hindi, English, or Tibetan 
[writing], so I used to cry a lot...They said tomorrow morning after breakfast we 
will give you your uniform, and you have to sign your name when you get it.  I 
forgot how to write my name.  When I was in line, there was a big rock, and I 
took a small rock and just practiced writing my name.  But, I was very nervous 
and shy, and when I got to the front of the line, I totally forgot.  The headmaster 
looked at me and laughed and said 'don't be shy,' but I couldn't even speak, and 
my stomach was like a butterfly.
That Dolma Dechen marks her arrival in India by recounting how she learned to write her name 
underlines her transformed subjectivity.  The exile government identifies Dolma Dechen as a 
refugee-citizen, and she learns to identify herself by signing her name.  Also, Dolma Dechen 
experiences anxiety since she “forgot” how to write her name.  This process of learning and 
forgetting figures as a sort of rebirth, since Dolma Dechen is re-identified and newly emplaced 
within the social world of Dharamsala.  Exposure to linguistic and ethnic diversity also 
influences Dolma Dechen's world view.  She ends her narrative by explaining, “I didn't know 
that there were people who didn't speak Tibetan, who had different faces, until I was in Nepal. I 
thought that people spoke Tibetan in India, that all people were the same everywhere.”  After 
leaving Tibet, Dolma Dechen sees the Tibetan people as a unique collectivity.  Combined with 
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the acquisition of a refugee certificate, as described above, Dolma Dechen's realization of 
Tibetanness marks her entry into the self-aware diaspora.  
The production of a self-aware diaspora involves the creation of diasporic subjects.  Axel 
(2004) offers a general discussion of “diaspora” motivated by an analysis of Sikh nationalist 
movements, which are mobilized globally, primarily through the internet.  Axel speaks of 
“context” as a process of subject formation that “facilitates productions of both difference and 
'identity'” by shaping understandings of temporality (past, present, and future) and of space 
(creating a sense of displacement) (30).  In Dolma Dechen's narrative, she experiences a shift in 
“context” through interpersonal encounters with ethnic and linguistic difference, as well as 
through official avenues of political identification.  Dolma Dechen's narrative suggests that the 
shifting contexts in which Tibetan migrants find themselves speak to processes that are social 
and bureaucratic, individual and collective, local and global.
Therefore, Dolma Dechen's journey demonstrates her shifting subjectivity.  The notion of 
common Tibetan motivations for migration emerges in her story, but is complicated by her 
specific history of gendered family relationships.  Her family's circumstances following her 
father's death lead her to experience social displacement in migrating to Lhasa for work.  This 
displacement provides a precursor to her journey to India, which once again ruptures her 
relationship with her mother.  However, Dolma Dechen's experiences of liminality are resolved 
once she obtains diasporic citizenship, both literal and imagined.  Through the acquisition of a 
registration certificate, Dolma Dechen's refugee status is both symbolized and solidified.  And, it  
is only through encountering difference in the exile community that she understands Tibetans as 
a unique linguistic and ethnic group.  Ironically, Dolma Dechen affirms her Tibetan-ness through 
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articulations of social rupture.  As Cecilia Rothenberg (1999) found, in migrant Palestinian 
communities, “the weakening of family relations through the effects of distance can be so great 
that many immigrant Palestinians may shift from practicing those relations to imagining them” 
(38).  Tibetan women's narratives suggest a similar conceptual process.  In addition to 
continually (re)imagining kinship relations with those left behind in Tibet, women feel affective 
ties to members of a Tibetan imagined community upon enculturation in exile.  As will be further 
demonstrated throughout the thesis, it is imagined ties of kinship, strengthened in diaspora, that 
characterize the Tibetan nation.
Kalsang Tsomo
Kalsang Tsomo was the first woman I interviewed at the Tibetan Reception Center.  After my 
translator, Jangchup, and I met with Mingyur (the center's director), we walked outside into the 
hot sun, planning to go home and come back another day.  But, we passed Kalsang Tsomo sitting 
on a bench nearby, so I asked her if we could speak, and she agreed.  
Kalsang Tsomo had reached India only one month ago, leaving her husband and two 
teenage daughters behind at her home near Lhasa.  Kalsang Tsomo frames her narrative as a 
religious pilgrimage.  Kalsang Tsomo explains, 
My main aim is to see His Holiness, and to search for one of my relatives who  
came to India in 1959.  He is my mother's sister's son.  I heard that he is in  
South India, but I haven't been able to find out anything else yet...It's true that  
there is no freedom of religion in Tibet.  There are no problems for food or  
grain, everything is available.  The Chinese put pressure on other people, but  
not on me because I didn't protest...I knew a bit about the exile government,  
because I saw people in exile on tv.  I liked India very much because His  
Holiness has stayed here for so long, and many Tibetans are allowed to stay.  
So, for this, I came...I took a bus to Dram with some businessmen who looked  
after me.  Then, I walked for five days from Dram to Nepal.
Like Dolma Dechen, Kalsang Tsomo opens her narrative by reiterating one of the “two reasons” 
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that Tibetans migrate to India.  Kalsang Tsomo, however, also complicates the normative 
migration narrative, affirming that kinship, within families and the greater Tibetan community,  
drives movement between India and Tibet.  Kalsang Tsomo mentions that her nephew may be in 
India at the outset of her story, but does not speak of him again.  However, she repeatedly 
references the Dalai Lama, and states she wished to come to India because the country hosts the 
Dalai Lama and the exile community.  
In fact, the Dalai Lama and the exile community form part of an extended kin network in 
which my informants seem to locate themselves.  In her ethnography of Tibetan students in 
Dharamsala, Margaret Nowak (1984) explains that “lineage” connotes kinship bonds of marriage 
and consanguinity as well as affinity to lamas (93).  For example, Tibetan traditions of naming 
demonstrate kinship ties between religious leaders and their followers.  Tibetans have two given 
names, which are, for the most part, androgynous.10  Most often, Tibetan families request a name 
for their child, either shortly before birth or at a ceremony shortly after birth, from a lama.  The 
lama will then provide the child with two names, the first of which is his own.  The lama writes 
the names on a piece of sacred thread which Tibetans keep with them, frequently for their 
lifetime, as protection (I was told that the threads make one “bullet proof”). When parents cannot 
contact a lama, they choose the child's two names themselves, often based on the names' spiritual 
meanings as opposed to namesakes.  The practice of naming thus connects children to religious 
lineages (when named by a lama) and/or spiritual ideals, as opposed to the immediate kinship 
networks into which they are born.  In Dharamsala, these naming practices take place 
bureaucratically.  In order to receive a name from the Dalai Lama, parents must fill out a name 
10 The vast majority of names are androgynous, but some suggest femininity when used as a second name.  Those 
names that are exclusively female refer to goddesses, such as Dolma (sgrol ma ), a female Bodhisattva (tārā in 
Sanskrit).
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request form and return it to an office at the Dalai Lama's temple.  Once the paper work has been 
processed, the office sends to the parents the child's name along with the sacred thread.  In this 
system, babies acquire membership in the Buddhist exile community through bureaucratic 
identification; religious institutions officially determine personhood.  Naming practices therefore  
point to the ways that kinship networks extend beyond the family to include the Buddhist 
religious community.  And, the Dalai Lama's presence and the bureaucratic proceedings of his 
temple strengthen these networks in the exile community.
Religious motivation for migration can be understood in this context of overlapping 
networks of kinship and religion.  For example, as Kalsang Tsomo continues to speak, she 
ascribes to the Dalai Lama a sense of kinship, underwritten by notions of physical and spiritual 
lineage, through discussions of reincarnation.  She says, “Even though I am uneducated, I feel  
that having reincarnation is good because even if the highest lama dies, he can come back, so  
the Buddhist religion cannot die...I feel lucky being Buddhist because there is reincarnation.” 
Kalsang Tsomo connects the philosophy of reincarnation to the continuation of the Buddhist 
religion, and, by extension, of the Tibetan people.  That she feels “lucky being Buddhist” points 
to a personal identification with this process of renewal; because lineages of Buddhist leaders are 
sustained through reincarnation, the Tibetan people can survive.  This affinity to Buddhist 
leaders, including the Dalai Lama, suggests that Tibetan conceptions of lineage shape 
subjectivity, both in self- and official identification with a Buddhist collectivity.
Tibetan vocabulary further demonstrates the strength of Buddhist identity.  The Tibetan 
word for a Buddhist is nang pa, literally, an “insider.”  A few days after I  met Kalsang Tsomo for 
the first time, I returned to the reception center, along with Jangchup to assist with translation.  I  
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was speaking with a young woman from Amdo, and Kalsang Tsomo came by to listen.  When I 
asked the woman if she is nang pa, she did not understand the word.  Jangchup could not think 
of another word to translate “Buddhist,” but Kalsang Tsomo assured me, “she is nang pa.  All  
Tibetans are nang pa.  She didn't understand because Amdo has a different language.”  With this 
statement Kalsang Tsomo, links Buddhist identity to an intrinsic Tibetanness.  
It seems that congruence between individual and collective Tibetan subjectivity in turn 
propels migration, since explicit constructions of Tibetanness emanate from the exile community.  
For example, Kalsang Tsomo's narrative demonstrates that, in the Tibetan diaspora, mediascapes 
catalyze ethnoscapes, and ethnoscapes proliferate and are sustained along various kinship ties. 
As cited above, Kalsang Tsomo explains that she had heard that the Dalai Lama was in India and 
had seen exiled Tibetans on tv.  Another woman who had migrated alone told me that, before 
coming to India, she didn't know much about the Dalai Lama, but that she remembers her father 
listening to Radio Free Asia for news about him.  In a political climate in which discussing the 
Dalai Lama can lead to harassment and even imprisonment, it is through access to the media that  
many Tibetans come to know of him.  Media contribute to understandings of kinship, since they 
serve to sustain affiliation with the Dalai Lama across generations and to disseminate awareness 
of a Tibetan community beyond China.  These kinship networks, which include familial and 
religious lineages and affiliation with an imagined Tibetan collectivity, seem to inspire migration.
The Dalai Lama seems to provide a powerful motivation for migration because he figures 
as a summarizing symbol.  Juxtaposed with statements from other women, the importance 
Kalsang Tsomo places on the Dalai Lama comes into focus.  Tsewang, a young woman staying at 
the reception center, told me,
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I was fulfilled to see His Holiness.  I don't care about what happens after  
now.  It was my first time seeing His Holiness, and my eyes filled with  
tears because I believe in him.  In Tibet, we are not allowed to keep his  
photo or his blessings in our houses.
Tsewang uses her intense, emotional response upon seeing the Dalai Lama to express that 
meeting him was worth the suffering incurred through migration.  Additionally, like Kalsang 
Tsomo, Tsewang speaks of religious repression in China, suggesting that restrictions on religious 
practices strengthen the desire to migrate for the sake of Buddhism, since Tibetans cannot openly 
worship the Dalai Lama or receive the associated spiritual merits in Tibet.  
The Dalai Lama is the crux of political dynamics in Tibet.  His worship is forbidden in 
Tibet because he fled Chinese rule and established an exile society.  In a sense, therefore, he 
serves to summarize the Tibetan people in Chinese political discourse, since he exemplifies the 
political resistance associated with the diaspora.  The political conflict surrounding the Dalai  
Lama that has pushed Tibetans to journey to India for the sake of worship can be understood, in 
part, as a struggle between competing symbolic systems in which the Dalai Lama summarizes 
Tibetanness.  For Tibetan Buddhist practitioners, the Dalai Lama is an emotionally powerful,  
sacred symbol who exemplifies the Tibetan collectivity.  Given that the Chinese government 
enacts political intervention in Tibet primarily through sinicization programs, 11 the Dalai Lama's 
role as a summarizing symbol among Tibetans poses a political threat.  Chinese government 
policies have addressed this political threat by undermining the Dalai Lama's symbolic value by 
repressing worship practices.  Religious repression has, however, stimulated further migration, 
since media and kinship networks transmit “knowledge” of the Dalai Lama.  
As a catalyst for migration, the Dalai Lama thus influences both Tibetan patterns of 
11 For further information on China's minority policies, in particular, on the importance of assimilation into the 
Chinese body politic, see Gladney (1994) Mullaney and Anderson (2010), and Rossabi (2004).
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thought and of action.  Ortner writes that summarizing symbols “while primarily functioning to 
compound rather than sort out experience, are seen as both formulating basic orientations and 
implying...certain modes of action” (ibid: 1342).  The basic orientation formulated by the Dalai  
Lama (as symbol) involves Buddhist worship and the espousal of Buddhist philosophy in 
interpreting the social world.  The ways that Tibetans seem to interpret their social worlds 
through Buddhist philosophy include making sense of collective survival (that is, reproduction 
and cultural renewal) through forces such as reincarnation.  And, this line of interpretation 
implies that becoming part of the Tibetan collectivity is both spiritually desirable, and can be 
achieved by accessing religious freedom in India.  Migration therefore figures as a mode of 
action adapted to the patterns of thought built around the Dalai Lama as a summarizing symbol.
Symbols are, however, polysemic and become compressed in the dominant migration 
narrative—that is, the multiple meanings that individuals actively invoke or subtly indicate 
become overruled by certain icons that seem to serve a clear-cut, often singular, purpose in 
narratives.  In the dominant migration narrative, the Dalai Lama serves solely as a motivating 
factor for migration.  However, especially in the context of strict control of the Dalai Lama's 
image in Tibet, the Dalai Lama can carry vastly different connotations for the same individuals,  
as they move between social worlds in Tibet and in exile.  In addition to expressing reverence for 
the Dalai Lama, Kalsang Tsomo emphasizes her immediate kinship relations with her daughters. 
She reveals that conceptual connections between suffering and gender underlie her religious 
convictions.  Kalsang Tsomo says,
I want to stay in India for two more years.  I need the blessing of His Holiness  
and I want to get the Kalachakra initiation12 at Bodhgaya...I hoped to take my 
12 Kalsang Tsomo referred to this religious practice by its Tibetan name (dus kyi 'khor lo), but Jangchup translated 
it in the Sanskrit.  I  frequently encountered the  practice of translating Tibetan religious terms into a Sanskrit 
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daughters here to study in the Tibetan Children's Village under His Holiness,  
but it is very difficult because if they are caught, the Chinese army will beat  
them very badly.  They cannot take the same suffering as me.
Kalsang Tsomo clarifies the ways that Tibetan women discuss the experience of social 
displacement through idioms of gender and kinship.  Dolma Dechen expressed social suffering, 
due to ruptured kinship ties, through her relationship with her mother.  Kalsang Tsomo likewise 
makes sense of her social dislocation by discussing her daughters.  Kalsang Tsomo 
communicates the sacrificial nature of her journey—that is, she bolsters her religious motivations 
for migration—through her description of ruptured kinship ties.
The suffering that characterizes Tibetan migration seems to include both the pain 
experienced during the journey as well as social dislocation.  Given that migration seems to 
present a mode of action implied by Tibetan thought, suffering marks collective Tibetan 
experience.  Tibetans told me that the experience of suffering is spiritually productive.  To suffer 
increases one's merits, by serving as a vehicle through which one lives out the karma of previous 
transgressions (of this life or of past lives).  In describing the inadequacy of the human rights 
framework in addressing Tibetan suffering, Adams (1998) explains, 
Suffering is often depicted as a uniform experience among Tibetans...because it 
is said that all Tibetans are, by cultural identity, religious...It is thus not 
surprising that suffering is often depicted by Tibetans in Buddhist terms, because 
Buddhism has formed a foundation for Tibetan culture despite wide variation in 
lay religious knowledge and practice [81].
Contextualizing Kalsang Tsomo's sacrificial narrative within this scholarship on Buddhist 
thought, it seems that suffering encourages migration as a spiritual path.  However, Kalsang 
Tsomo's discussion of her daughter's (potential) suffering also reveals subtleties within Buddhist 
understandings of gender which are obliterated in the normative narrative of religious 
equivalent when Tibetans communicated with English speakers.
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pilgrimage.  Kalsang Tsomo's protection of her daughters can be contextualized within Tibetan 
understandings of gender difference.  Tibetans commonly explained what they considered to be 
gendered migration patterns by invoking the idea that women can “take” less suffering than men. 
Mingyur told me,
More men than women come to India because the journey is very difficult. They 
have to hide in the day time in the forest, and they often come during the winter 
because the Chinese police hesitate to look everywhere then.
Likewise, a male student at the Tibetan Transit School explained, “We say, in our culture, that if  
a boy and a girl are faced with the same problem, the girl will be afraid but the boy will think of  
how to solve the problem.  Maybe that is why more men come [to India].”  These statements, 
suggesting that women are physically and mentally weaker than men, mirror broader notions of 
gender in Tibetan Buddhism.  In spiritual hierarchies of reincarnation, women embody a lower 
incarnation than men.  This hierarchy seems to play out in descriptions of the self, as well as in 
everyday interpersonal interactions.  A woman living near Norbulinka, for example, told me that 
she “will be a man” in her next life, because “women's minds and bodies are different.”13 
Similarly, when women openly express emotion, men frequently explain that they behave this 
way because they “have small hearts” (sems chung chung).14  Since Buddhist thought implies 
migration as a logical response to religious repression in Tibet, it follows that the enactment of 
13 Similar sentiments are described in Charlene Makley's (2005) study on attitudes towards nuns in Amdo.  She 
writes, “the body of a particular rebirth critically influences the capacities of the mind to learn during that  
lifetime, and therefore to master the body and materiality in general through ritual power...the female body was 
still widely seen to be a lower rebirth, associated with more suffering, and the result of an inadequate 
accumulation of merit from past lifetimes” (p. 269).
14 The word chung chung can mean both small and weak.  Additionally, it is worth noting that Robert Desjarlais 
(1992) found the same conceptual connections between gender, emotion, and sems among the ethnically Tibetan 
Yolmo people in Nepal.  He explains, “the 'bigger' the sems, the stronger, more courageous, and less overtly 
emotional a person is.  A strong sems is one that can contain or 'hold' emotions within.  Consequently, as 
children, women, and the elderly are believed to have smaller [sems] than the average adult male, they are said to 
be more emotional and frighten more easily” (56).  Also, sems shares the metaphorical but not literal meaning of 
the English “heart,” as the seat of emotions.  But, it can also refer to states of mind (such as whether or not an 
individual is mentally present) and is translated by some, including Desjarlais, as “heartmind.” 
54
migration is also patterned according to Buddhist philosophies which posit essentialized gender 
difference.   Kalsang Tsomo's narrative demonstrates that the Dalai Lama's role in the dominant 
migration narrative summarizes his place within Tibetan social cosmology, but eclipses nuances 
of kinship and gender that shape lay Buddhism into a driving force for migration.
Tenzin Yangzom
A few days after meeting Kalsang Tsomo, I return to the reception center with my translator, 
Tenzin Tsering.  With the permission of the director, we enter the women's dormitory, a storied 
concrete block building.  At first, we meet no one.  Then, we see a girl of about ten years old 
playing in the hall, with purple dots on her face, which I thought she had colored in ink.  We ask 
if any women are in the building, and she tells us a nun is resting in a room down the hall.  She 
skips ahead of us, leading the way.  In the dormitory room, we find a sole young woman wearing 
a nun's robes who agrees to speak with us.  Her face is covered with the same purple dots as the 
girl.  She introduces herself as Tenzin Yangzom, explaining that she arrived at the reception 
center only one month ago.  She continues to speak, telling us that she is twenty-two years old 
and, before leaving Tibet, she had lived only in rural Utzang.
Like Kalsang Tsomo, Tenzin Yangzom reiterates that individuals identify with a unique 
Tibetan collectivity through experiences of suffering.  She locates these experiences within the 
realms of gender and religion.  Tenzin Yangzom says,
In my life, there was not much of a problem of what to eat.  I lived on a farm, so  
there was always enough.  But, I didn't have freedom of religion.  I was a nun  
but I couldn't live in a nunnery because the Chinese didn't give me the  
necessary documents.  I went to the nunnery each day to study and came back at  
night...There used to be more nuns, but the government isn't giving documents  
anymore.  Earlier, there was no need for documents, but then the Chinese made  
a law that you needed documents to live in a nunnery.  Then, they stopped  
giving out the documents.  You had to go to Shigatze [the administrative center  
55
of the district] and then Lhasa to get the paperwork, and there was so much  
bureaucracy.  You had to know someone who worked in one of the offices to get  
the paperwork.
This narrative fragment can be understood in the context of competing discourses on Chinese 
intervention in Tibet.  The first two sentences refute Chinese moral claims to state presence in 
Tibet, which assert that the government is liberating the Tibetan people from poverty and under-
development.  Many narratives mirrored these subtle refutations, describing subsistence in their 
opening statements.  Kalsang Tsomo, for example, had said, “There are no problems for food or 
grain, everything is available.”  Although not speaking of subsistence, Mingyur also described 
Tibet in a manner meant to discredit the Chinese government's portrayal of their interventionist  
activities.  She told me, “there were armed forces in Tibet who were carrying a banner on a truck 
that said, 'We came to respect the Tibetan people.  The army said that, right there with their  
guns.”  These statements present a sort of counter-narrative to Chinese development discourse, at 
the same time, articulating Tibetan nationalist claims to realign the Tibetan people with the  
Tibetan homeland.
Tenzin Yangzom explains that practicing Buddhism has alleviated suffering and 
disability, serving as a form of healing.  She continues, 
I became a nun three years ago.  I had wanted to be a nun since I was very  
young.  When I was younger, I was blind, and I went to a woman oracle with my  
family.  This woman said that I had to pray and that there were many struggles  
ahead, but that I should study and pray to overcome them.  After this, I started  
praying.  Even before that, I had really liked prayers and Buddhism, so when  
the oracle said this, I was happy...Listening to the advice that I should study  
Buddhism has been very helpful, even though I have only been learning  
mantras.  I am physically and mentally intact, and my eyesight got much better,  
and all my misfortunes have been dealt with.
As in Dolma Dechen's narrative, blindness (in this case literal) marks a state of deficiency, used 
56
to describe everyday tensions in Tibet that arise from the struggles of rural life.  Tenzin Yangzom 
connects eyesight to physical and mental integrity achieved through religious practice.  She has 
managed her personal struggles and suffering (“misfortunes”) through this holistic integrity.  For 
Dolma Dechen, accessing secular education provided a sense of personal fulfillment that 
alleviated her figurative blindness.  For Tenzin Yangzom, studying Buddhism is a source of 
physical healing that has enhanced her ability to tolerate suffering.  In this manner, women's 
stories echo the normative migration narrative's central concern with, in Mingyur's words, 
“modern and traditional education.”
Tenzin Yangzom continues to speak of religious repression.  She explains,
I went to the nunnery each day to study and came back at night...If you were  
wearing robes, the Chinese would ask you what monastery you live in and  
where your documents are, so I had to change my clothes when I went out from  
the monastery...It took me years and years, I kept telling my parents I had to go  
somewhere where I could practice the Dharma.  I told them I am like an idiot if  
I just stayed there, wearing the robes.
Bureaucratic restrictions interfered with Tenzin Yangzom's daily life, since her identity as a nun 
was incompatible with her official identification.  In Tibet, it is illegal to “be” a nun without  
bureaucratic identification provided by the Chinese government.  These identification laws 
dissociated Tenzin Yangzom from her nunhood, since she had to live with her family and change 
in and out of her nun's robes rather than living in the monastery as a nun.  Axel (2004) has 
studied the ways that the “visible identity” of the amritdhari (a Sikh who has been initiated into 
the Khalsa, a Sikh religious order), marked by religiously prescribed dress and appearance, 
“constitute[s] an individual as a representative—and the body as a representation—of a Sikh 
collectivity” (33).  The androgynous red robes and shaved heads of Tibetan (dge lugs pa) monks 
and nuns constitute a similar visible identity, which aligns individuals with the collectivity  
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through their embodied representation of Tibetanness.  Chinese bureaucratic restraints therefore 
directly undermine Tenzin Yangzom's identity, both personal and collective. She seems to view 
migrating to India as the only means of legitimizing her religious identity.
However, Tenzin Yangzom's family complicates her decision to migrate.  As explained 
above, Tenzin Yangzom spent many years discussing migration with her family.  She says,
My family had to tell the Chinese that I went to Lhasa, and that they didn't know  
exactly where I was.  It wasn't only that they were worried that I am a woman.  
They sent my brother with me, and I had a document saying that I could travel  
to the border, but I didn't want to use the document because it would be  
registered that I had reached the Nepali border and had not come back.  I spent  
an entire day in the car, and I traveled at night.  My brother gave his  
thumbprints when we reached the check points, because you need a pass  
wherever you go, but I just stayed in the car.  In Shang, I met up with the ten-
year old girl who is staying at the reception center now.  She came alone,  
without her family, like me.  On the journey, the physical pain was nothing  
compared to the constant fear that I would fail, that I would be put in prison  
and my family, too, that they would suffer because of this act.  We had to walk  
all day and we were very tired.  But, this we could bear.  The mental trauma was  
very difficult.
Like Kalsang Tsomo and Dolma Dechen, Tenzin Yangzom reveals the role of gender and 
suffering in family decisions surrounding migration.  Tenzin Yangzom explains that her family is 
fearful because she is female.  And yet, Tenzin Yangzom does not focus on gender to the same 
extent as Kalsang Tsomo and Dolma Dechen.  Rather, she seems to take for granted additional 
risk posed to females migrants (“it wasn't only...”).  Tenzin Yangzom portrays her fears for her 
family as her greatest source of suffering.  Tenzin Yangzom therefore subsumes issues of gender 
under other forms of suffering, a pattern seen across Tibetan women's narratives.
Since women frequently hint at, but mostly gloss over, issues of gender that arise in their 
narratives, gender seems to form a sort of “hidden social infrastructure” (Turner 1980: 154) in 
the social drama of migration.  As mentioned above, Buddhist philosophy posits essentialized 
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gender difference founded on notions of biological determinism.  As Makley (2005) explains, 
“the basis for the lower status of the female body [is] the assumption that the female body, 
burdened by such physiological suffering as menstruation and childbirth,  more tightly 
circumscribes the mind than a male body” (269).  However, even biological sex is fluid in 
Tibetan Buddhist cosmology.  Especially shortly after birth, an individual's sex may literally 
switch from male to female.  Women from a variety of backgrounds, including college-educated 
women born in India, told me that it is not uncommon for a baby's sex to change, but that they 
“don't really know how this process takes place.”15  Monastic culture, which dissociates 
individuals from their reproductive capacities, further complicates understandings of sex and 
gender.  Both monks and nuns seem to renounce gender when entering monasteries, since, for 
example, there is no colloquial term that refers to women, including nuns, or men, including 
monks (ibid: 273).  However, monks are nonetheless more highly respected than nuns, mirroring 
the gendered hierarchy of the secular social world.  Cultural conceptions of sex and gender are 
therefore rife with contradictions that my informants do not seem to overtly describe  (or 
recognize) in their narratives.
These contradictions, however, play out in in stories of migration.  Both Tibetan men and 
women with whom I spoke invoke Buddhist philosophies and practices of (seeming) gender 
egalitarianism when considering issues of violence.  Despite my observations, a female nurse 
told me that domestic violence simply “doesn't happen” in Tibetan families because “Tibetans 
are Buddhists, so they are non-violent.”  Individuals seem willing to provide examples of cross-
cultural gendered violence, perpetrated by Indian or Chinese men against Tibetan women. 
15 Craig (2009) notes that Tibetan medical texts document the possibility of sex change during fetal development 
(152).
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Although women raise such examples in migration narratives, they do so covertly.  For example, 
my female informants speak of rape as “getting pregnant on the way to India,” and say that it is 
unsafe to travel without men.  Both Kalsang Tsomo and Tenzin Yangzom implicitly discuss 
gendered violence in this manner, suggesting that women risk more suffering than men through 
migration.  The possibility of gendered suffering seems to constrain women's travels, leading to a 
gendered performance of the Tibetan social drama of migration.
Tenzin Yangzom has finished her narrative.  As Tenzin Tsering and I get ready to leave, 
we pass back through the compound's first building, in which the director's office is located.  In 
the entryway, I notice for the first time bulletin boards decorated with photographs of famished 
bodies, frostbitten toes, and faces pock-marked with purple dots.  Captions explain in English the 
various ailments, which were contracted during the journey from Tibet to Dharamsala.  The 
images of faces covered in the purple dots are labeled “chicken pox.”  The bulletin boards attest  
to the physical suffering undergone during migration from Tibet to India.  And, as suggested by 
their location in the entryway of the main building and their English captions, the bulletin boards  
serve as a display of somatic suffering intended for a foreign audience.  Through such displays, 
bodily suffering offers a pictorial narrative of the Tibetan experience of migration.  In her illness, 
Tenzin Yangzom embodies collective suffering that also arises in visual narrative.  As will be 
further described in Chapter Two, accounts of bodily suffering form another facet of collective 
Tibetan experience, and provide a channel through which individuals represent the Tibetan 
imagined community to an international audience.
Imagined Presents, Projected Pasts: The “Mythico-History” of Migration
The stories of Dolma Dechen, Kalsang Tsomo, and Tenzin Yangzom have demonstrated the ways 
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that Tibetan women align themselves with a normative narrative of migration, in which 
education and the Dalai Lama figure as the two guiding forces of a united Tibetan ethnoscape.  In 
these narratives, “the Chinese” have precipitated both the lack of educational opportunities and 
religious repression.  As Tibetan women express their personal history,  they portray specific 
forms of Chinese oppression as common, summarizing experiences of the Tibetan imagined 
community that impel migration.  At the same time, the complexity of each narrative reveals  
patterns of discord with normative, authoritative statements about migration.  Women's narratives 
reveal connections between kinship, religion, and gender that also seem to shape the cultural 
logics surrounding the decision to migrate.
Tibetan women in Dharamsala reflect upon their migration with reference to the 
collective suffering of the Tibetan people.  As individuals become enculturated within a self-
aware diaspora, they come to associate Tibetan political history with collective suffering.  
According to my informants, in Tibet, the concept of a Tibetan nation is generational; their  
parents and grandparents “know about Tibet,” but, before migrating, they, personally, did not. 
When reaching the exile community, however, individuals come into contact with historical  
knowledge that produces a national identity.  And, my informants seem to conflate their personal 
national identities with those of older generations including those who stayed behind in Tibet.  
This dynamic, in which present historical knowledge about the Tibetan nation is projected into 
the past, infiltrates narrative expressions. 
My informants employ key symbols to communicate this historical knowledge.  For 
example, many mentioned the Tibetan flag, remarking that seeing the Tibetan flag at the 
reception center in Kathmandu was the first time they understood Tibet as a country.  A young 
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man from Amdo explained to me, “When I got to Kathmandu, I saw the American flag and the 
Tibetan flag next to it, and I had to ask what country that flag belonged to.  Then, I realized that 
Tibet is a country.”  Many informants recounted an identical scenario, including the juxtaposition 
of the Tibetan flag and the American flag, and the fact that the American flag was immediately  
recognizable but the Tibetan flag was not.  From the outset of their enculturation, migrants thus 
encounter the portrayal of Tibet and America as allies.  This Tibetan-American alliance seems to  
profoundly shape Tibetans' experiences in a world order of nation-states.  
Speakers likewise employ specific historical moments as key symbols.  These moments 
almost always involve conflict with China, and serve to generate a sort of diasporic national 
history through which individuals seem to interpret present nationalist sentiment in Dharamsala. 
My informants consistently mention three Tibetan uprisings: the Lhasa uprising in 1959 (see p. 
19), the international protests surrounding the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, and ongoing 
unrest at the Kirti Monastery in Amdo, beginning in March 2011 and continuing through the 
ethnographic present.  Axel (2004) explains that, in the study of diasporas such key historical 
moments constitute a sort of “diasporic archive,” generated by “collecting 'facts' from the 
homeland to help explain the peculiar problems of a dispersed population” (29).  As students of 
diaspora, “we come to understand diaspora as something objectively present in the world today 
with regard to something else in the past...we hope to find in the present a repository of an 
authoritative knowledge of the past” (ibid: 28-29).  Axel argues that scholarship on diaspora 
delineates populations and homelands, and seeks to align the two through historical analyses. 
From my informants' statements, it seems that a similar process of knowledge production takes 
place within the Tibetan diaspora. Tibetans seem to employ history as a means of solidifying a 
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Tibetan imagined community.  In her ethnographic study of life in a Burundian refugee camp, 
Malkki (1990) describes the “mythico-history” as a historical narrative that “went far beyond 
accurate recording.  It represented not only a description of the past, nor even merely an 
evaluation of the past, but a subversive recasting and reinterpretation of it in fundamentally 
moral, categorical terms” (37).  Tibetan accounts of the diaspora's formation seem to present a 
similar process of historical reinterpretation.  My informants employ binary oppositions between 
the “Tibetan” and the “Chinese” to order political history (from specific moments in a diasporic  
archive) in a manner that morally legitimates Tibetan claims to realign the diasporic population  
with the homeland.  By employing historical moments as key symbols, Tibetans in Dharamsala 
seem to construct a mythico-history.
I turn, now, to two women's performances of Tibetan diasporic subjectivity.  These 
women employ the mythico-history to set the scene of exilic life.  Malkki (1990) found that, in 
the Burundian mythico-history, “the personal and collective fused into one dynamic discourse 
that was recorded from different persons and in varying contexts.  The impassioned, even 
relentless, preoccupation with this particular form of history presented itself as a social fact to be 
explained” (37).  The Tibetan diaspora, with its locus in Dharamsala, manifests a similar 
discursive process in which a common historical narrative provides a framework through which 
Tibetan subjects perform personal history.  This section examines the fact that, despite emphasis 
on dual motivations for migration that are temporally specific (the Dalai Lama's presence, and 
the educational infrastructure that has been built by the government in exile over the past four 
decades), Tibetan migrants tie their life histories to a single imagined ethnoscape beginning with 
the Dalai Lama's expulsion from Tibet.
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Jangchup
Jangchup and I met by chance in a coffee shop where a mutual friend, Metok, works.  We began 
to talk, and, after learning that she is studying English in college, I asked if she would help me 
with translation.  After agreeing to help me interview women who do not speak English, she also 
offered to share with me her own life story.  She began to speak immediately, as Metok sat 
nearby.
Jangchup is twenty-two years old, with two older sisters and another sibling who recently 
passed away.  She was born near Khadtze, Kham, in the same village as Metok, and came to 
India when she was nine years old.  Jangchup is one of the few women with whom I spoke who 
had migrated as a child.  Her life story, therefore, carries important implications for an 
examination of personal and social memory in the narration of the mythico-history because she 
grew up, without her family, in the care of an educational institution run by the exile 
government.  She explains,
I came to India with Metok by walking.  My parents didn't come, and I haven't 
seen my parents since 1998 when I left.  My parents sent me because in Tibet, 
we don't have the opportunity to study, especially Tibetan and English. 
Everything is in Chinese.  Also, maybe my parents found it difficult for me to 
stay with them.  We went from Kham to Lhasa in a bus, and then my father 
arranged our journey with a man who was the leader.  We came with him, we 
took things to eat and some clothes.  There were other people with us, and they 
gave me a lot of help.  We had to walk in the mornings and at night and sleep 
during the day.  I wanted to sleep, but the way was very snowy, so sometimes I 
just fell asleep on the snow and the leader would carry me...I thought India was 
a nice place, better than Tibet, but I found that it is not so nice.  Because, I 
forget much about my parents...It is not so clean, and I don't have my parents' 
love.  Everything is really strange here, so I think Tibet is much better for me.
Jangchup expresses a sense of displacement in her host country that hints at the moral 
underpinnings of her narration.  She says that India did not meet her expectations (“it is not so 
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nice”), explaining that it is in Tibet that she would feel more in place (“Tibet is better for me”).  
Additionally,  Jangchup communicates the moral importance of connecting the Tibetan people 
with the Tibetan homeland through a discussion of the social rupture she experienced upon 
leaving her family.  Again, we see that kinship seems to provide a forum for making sense of 
diasporic experience.  In this case, Janchup begins to articulate a mythico-history through the 
suffering inherent to the experience of migration.  And, she expresses this suffering through the 
idiom of kinship.
Jangchup demonstrates a cultural concern with perpetuating a mythico-history beyond the 
Tibetan community.  She explains that she is going to college in Chennai on a scholarship from 
the Tibetan government, and that it was difficult to move from the Dharamsala area, where she 
grew up at the Tibetan Children's Village, to South India.  She says of her classmates in Chennai,
They don't know much English, and the first time they met us, they called us 
Chinese because they had never seen our faces.  We talked about Tibet in class, 
how Tibet looks, differences between Tibet and India, and about how China 
tortured Tibet and how people suffered under the Chinese.  I have never been to 
Tibet, but we used to get information from Tibet and we know how people are 
suffering at the Kirti Monastery.  All this news we got.  We heard much about 
how Tibetan people suffer.
This statement demonstrates a narrative pattern in which Tibetans express their personal 
identities by defining the Tibetan nation.  Jangchup addresses a personal experience of social 
misunderstanding through a moral ordering of Tibetan history; when her classmates mistook her 
for Chinese, she clarified her identity with reference to the nation, differentiating Tibet from 
China and India.  This differentiation serves to accentuate Jangchup's displacement.  In 
recounting this personal sense of being out of place in the host country, Tibetans (like Jangchup) 
highlight the necessity of returning to Tibet if their suffering is to be alleviated.
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Jangchup's statement also demonstrates that place and time are conflated in the moral 
ordering of Tibetan history.  She says that she has never been to Tibet, although she was born in 
Kham and lived there for nine years.  And, she uses the example of the Kirti monastery, a site of 
ongoing political unrest in Kham beginning in March 2011, to explain the suffering of the 
Tibetan people, present and past.  Axel (2004) notes a similar dynamic in Sikh nationalist 
discourses, which defines “Sikh anteriority and a Sikh futurity, in terms of the priority of present 
violence” (44).  Tibetan narratives, as exemplified by Jangchup's, follow a similar discursive 
pattern, projecting present examples of political oppression into both the past and future.  This 
temporal omniscience frames suffering as a characteristic state of the Tibetan people resulting 
from a protracted conflict in the homeland.  Jangchup's conflation of past and present also serves 
to render the Tibetan situation comprehensible to a broad public, both in India and abroad. 
International media have documented the protests at the Kirti Monastery, and the exile 
community in Dharamsala held multiple vigils during my stay.  That Jangchup draws on an 
immediate example of Tibetan suffering (to which the ethnographer can relate) to communicate a  
continuous state of suffering demonstrates a recurring pattern of making sense of the present 
through collective political history; speakers fit present experiences into the mythico-history's  
moral ordering, in a manner that attempts to “give witness”16 to Tibetan suffering.
Additionally, that Jangchup explains Tibetan history through an idiom of torture clarifies 
the relationship between suffering and the Tibetan collective identity.  In their narratives, Tibetan  
women employ “torture” both figuratively and literally, at times conforming to the concept's  
definition in international human rights discourse, at others, using it as a vehicle to communicate  
16 Politically active Tibetans repeatedly employed this phrase when they explained to me their intentions in 
participating in demonstrations and producing media (newspapers, reports, documentaries, and blog entries) 
about Tibet.
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the broad injustices that characterize Tibetan existence, in both Tibet and in the diaspora.  
Jangchup's personal identification with the nation—that is, the ways that she aligns the self with 
the Tibetan mythico-history—becomes more clear, as she speaks of “Tibet,” “China,” and “how 
people suffered,” interchangeably.  Jangchup demonstrates the ways that linguistic performances 
of collective suffering unite the nation, the people, and the individual.
However, Jangchup also complicates her own temporal extension of collective suffering. 
Reiterating the common history of the Tibetan exodus, I ask whether or not Tibetans migrate 
today for the same reasons as in 1959.  Jangchup responds,
They continue to come and the reason is that they can't survive under the 
torture.  For us, our parents sent us for the betterment of our future.  But, many 
elders come because they don't want to die under China.  And, these days, many 
people know about Tibet.  All Tibetan people are scattered.  Especially in India, 
they will know about Tibet...[But] Tamil girls don't know about Tibet.  We tell 
them that we are not Chinese, Mani Puri, Naga, that Tibet is the roof of the 
world, between Nepal and China.  I'm proud to be Tibetan, because everyone 
loves their own country.  I get worried when Tibetans are suffering in Tibet and 
in exile.  I love Tibet.  I love the Tibetan people and nation.
In this statement, Jangchup moves between political rhetoric, in her allegiance to the Tibetan 
nation, and historical knowledge, in repeatedly mentioning collective Tibetan suffering.  And, 
Jangchup's statements about those who “know” or “don't know” about Tibet seem to further join 
individual identity to national allegiance.  Additionally, Jangchup's consistent use of plural  
pronouns highlights the priority that Tibetans give to collective identity, despite generational and 
regional divides that have been re-crafted in exile.  For example, regional social divisions seem 
to have become less salient in exile,17 but two generations of Tibetans have been born in India, 
17 That is, Tibetans and the government in exile seem to actively down-play regionalism.  For example, Nowak 
(1984) describes the ways that by conducting language instruction in the Central Tibetan dialect, and 
incorporating a sort of “pan-Tibetan ideology” through textbooks and coursework, the exile government's 
schools “are consciously setting out to produce a more homogenous younger generation who are learning to put 
their national identity ahead of regional loyalties” (65).
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creating the distinction between “old” (gzhas chigs) and “new” (gsa'a a'g.yor) migrants. 
Nonetheless, as cited above, Jangchup says that her Tamil classmates had never seen “our faces,” 
and that, in response, “we tell them that we are not Chinese.”  Likewise, one woman staying at 
the reception center told me, “Maybe all Tibetans have the same heart, so maybe [earlier  
migrants] came for the same reasons as us.”  The notion that Tibetans “have the same heart” 
mirrors Jangchup's description of Tibetan faces; both statements essentialize collective identity,  
Jangchup's through biology and the other woman's through shared affect.  And yet, Jangchup 
also articulates a tension between the normative narrative of  present motivations for migration 
and the mythico-history of the Tibetan diaspora.  She positions her parents' reasons for sending 
her to Tibet against the suffering perpetrated by China.  
This tension between the logics driving old and new migration plays out socially, as well 
as discursively.  One day, I was waiting for the bus to TTS.  A man sat down next to me, asking 
where I was going.  When I told him I was going to TTS, he launched into a discussion about the 
problems that new arrivals from Tibet cause in Dharamsala.  I looked apprehensively towards a 
group of Tibetan girls, clearly TTS students, mingling in a shop across the street, but the man 
kept on speaking, somewhat vehemently.  He told me, 
These new-comers are not like my parents, who came to India with nothing and 
made something of their lives by working on the roads and chose to survive. 
The new arrivals drink, they don't know how to...cope with Indian society, they 
just come here and get sent to a school where they are taken care of, and then 
they [graduate] and make all these problems.
From this statement, I perceived that a moral ordering of history had been extended to the social  
dynamics of the exile community.  The man's description of his parents' work on the roads forms 
part of the common history of the diaspora, which my informants born in exile reiterate, since 
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many of the first migrants were employed on construction projects in the Indian Himalayan 
towns of Dharamsala, Manali, and Mussoorie.  This man suggests that he considers the suffering 
of these earlier migrants to be greater than that of the new-comers.  He positions earlier 
generations' reasons for migrating as morally superior, by virtue of their superior suffering.  The 
man thus suggests that suffering produces social merit.  Following this line of interpretation, I 
commented that Tibetan new-comers must have experienced some hardship in Tibet, if they were 
willing to cross the Himalayas and risk arrest to reach India.  The man exclaimed, “Oh! That is 
not something that you should at all be concerned about!  Everyone says, 'I walked across the 
mountains,' but it's really nothing major.  No problem.”  That the man discounts the new-comers' 
narratives of migration further highlights a moral hierarchy of suffering that reflects a basic 
social division in the exile community.  
The man's opposition of his parents' generation with the new-comers can be understood 
as a sort of collective cognitive dissonance within the diaspora.  Speakers highlight the notion of 
the collective suffering of the Tibetan people. And yet, the Tibetan community in diaspora (in 
Dharamsala, in particular, since it hosts most of the schools for migrants as well as the main 
reception center) faces fundamental social differences which arise from the stark contrasts 
between political and cultural life in India and in Tibet.  In writing of the common features of 
diasporas, Chakrabarty (1998) asserts that “'generation'...remains a key organizing 
principle...because diasporas are internally differentiated around constellations of shared 
memories” (472).  In the case of Dharamsala, diverse memories of migration at different 
historical moments shape this generational organization.  The social reality of diverse memories  
and experiences thus comes into conflict with the national imagining of a unified Tibetan 
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diaspora.  I see this man's attitudes towards new-comers as a response to this conflict, in which 
speakers order competing normative stories according to their protagonists' (perceived) degree of 
suffering.  The narrative of Sonam, a young woman born in India, further elucidates the 
dynamics of generation in Dharamsala.
Sonam
In Dharamsala, concrete buildings are claustrophobically packed up and down the hillsides, 
hugging the narrow mountain roads.  One day, while leaving my apartment, I noticed a sign for 
the office of Students for a Free Tibet in the building across the street, and I decided to stop in. 
The office employees were too busy to speak with me, but they gave me the phone numbers of 
five young women, one of whom was Sonam.  I called her, and she agreed to have coffee with 
me the next day.18
Sonam is a twenty-seven year old woman born in Bylakuppe, a Tibetan settlement in 
South India.  The oldest of three children, her family moved between Bylakuppe and Dharamsala 
throughout her childhood and adolescence.  She graduated from a women's college in Chennai a 
few years ago, and currently works on small projects for NGOs and consultants in the 
Dharamsala area.  Almost all of the life stories I collected came from women born in Tibet.  
Sonam's story thus provides a forum to examine congruence and dissonance across a 
fundamental social divide in Dharamsala.  Sonam tells me her life story by focusing on her 
relatives and the complications of being a refugee in India.  When I ask about her family, she 
tells me,
My grandparents left Tibet because the Chinese were just coming into their 
18 “Having coffee” seems to be a sort of cosmopolitan practice that has arisen with the tourist infrastructure in  
Dharamsala, but is absent in Kathmandu.  Tibetans frequent coffee houses and restaurants to socialize with each  
other and with tourists.
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villages and so that was starting to create problems and they heard that the Dalai 
Lama had already left and so they wanted to follow the Dalai Lama and they 
wanted to run away from the Chinese persecution and torture because in my 
grandma's village, the Chinese soldiers were arresting all these heads of the 
Tibetan families and beating them up...It's not like they wanted to leave, because 
my grandma would talk a lot about jewelries that she had to leave behind.  And 
the livestock--she would constantly talk about how many thousands and 
thousands of sheep, hundreds of cattle, yak, and horses that she had to leave 
behind....In those times they walked, they were all born mountaineers or 
trekkers.
Although she was born in India, unlike Jangchup, Sonam paints a corresponding picture of 
Chinese oppression, in which “torture” figures as a shared, and fundamentally life-altering, 
experience of Tibetans in Tibet.  In fact, my Tibetan informants born in India seemed to give 
more vivid descriptions of the social strife in Tibet than most Tibetans from Tibet, which 
suggests that oral transmission of narratives across generations may also influence diasporic 
subjectivity.  Second-hand narratives of familial migration suggest that, contrary to the mythico-
history, experiences of political oppression are inconsistent throughout time.
Sonam also echoes Jangchup in her descriptions of life at college.  She says,
Going to college was a reality check.  I was raised in a very Tibetan 
environment. I led a very protected, cocooned Tibetan life, but when you leave, 
that is when you really have to assert your identity as a Tibetan.  The feeling 
comes strong that you are a minority--not just a minority citizen, because there 
are other students who are from the North East [of India], they feel themselves 
as a minority--but the sense that you don't belong here in India, that comes quite 
strong when you are outside your Tibetan settlement.
Sonams description of life as a “minority” suggests that feelings of displacement persist across 
generations, regardless of birth place.  And, that she speaks of a “Tibetan environment” as 
“protected” recalls statements about “torture” perpetrated against Tibet.  Sonam conforms to the 
mythico-history in which nations figure as moral actors, and China actively threatens the Tibetan 
collectivity.
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Also, Sonam clarifies the ways that bureaucratic identity seems to shape refugee 
subjectivity.  She explains,
When you introduce yourself as a Tibetan with respect to someone who has no 
clue about Tibet, it becomes quite complicated to explain it in a way that that  
person gets it at a minimum.  Like, if you say “I'm an American,” you don't have 
to go beyond that, they just have a clue about it...so when you introduce yourself 
as Tibetan sometimes they blink their eyes, sometimes the first thing they say 
mostly is “the Dalai Lama,” and I try to go beyond it.  I always end up talking 
about political history, because I have to justify my existence in India as a 
refugee who was born in raised in India but who is not an Indian.  I have to tell 
them 1959, blah blah blah, I'm born and raised in India but I'm not an Indian 
citizen.  My document says I'm a foreigner.
Sonam articulates Tibetan political history through her bureaucratic identification (the fact that  
she was born a refugee) rather than through more abstract collective ties of affect and suffering 
in migration.  Sonam suggests that, for Tibetans born in India, bureaucratic identification is the 
key symbol that marks cultural and political otherness in India.  She seems to view the Dalai 
Lama to be an inadequate representation of the Tibetan people.  She suggests, however, that 
political history and political classification portray Tibet and Tibetans more holistically.  With  
this statement, Sonam may be responding to simplistic appropriations of the key symbol of the 
Dalai Lama in Western imaginings of Tibet and Tibetans.  As described in the Introduction, 
Tibetans in Dharamsala sometimes seemed suspicious of my motivations for speaking with them. 
These Tibetans were, more often than not, born in India.  Tibetans from Tibet expressed a far 
greater enthusiasm for my presence, and a striking lack of criticism for Western involvement in 
the Tibetan cause.  Tibetans born in India have been in longer-term contact with Western tourists 
and activists.  They also benefit less from aid from Euro-American donors, NGOs, and the exile 
government itself, although they are largely more educated (many have graduated from 
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bachelors' and masters' programs at Indian Universities).19  These sociological differences may 
lead to an awareness among Tibetans born in India that Western deployment of symbols such as 
the Dalai Lama misrepresents the complex aspects of culture that these symbols summarize.20  As 
Sonam suggests, the political history of conflict that has led to a state of lived tension between 
India and the homeland more accurately reflects Tibetanness.
Nonetheless, Sonam seems to welcome political support for Tibetan freedom from 
cultural and national outsiders.  She seems preoccupied with disseminating a specific political  
knowledge about Tibet beyond the Tibetan community.  Like Jangchup, who focused on how she 
speaks about Tibet to her Tamil classmates, Sonam stresses the importance of explaining her 
Tibetanness so that others understand.  The importance of spreading awareness about Tibet 
further connects Tibetan personal narratives to the mythico-history.  It is the act of telling, that is,  
of perpetuating a moral ordering of the Tibetan conflict, that enhances the cohesion of diasporic 
citizens and advances Tibetan nationalist goals.  In this way, Sonam's narrative performance of 
political history bolsters a linguistic process of cultural renewal.
The mythico-history can be understood as a form of litany.  The mythico-history circles 
through time, continuously incorporating presently unfolding life histories of migration into a 
master narrative of the diaspora's formation.   Ries (1997) explains the ways that litany 
contributes to cultural renewal in Moscow, writing that, in her informants' litanies, “The inherent 
19 It seemed that most individual sponsors of Tibetans (further described in Chapter Four) supported only Tibetans 
born in Tibet.  Also, as Tenzin Youdon, SIT's program assistant, explained, the best exile government schools 
operate almost exclusively for Tibetans born in Tibet.  One day, we were having tea and Tenzin Youdon began 
describing tensions between Tibetans and Indians in Dharamsala.  She explained that she felt that new-comers 
provoke many conflicts with Indian youth, since they party and drink more than Tibetans born in India.  She 
explained that this behavior is understandable in the context of Chinese attempts to “ruin” Tibetan youth (“in 
Lhasa,” she explained, “beer is cheaper than water”).  Nonetheless, she seemed irritated that Tibetans from Tibet  
behaved indolently when they can access “things that not even us—Tibetans born here—can get.”
20 McLagan (2002), for example, noted that Western audiences of media activism for Tibet “are generally ignorant  
about the intertwining of religion and politics that defines the Tibetan system and challenges their own 
fundamental cultural categories” (99).
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form of the litany was one key to its socially reproductive power.  It was circular rather than 
linear, a mythical rather than a pragmatic discourse” (118).  Tibetan migration narratives seem to 
function similarly.  In speaking of migration, Tibetans temporally and conceptually link distinct,  
personal experiences through summarizing symbols.  This narrative process aligns personal 
experience with national history, in a manner that affirms national belonging in exile.  By 
preserving a discourse of suffering, litanies of migration contribute to the reproduction of the 
Tibetan collectivity.  And, as revealed in the narratives cited above, performances of individual  
subjectivity seem to mold themselves to this imagined collectivity.
Conclusions
Tibetans seem to define the nation with reference to a specific moment of colonization.  Diaspora 
studies call for a more nuanced understanding of history and diaspora formation, in which 
“spaces have always been hierarchically interconnected, instead of naturally 
disconnected...Colonialism, then, represents the displacement of one form of interconnection by 
another” (Gupta & Ferguson 1997: 8).  As described in the Introduction, the space of Tibet and 
the people who inhabit it has been historically ruled through monastic centers.  In a largely 
dispersed rural population, the family served as a primary institution that structured daily life,  
and large-scale “state” cohesion was achieved through allegiance rather than organized 
administrative rule.21  The family and the monastery served corresponding purposes: to manage 
population and inheritance.22  Due to the social functions of these institutions, understandings of 
21 As McGranahan (2010a) explains, for example, in premodern Tibet, “There was a wide variety of political and  
social formations...Some of these groups were subordinate to others, and some were self-governing; many, but 
not all, of these groups were subordinate to the Dalai Lama's administration in Lhasa.  Yet the administrative 
aspects of rule were not weighted more heavily than the ritual or performative aspects of rule...what mattered  
was...the sentiments and allegiances of people and communities to the central state” (41).
22 Many scholars argue that the monastery is, first and foremost, an institution of inheritance management. 
Families frequently send their second son to the monastery, removing him from the realm of reproduction 
(Childs 2004: 57-58, 70).
74
birth and rebirth converge in kinships that are both spiritual and physical.  Practices of lineage 
and naming, for example, demonstrate the congruence between the institutions of the family and 
monastery.  Tibetans are formally recognized as full, incarnate humans through religious rituals.  
Chinese colonization of Tibet therefore represents a shift in complex power relations between 
centers of rule and peripheries, rather than the conquest of a clearly demarcated region.  It seems 
that Tibetans who directly experienced colonization made sense of this displacement of power 
through the indigenous hierarchy of the monastery.  Such evidence arises, for example, in the 
historical fact of a massive exodus following the Dalai Lama's migration to India, as well as in 
the narratives of older Tibetans told to me by their children and grandchildren, such as Sonam, 
which suggest a sense of kinship to the Dalai Lama.  And, the very structure of the exile 
government implies this sense of collective kinship.  The exile government, created in response 
to colonization, represents a new social formation that extends the monastery into the 
international order of nation-states.  The Tibetan community thus presents a unique example of 
kinship ties which strengthen national imaginaries.
  In response to the imposition of Chinese colonial rule, the exile government has adopted 
institutions of power characteristic of the nation-state, complementing but not obliterating 
existing practices that manage and measure belonging.23  Because the Dalai Lama heads the 
Tibetan nation24, spiritual hierarchy from Tibet has been preserved in the present-day exile 
government; the historical monastic hierarchy has thus been projected onto a new institutional 
23 For a more extensive discussion of “traditional” and “modern” organizational infrastructures in the exile  
government, see McGranahan 2010a: 13-17.
24 Now, figuratively, rather than literally, since Tibet elected its first president in the spring of 2011.  Nonetheless, 
Tibetans told me that “the Dalai Lama always says he is going to step down, so nothing is going to change.”  I 
also heard, on multiple occasions, that Tibetans would not be in favor of a democratically elected government 
because they trust the Dalai Lama above all.  It seems that the Dalai Lama's political move can be understood 
best in the context of concerns about his death.
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infrastructure in the form of an exile nation.  The Tibetan government has developed maps and 
censuses, which act as “totalizing classification[s]” (Anderson 1983: 173), since they unite 
individuals across previous social divisions.  Maps of Tibet circulate, on which the three 
provinces of Kham, Amdo, and Utzang are painted in stark contrast to China's map which marks 
only the Tibet Autonomous Region (Fig. 7 and 8).  Individuals locate their homelands within this 
Tibetan nation, prioritizing a pan-Tibetan consciousness over regional affiliations.  Likewise, as 
Tibetans flee Tibet, the political frameworks of the Indian state and international community 
manage them as refugees; Tibetans are incorporated into a world of nation-states through their 
bureaucratic identification as displaced persons (in this case, through “registration certificates”).  
In becoming incorporated into the world of nation-states through their refugee status, Tibetans 
affirm their membership within a collectivity that is based on existing hierarchies from Tibet, but  
that resists newly imposed Chinese hierarchies of Communist rule.  
The exile government's institutions of power align with the desire for national freedom. 
The Tibetan government in exile seems to have fashioned itself as a nation in order to make 
legitimate claims to governance to the international community of nation-states. The imagination  
of Tibet as a naturally existing nation that has become a diaspora in response to colonization 
reflects the contemporary structure of the global political economy.  Gupta and Ferguson (1997) 
explain that, in this global political economy, “space itself becomes a kind of neutral grid on 
which cultural difference, historical memory, and societal organization are inscribed” (7).  
Individuals from spatially dispersed populations in Tibet come into contact in the small 
community of Dharamsala.  It seems that they subsequently project this newly encountered pan-
Tibetan social structure onto the geographic map of greater Tibet.  In writing of the overlap 
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between anthropology and diaspora studies, Levy (2000) explains “diasporas function as a 
sociocultural integrative apparatus” (138).  The case of Tibet seems to epitomize this function of 
diasporas.  In the diaspora's bureaucratic integrative apparatus, centered in Dharamsala, Tibetans 
become refugee citizens.  Dharamsala also presents a conceptual integrative apparatus that 
shapes exilic subjectivities through institutional management.  My informants' deployment of 
key symbols in migration narratives evidences this process of conceptual integration, since 
Tibetans fit their personal histories into a collective history of a homogenous Tibetan nation.
Membership to the Tibetan imagined community is predicated upon the refugee identity. 
In her study of Khampa ex-guerrilla soldiers, McGranahan (2010a) notes that “Political statuses 
reach deeply into people's lives, affecting how their communities are organized and how they 
move themselves, their bodies, and their histories through the world” (52).  For Tibetans, being a 
refugee matters not simply because it affirms membership within a unique collectivity, but rather,  
because it provides a specific social vantage point through which individuals navigate the 
diaspora's complexity and contradiction.  Furthermore, this social vantage point shapes and is 
shaped by narrative.  Ries (1997) argues that “the structures that mold a social world inhere first 
in the person; local worlds are, as it were, by-products of people's productions of themselves” 
(44).  Tibetans' productions of the self and the collectivity take place through narrative plots 
structured by certain key events, including migration.  In Tibetan nationalist discourse, which has 
been charted through individual narratives in this chapter, migration appears as a social drama 
through which individuals perform membership to the nation in diaspora.  Migration thus 
exemplifies what Geertz refers to as “the repetitive performance dimensions of social action—
the reenactment and reexperience of known forms” (1983: 28).  Enacted and experienced as a 
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rite of passage, the process of migration confers to the individual a collective Tibetan identity 
through both official, bureaucratic citizenship, as well as through the performance of a 
paradigmatically Tibetan experience of suffering and social rupture.
Although Tibetans in Dharamsala employ the specific diasporic situation brought about 
by migration from Tibet to India to exemplify Tibetan collective experience, many lived in  
internal diasporas within Tibet.  In speaking of such constant migrations, both within and across 
borders, Gupta and Ferguson (1997) describe the global political economy as a “world of 
diaspora” (10).  Chinese colonialism has rendered Tibetan social space both more cohesive and 
more fragmented.  On the one hand, economic and political transformations initiated by the 
Chinese government have brought individuals from disparate regions of Tibet into contact by 
virtue of the necessity of finding employment outside the home.  Yet, in participating in wider 
economies, individuals experience geographic and social displacement.  These displacements 
prefigure transnational migration between Tibet and India, often along the lines of kinship. 
Internal migration facilitates the circulation of information about the exile community, including  
news of the Dalai Lama and from kin who have migrated in the past.  My informants' 
movements demonstrate a conflation of borders and diasporas,25 since multiple forms of contact 
wax and wane as individuals travel.  In this way, migration reconfigures Tibetan kinship 
relations.
In light of this dynamic of waning and waxing interpersonal contact, I argue for a broad 
approach to kinship, in which the family, nation, and monastery are understood as kinship 
formations (especially in the context of overlapping categories of religious and familial lineage).  
25 In offering a theory of diaspora, Clifford (1994) writes of an “overlap of border and diaspora” that seems similar  
to the dynamic movements of my informants (304).
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Tibetan society thus presents a multiplicity of diasporas, as well as a multiplicity of kinships.  
Axel (2004) writes that the imagined state of stability believed to precede the formation of a 
diaspora figures “as an originary moment of tradition or kinship” (31).  According to this model, 
kinship provides a foundational structure through which exiles imagine Tibet's nationhood.  And, 
diverse kinship formations influence social cohesion and division in Dharamsala.  In particular, 
birth place and generation play out in narratives of migration and mirror the division between 
Tibetans born in India and Tibetans from Tibet.  As Ries found in Russia, “Born into the context 
of the many layered, fantastically embroidered, epic tale that is Russia, individuals also to greater  
or lesser extents embody that tale in the personal narratives they fashion from the materials of 
their own lives and, in so doing, assert their cultural identity and belonging” (Ries 1997: 27). 
Similarly, Tibetans in Dharamsala wield their narratives of migration competitively, constructing  
a moral hierarchy of suffering through the mythico-history.  In migrating, and in retelling 
familial migration, Tibetans perform, in embodied experience, the key plot line of the Tibetan  
mythico-history.
To an outside observer, gender influences Tibetan women's decisions to undertake the 
ritual of migration.  Gender also seems to shape women's lived experiences of migration, and the 
ways that they make sense of both social rupture from kin in Tibet and emplacement within the 
Tibetan community of Dharamsala.  However, the women with whom I spoke consistently 
overlook or merely hint at the ways that gender has shaped their experiences. Their subtle 
references to gender seem to be structured within ideologies and institutions, such as lay 
Buddhist thought and family dynamics.  This chapter has charted how Tibetan women move 
through the multiple social institutions of family, monastery, Chinese colonial rule, and the exile  
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government in their changing life circumstances.  The interactions between these social  
institutions seem to provoke tension within social worlds in Tibet.  Internal migrations manifest 
these tensions, as individuals experience social rupture upon moving between natal villages and 
Lhasa (as exemplified by Dolma Dechen) and between the family and monastery (as 
demonstrated by Tenzin Yangzom).  Rupture also becomes apparent in conflicts between Chinese 
political and Tibetan religious order, since repression interferes with the daily lives of those who 
engage in religious practices and who seek religious education.  Transnational migration seems 
to arise as a response to these tensions and social ruptures.
As described in the body of the chapter, this migration seems to be constrained by gender. 
As the creative force of the diaspora, migration highlights the collective suffering of the Tibetan 
people through memories of oppression.  When women perform narratives, both personal and 
historical, they align their present experiences with these collective, selectively remembered 
instances of oppression.  In migration narratives, women seem to hint at the idea that they and 
their female kin can tolerate less suffering than men.  The possibility of gendered violence also 
seems to make families less willing to support women's migration.  Gender is, to an extent, 
overlooked in these subtle statements about suffering in migration.  But, given that suffering 
characterizes the collectivity,  and that women seem to risk greater suffering by undertaking the 
ritual of migration, my informants wield gender in other narrative genres to explicitly 
communicate the depth of Tibetan suffering.  The following chapter examines women's 
experiences of political imprisonment, which serve as icons of a suffering constructed as 
essentially Tibetan.
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Chapter 2: The Prison Narrative: gender and embodiment in collective trauma
Introduction: Spectacle, Performance, and Transnational Mobilization
Chapter One demonstrated that, through narrative, women performed for me a story of collective 
suffering that served to construct (discursively and imaginatively) the nation.  I found that my 
positionality as an American provoked specific politicized discussions of suffering.  Tibetan 
individuals, in informal contexts and as representatives of institutions, consistently pointed me 
towards those who had lived out what I soon came to recognize as certain iconic experiences. 
Most commonly, Tibetans in Dharamsala pushed me to speak with former political prisoners 
(whether or not they were women). Through these encounters, I began to realize that stories of 
torture and trauma dominate the narrative space of Dharamsala.  This narrative space 
encompassed media and daily interactions in Dharamsala (including the persistently circulating 
human rights literature), as well as the space I carved out (and which had been carved out by 
other Western researchers, journalists, and activists) by conducting interviews.  In guiding me 
towards specific narratives, individuals from a variety of backgrounds and in a variety of 
contexts participated in the performance of Tibetan nationality.  Political prisoners themselves  
performed national identity by recounting a common plot of protest, arrest, systematic torture,  
and continued illness.  Since former political prisoners' stories seemed strikingly similar, I 
grouped them into genre that I call “the prison narrative.”
The prison narrative employs vivid descriptions of physical torture to epitomize the 
collective suffering of the Tibetan people and the moral imperative of humanitarian involvement  
in Tibet.  These corporeal descriptions seem to be crafted into a spectacle intended for an 
international audience as well as for other Tibetan exiles.  I did not conduct audience research for 
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this project, beyond reflecting upon my own reactions to hearing Tibetans' life stories, reading 
human rights reports, and seeing human rights media.  As I will describe throughout the chapter, 
however, other scholars of human rights media have noted the efficacy of titillating accounts of 
physical pain.  From my own encounters with the prison narrative in these diverse forms, it 
seems that references to torture function to articulate pain through an idiom that is meant to be 
universally comprehensible: the human body.  By representing embodied suffering as raw, 
physical pain, the prison narrative actively strips bodily experience of cultural specificity.  The 
prison narrative acts as political propaganda, since it advocates political support of Tibetan 
freedom through activism and humanitarian assistance.  To this end, narrative descriptions of 
Tibetan bodily suffering seem to evoke a universal embodied response for an international 
audience in order to mobilize specific political actions.   As will become clear throughout the  
chapter, this process of universalization—and, of de-culturalization—takes on a gendered form, 
since narrative descriptions focus on women's sexual torture.  This chapter compares examples of 
the prison narrative in human rights literature towards which my informants pointed me, and in 
the narrative performances of three female former political prisoners.  Juxtaposing these 
narrative performances of imprisonment with human rights accounts suggests that culturally 
specific understandings of gender influence the interpretation of seemingly universal experiences 
of pain.  
Much scholarly work focuses on the role of large-scale media, such as television and 
film, in mobilizing international activism for Tibetan freedom (McLagan 2002, McLagan 2003, 
McLagan 2005, McLagan 2006, Schell 2000).  Scholars have suggested that these media 
capitalize upon a sort of exoticization of Tibet and Tibetans for a Euro-American audience 
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(Lopez 1998, McLagan 2002).  In analyzing the spoken testimony of individual Tibetan women, 
I found that spoken and written discourse seemed to employ similar exoticizing language and 
imagery.  Through symbols, both visual and narrative, that suggest an exoticizing aesthetic, 
human rights organizations seem to bolster a discourse of Tibetan suffering.  
This chapter begins with an examination of an English language report, which was 
authored by a human rights organization, the Tibetan Women's Association (TWA), and crafted 
for an international audience. When I explained that I was seeking to learn about Tibetan women, 
my Tibetan friends advised me to contact the TWA, and explicitly told me to read their reports.  
The TWA composed these reports in English, which suggests that Euro-Americans form the 
primary intended readership.26  The TWA has published some of their reports online, but most are 
available only in print form for purchase at the TWA's office.27  I did not purchase any of these 
reports myself.  But, I acquired copies as gifts from friends and informants, which indicates that 
my informants see English language human rights reports as a meaningful representation of Tibet 
and Tibetans, and that they consider me to be among the reports' intended audience.  
The chapter then moves to explore the life stories of three female former political 
prisoners.  The published and personal prison narratives seem to interact dynamically, each 
influencing the other's content and form; women's life stories seem to employ the same narrative 
techniques to recount (nearly) the same plot line as human rights reports.  As in Tibetans' 
narratives of migration, individual stories of imprisonment align with a normative representation 
of collective suffering, which, in the case of the prison narrative, human rights reports clearly 
26 Although many Tibetans and Indians are also literate in English, notions of liberal humanism form the reports' 
ideological basis.  Also, many of the organizations that create the reports, even when based in Dharamsala, are  
funded by European and American individuals, foundations, and governments.
27 Pdf files of some of the TWA's reports can be accessed through their website (http://tibetanwomen.org/books-
reports/).
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articulate.  Former political prisoners' life stories showed far greater congruence with a 
normative narrative than did women's migration stories.  By collecting elicited life stories at set  
times through formal interviews, I expected that many would narrate their lives in a somewhat 
staged manner.  However, that former political prisoners' stories held so closely to a normative 
narrative suggests that they actively sought to mold their life stories to a normative 
representation; the performative aspect of their narratives seemed heightened in comparison to 
other expressions of Tibetan suffering.
Imprisonment as Symbolic Capital
Throughout the chapter, I draw on classic scholarship of social class and hegemony.  Political 
prisoners seem to possess a symbolic power that comes from the symbolic capital of experiences 
of imprisonment.28  Bourdieu (1989) discusses the emergence of social classes as a process 
through which a group grants certain individuals the authority to represent the collectivity.  
Groups grant this power of representation to authority figures on the basis of “symbolic power,” 
which Bourdieu describes broadly as an ability (“efficacy”) for mobilization (23).  I see former 
political prisoners in Dharamsala as an authoritative social class.  A broader community, both 
Tibetan and international, seems to have granted them the authority to represent the Tibetan 
collectivity because of their lived experiences of torture.  Narrative performances of 
imprisonment provide a forum for the exercise of symbolic power.  I argue that, through their 
dominance over narrative space, Tibetan female political prisoners represent a hegemonic social  
formation.
28 Kleinman and Kleinman (1997) have noted a similar dynamic, which they argue is produced by the international 
humanitarian regime's commodification of suffering.  They explain media interest in suffering as an 
“appropriation” that converts memories into “trauma stories.”  Trauma stories then function as “the currency, the 
symbolic capital, with which [victims] enter exchanges for physical resources and achieve the status of  political  
refugee” (10).
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Institutions privilege former political prisoners by endowing them with economic capital.  
The exile government's department of security registers all cases of imprisonment among new 
arrivals (through self-reporting).   Once registered, the Department of Health's Torture Survivor's 
Unit offers social and medical support for former political prisoners for their first ten years in 
exile, in the form of a monthly stipend and reimbursement for all medical costs.  Former political  
prisoners' symbolic capital, in the form of experiences of imprisonment, confers to them 
economic capital, in the form of financial support from the government.  That is, government 
support converts the symbolic capital of the prison narrative into economic capital.  Although 
representatives of the Department of Health explained these services as a system of social 
support for recovery from trauma, it seems that ex-political prisoners benefit mainly from the 
monthly stipend.  For example, the Department of Health offers mental health treatment to 
former political prisoners, but it seems that they do not normally access these services.  As 
Dolkar, an employee at the Torture Survivor's Unit told me, 
There is also a counselor who is very new, but torture victims are mostly very 
sound mentally.  We have a few mental patients in other Tibetan settlements, so 
we are planning on sending the counselor there.  Political prisoners have very 
high coping mechanisms.  While in prison, they always think of His Holiness, 
and we believe in karmic relations, so we think that we might have done 
something wrong in a past life and that is the reason we are experiencing 
hardship now.  They believe in Buddhism, and also think that their torture is 
nothing compared to the suffering of all Tibetans.  They feel that they are 
suffering for all Tibetans.
With this statement, Dolkar expresses that former political prisoners rarely require social support 
from the government.  Rather, the financial support they receive affirms their privileged status.  
And, as the narratives will elucidate, Dolkar's explanation of the political prisoners' “coping 
mechanisms” summarizes quite concisely the common themes underlying stories of 
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imprisonment, namely, strength in collective suffering and Buddhist cosmology.  
As Bourdieu writes, “Symbolic power is the power to make things with words...symbolic 
power is a power of consecration and revelation” (ibid).  Bourdieu asserts that symbolic power 
allows for linguistic representation, and that linguistic representation produces value.  It is due to 
their lived experience of a Tibetan key scenario—that of political resistance to and torture by the 
Chinese—that the community in Dharamsala grants former political prisoners the symbolic 
power to represent a Tibetan collectivity.  And, due to the symbolic power associated with 
imprisonment, individuals and human rights organizations wield the prison narrative as a 
political tool in Dharamsala's networks of humanitarian aid.  The prison narrative's political 
efficacy lies partly in its appeal to an international audience, which plays out in daily life in  
Dharamsala.  Given the number of tourists and the relative dearth of activities in McLeod Ganj,  
there is a constant supply of foreigners who take part in volunteer events run by NGOs.  Gu Chu 
Sum, an association of former political prisoners, houses recently arrived torture victims and 
holds daily English conversation classes which are frequently attended by two to three times as 
many volunteers as Tibetans.  Another NGO, Learning and Ideas for Tibet (LIT), holds a weekly 
“Tuesday Talk with an Ex-Political Prisoner,” where tourists can eat free Tibetan food and learn 
about “the Tibet situation”.  Employees of LIT distribute fliers for the Tuesday Talks to 
foreigners as they meander the marketplace and sip coffee in cafés and restaurants (Fig. 9). 
NGOs thus profoundly influence foreigners' activities in Dharamsala, to the point of  structuring 
their interactions with the local community through a performance and spectacle of Tibetan 
plight.  
Articulations of Tibetanness seem to be cultivated in response to the symbolic demands 
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of the humanitarian discourse associated with Dharamsala's dense NGO infrastructure.  In this 
discourse, the narrative testimony of individual Tibetans links Tibetanness and suffering. 
Individual tales of suffering form a collective Tibetan trauma.  In standardizing the structure of 
narratives, humanitarian discourse therefore impinges upon personal expressions of Tibetan 
identity.  However, as Baumann writes, “Tibetans are not always mere passive victims of 
[Western] imagining, but strategically make use of the stereotypical images to raise awareness 
for their case and plight” (382).  Humanitarian discourse provides an avenue for entry into the 
international community.  In this way, the perpetuation of narratives that construct Tibetans as a 
sacred, suffering people represents a sort of geopolitical strategy, since it disseminates a specific 
understanding of political history that supports Tibetan national goals.   
And, hopes for international mobilization for Tibetan freedom seem to influence 
interpersonal interactions. Tibetans in Dharamsala seemed to associate me with my government's  
actions.29  As an American ethnographer, I found that I was, in fact, one such audience for the 
prison narrative.  Scheduled interviews with former political prisoners became an arena for the 
spectacle and performance of the prison narrative.  In addition to narrating their imprisonment by 
reiterating the common plot of the prison narrative, individuals gestured to demonstrate torture,  
showed to me the resulting scars and deformations, and directed me towards human rights 
literature intended for a Euro-American audience.  Therefore, as an interviewer, I also became a 
participant observer in the performance and spectacle of the deployment of an international 
humanitarian discourse.  In collecting personal narratives, I received testimonies.  In hearing 
testimonies, I became an international audience to human rights violations.  As an audience 
29 Once the event reached the international media, I even received text messages from Tibetans congratulating me  
on Osama bin Laden's death before I had heard the news myself.
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member, I participated in the dynamics of international dissemination of the prison narrative.  
For example, as I was leaving the Torture Survivor's Unit at the Department of Health, Dolkar 
called out to me, “it is mainly from USAID, from the American people, that we are getting 
funding, so, thank you to the US government!  There is a sign right there!” (Fig. 10). Former 
political prisoners sometimes interacted with me similarly, as if I could personally mobilize  
American intervention in Tibet.  At the Tibetan Reception Center, there were two male former 
political prisoners whom the director had arranged for me to interview.  Towards the end of the 
interview, one man told me, “There was another political prisoner I used to talk to through a 
window between our cells, and when we heard helicopters, we used to think that the Americans 
were coming to save us.”  As I left, he kept asking me what I “would do for Tibet,” and if I could 
“please write to Obama and Bush.”  This man seemed to hope that I could influence the political  
outcome of the conflict in Tibet.  He even explained that he had friends who were still 
imprisoned in Tibet, seeming to suggest that I could help these individuals by communicating 
with American government officials.  Such encounters underscore the extent to which 
international humanitarian discourse essentializes nationality.  This process of essentialization 
shapes personal hopes and social dynamics, since interpersonal interactions mirror the broader 
operations of international networks of political activism and humanitarian aid.  
In international human rights media and individual performances of Tibetan exile 
subjectivity, certain testimonies, including the prison narrative, receive social recognition.  
Carole McGranahan (2010b) explains that, among Tibetan exiles, 
experiences chosen to circulate as representative...tend to be those that validate 
existing power structures as a condition of their existence.  As a result, the 
conversion of experience to narration and the social recognition of such narration 
are all processes as generative of dispossession as they are of possession [769].
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The prison narrative reifies an essentialized dynamic between a Tibetan victim, a Chinese 
aggressor, and a foreign savior that corresponds to the conceptual structure of the Tibetan 
political conflict in an international humanitarian regime (an existing power structure).  This  
regime is characterized by the international dissemination of testimony, foreign private  
donations, and institutions who manage and moderate the two (NGOs and the exile government). 
As a result, the translation of a Tibetan's individual experiences of imprisonment seems to be 
crafted according to a narrative form that de-contextualizes and universalizes its message(s) for 
an international audience.  McLagan (2005) writes that the international humanitarian regime 
which arose in the post Cold-War global community represents “an organizational infrastructure 
that function[s] as a mechanism through which local political concerns [can] be translated into 
narratives and discursive forms that registe[r] as political in an international context” (224).  In 
passing through such a mechanism, the prison narrative is thus “dispossessed” from an original, 
personal experience of imprisonment.  This process of dispossession seems to result in a generic 
narrative plot that presents bodily suffering in line with a humanitarian discourse.  
Published Accounts of the Prison Narrative 
In Dharamsala, many publications that circulate are authored in English, and the organizations 
(even when based in Dharamsala) through which they are published often operate through 
foreign donations.  These published, English language accounts further political and 
humanitarian goals of gaining international recognition for Tibetan suffering and for the Tibetan 
freedom movement.  Additionally, women's narratives of imprisonment seem to monopolize this 
political and humanitarian discourse.  In the context of scholarship on human rights 
organizations, it seems that international consumption (and demand) may shape this monopoly. 
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McLagan (2003) notes that activists who seek to mobilize public audiences rely on media that 
portray victims' personal narratives.  These narratives produce emotional responses and, by 
extension ethical ties, between public audiences and the represented victims.  In this way, human 
rights media depend upon individual victims “who function as 'nodal points' in a transnational 
network of identification and solidarity” (McLagan 2003: 610).  In the case of human rights 
media about Tibet, women often act as such nodal points.  For example, two famous 
autobiographies were written and published in English by female ex-political prisoners (each co-
authored by an American woman), The Voice that Remembers by Ama Adhe (1997) and Sorrow 
Mountain: the journey of a Tibetan warrior nun by Ani Panchen (2000).  Ama Adhe's book was 
translated into Tibetan by the Tibetan Women's Association only in 2009, and Ani Panchen's 
book seems not to have been translated.  As Barnett (2005) asserts, such memoirs and personal 
testimony thus “appear to be part of a mainly western discourse” (356).  As described above, this 
“western discourse” circulates throughout daily life in Dharamsala, in conversation, media, and 
the operations of Dharamsala's NGOs.  We turn now, to an example of an English language 
publication that exemplifies this western discourse.
The Drapchi Fourteen
Known as the Drapchi Fourteen, a group of fourteen nuns was incarcerated in Drapchi prison, 
Tibet's largest detention facility, in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  While imprisoned, they 
covertly recorded resistance songs.  One recording was smuggled out, but the rest were 
discovered and confiscated, and the nuns received extended sentences.  After attending a 
leadership training workshop with the TWA, my translator, Jangchup, received booklet, “Light in 
the Abyss,” written in English by the Tibetan Women's Association, which she gave to me.  The 
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booklet recounts the plight of political prisoners in Tibet through narratives of the Drapchi 
Fourteen.  The booklet is also available for sale at the TWA's office in Dharamsala, which 
suggests that the booklet circulates for popular consumption by English readers.  The report 
opens with an overview of prison conditions and commonly suffered tortures.  It reads,
Torture, systematic and brutal, remains a daily reality for political prisoners in 
Tibet...Electric shocks are...commonly employed, delivered both through wires 
attached to the body and directly with cattle prods.  “Active” torture of this 
variety is supplemented by a variety of “passive” techniques ranging from 
exposing prisoners to extreme temperatures, to forcing prisoners to stand 
immobile for long stretches of time, deprivation of food, water and sleep, and 
forced exercise.  Chinese prison authorities have taken the creation of pain into a 
scientific craft.  A slew of specially designed restraints augment torture tactics 
including finger cuffs and self-tightening, barbed cuffs.  “Aerial suspension” is 
another commonly employed device in which prisoners are hung from the 
ceiling by the wrists or arms, putting immense strain upon the shoulders. 
Victims report being beaten while in this position and being left hanging for 
hours while coal and chili powder is burned below them [TWA 2009: 28-29].
This fragment suggests that an economy of bodily suffering permeates human rights discourse; 
physical torture serves as the main channel through which the TWA communicates atrocity 
across cultures and geographies, to an English readership.  In a discussion of the role of the 
individual in human rights discourse, Adams (1998) writes, 
Shared humanism requires a transcendence of cultural difference.  Difference is 
perceptible when bodies are enculturated, when a body becomes an encultured 
person.  Individualized and to some extent objectified by the presence of a body 
tortured, bodies can be universalized and suffering can go to work for human 
rights politics [83].
Adams argues that, in the realm of human rights, descriptions of physical suffering are effective 
because they are considered universal.  However, as the following sections will describe, 
experiences of embodiment are culturally specific.  Since the prison narrative de-contextualizes  
embodied experiences, it may lead a Euro-American audience to project understandings of 
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violence onto descriptions of physical torture.
Gendered violence clarifies this process of projection.  The TWA's report continues,
Female prisoners often suffer the worst treatment at the hands of prison officials. 
First-hand accounts reveal that gender specific torture is employed, and female 
prisoners are frequently the victims of sexual assault.  Female detainees are 
stripped naked during interrogations, and implements of torture such as sticks 
and electric batons are forcibly inserted into the mouth, vagina, and anus...Prison 
authorities target nuns in particular for these sadistic practices which serve to 
systematically degrade and humiliate the victims [TWA 2009: 29].
This example of vivid, sexual imagery further highlights human rights literature's economy of 
embodied suffering.  Different forms of human rights media across the world employ similar 
vivid accounts of raw, physical pain, attempting to achieve an embodied audience response. 
Anthropologist and documentary film-maker Ronit Avni describes the ways that spectacle 
operates according to this rationale in an international field.  Avni (2006) writes of a 
documentary film she created about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, “We wanted audiences to 
connect to the characters featured on a viscera, visual, and emotional level” (211).  The TWA's 
report seems to strive for a similar impact, noting the particularities of physical and sexual abuse 
that accompany imprisonment.  Such narrative spectacles of Tibetan women's torture suggest that 
humanitarian networks operate through an economy of pain.  In this economy, individual 
testimony of embodied atrocity circulates between cultures to create an embodied audience 
response.  This embodied response produces a moral understanding of Tibetan suffering (in 
Bourdieusian terms, “reveals and consecrates”) and, by extension, of the legitimacy of Tibetan 
claims to nationhood.
Additionally, the TWA's report demonstrates that the nun carries particular weight in this 
economy of suffering.  The nun's symbolic value seems to have developed in response to the 
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social dynamics of protest in Tibet.  Monasteries and nunneries, as the primary centers of Tibetan 
cultural education, organize and lead many political demonstrations.  Some sources even assert 
that the majority of female political prisoners are nuns (Tibet Justice Center 2008: 7). Barnett  
(2005) explains that, during a period of particular political upheaval in Tibet in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the time at which my informants and the Drapchi Fourteen were imprisoned, 
nuns developed “specifically female forms of protest” in prison, such as singing (334-354).  In 
addition to such gendered protests, Barnett asserts that, in Tibetan nun's accounts of 
imprisonment from the same time period, “the site of conflict and resistance becomes the 
prisoner's body” (335).  Accounts of imprisonment explain that Tibetan nuns undergo discipline 
that removes embodied markers of identity.  For example, from the 1990s onward, nuns in 
Drapchi prison were forbidden to cut their hair (ibid: 344).  As will be described below, 
enculturation of the nun's body occurs through identity markers such as a shaved head.  In being 
stripped of their embodied identity, imprisonment universalizes the nun's enculturated body.30 
And, since enculturation confers personhood (as described by Adams above), it is through an 
explicit de-personalization that embodiment operates in the prison's system of discipline.  
Barnett's discussion of the nun's body directs us towards the connections between Tibetan 
women, embodiment, and the Buddhist collectivity.  Foucault (1979[1975]) defines the “body 
politic” as “a set of material elements and techniques that serves as weapons, relays, 
communication routes and supports for the power and knowledge relations that invest human 
bodies and subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge” (28).  Prescriptions of 
dress and other material markers of embodied identity, such as a shaved head, enculturate the 
30 Tenzin Yangzom's description of being forbidden to wear the nun's robes (as cited in Chapter One) presents a  
similar example.
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nun, marking her as a Tibetan Buddhist subject.  Axel (2004) describes  the “visible identity” of 
the amritdhari (Sikh initiate), involving specific manners of dress, which makes the individual 
amritdhari recognizable as a Sikh following initiation.  Axel explains that, due to this resulting 
visible identity, initiation “refers to a specific process designed to constitute an individual as a 
representative—and the body as a representation—of a Sikh collectivity” both within the Sikh 
community and beyond (33).  Similarly, the Tibetan nun's visible identity marks her membership 
to the Buddhist collectivity in an embodied form that is recognizable to an international  
audience.  In prison, new disciplines explicitly re-enculturate the nun's body, dissociating her 
embodied identity from a Buddhist collectivity—that is, the Tibetan body politic—and marking 
her as a Chinese prisoner.  Ironically, therefore, the universalization of the nun's body that is 
wielded in the arena of international human rights results from her enculturation into the Chinese 
body politic.
However, portrayals of the Tibetan nun in human rights literature also demonstrate 
orientalizing trends in the international dissemination of representations of Tibetan political  
experience.  That the de-personalization of the nun's body carries particular weight in the 
narrative spectacle of human rights literature suggests an exoticizing aesthetic in line with 
general attitudes towards Tibetan Buddhism.  From the standpoint of human rights, bodily 
suffering is universally comprehensible.  And yet, human rights reports's persistent emphasis on 
bodily suffering seems to fetishize the sexual violence perpetrated against Tibetan nuns in prison. 
The prison narrative in human rights literature seems to suppose an audience's scopophilic 
interest in the embodied, sexual trauma of an exoticized “other.”
In fact, it seems that the nun genders the performance of the prison narrative in human 
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rights discourse according to Euro-American notions of sexual violence.  Incessant descriptions 
of sexual violence (and, as will be further examined in subsequent sections, the basic framing of 
certain violences as sexual when they are not necessarily experienced as such) demonstrates a 
form of discursive colonization that can be understood within an historical trajectory of  Euro-
American representations of the Oriental subject.  McLagan (2002) points to the ways that the 
emergence of television and other media technologies has initiated a political trend in which 
“images and spectacle [have become] central to the definitions and meanings of legitimacy in  
politics” (91).  In this trend towards spectacle, the definition of political conflicts, such as that in 
Tibet, hinge on symbolic construction.  For example, Stoler (1991) writes that, through “the 
salience of sexual symbols as graphic representations of colonial dominance,” sexual imagery 
“serves as a loaded metaphor for domination” (54).  The prison narrative's persistent sexual 
imagery thus frames the political conflict in Tibet as an example of colonial dominance, a pattern  
of representation that serves to morally legitimize calls for Tibetan freedom.31  The following 
sections present the translation of the prison narrative into individual life stories, suggesting that 
international humanitarian discourse arises in multiple contexts in the Tibetan diaspora.  That is,  
humanitarian discourse seems to provide a framework through which individuals in Dharamsala 
reflect upon their own lives, make sense of the broader functions of institutions and states, and 
perform allegiance to the Tibetan imagined community in exile.
Shaping Subjectivities through Human Rights Discourse: “The Prison Narrative” in the 
Life Stories of Ex-Political Prisoners
31 The image of Tibet as a colony in crisis is contested.  Barnett (2001) explains that Tibetan exile activists sought 
to shift representation of Tibet to a “colonial concept,” “having realized in the mid 1980s that foreign 
governments had no strategic or political interest in raising the Tibet issue” (279).  However, rather than pushing 
the Tibet crisis into the realm of legitimate politics, this action figured as a continuation of “attempt[s] to achieve 
political effects by engaging people in a shared image or representation” (ibid).  We see, therefore, the colonial  
framing of the Tibetan crisis as a pattern of representation that continues in the realm of international law.
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Beyond serving as a tool for achieving political and humanitarian goals, the prison narrative 
seems to present a channel through which Tibetans socially locate themselves in Dharamsala. 
Geertz explains that in his ethnographic work, he has been centrally concerned with interpreting 
how his indigenous interlocutors “define themselves as persons, what goes into the idea they 
have...of what a self...is” (1983: 58).  To this end, he sought out “the symbolic forms—words, 
images, institutions, behaviors—in terms of which, in each place, people actually represented 
themselves to themselves and to one another” (ibid: 58).  The prison narrative provides a unique 
example of native self-representation that sheds light on the construction of subjects, marked by 
differing degrees of Tibetanness, in Dharamsala.  I found that the prison narrative creates and 
sanctifies specific knowledge about Tibet that certain individuals and groups in Dharamsala seem 
to possess through their embodiment of key scenarios.  This section presents a conversation 
between the narratives of three female former political prisoners in Dharamsala through which I 
hope to clarify the ways that the prison narrative influences subjectivities in Dharamsala—both 
of former political prisoners and of other TIbetans.
The experience of imprisonment is bound in power relations that operate in an 
international humanitarian regime, but that play out in daily life in Dharamsala.  One day, for  
example, I had made an appointment to interview Pema Tsering, a woman who had given birth to 
a baby girl eight months prior, in her home near the Norbulinka Institute.  I had enlisted the 
translation skills of my friend, Lhamo Tso, who had helped me in an interview with Sangmu, a 
former political prisoner, a few weeks before.  We reached Pema Tsering's home, and I moved to 
knock on the door.  Lhamo Tso told me I was at the wrong house, pointing across the road to a 
restaurant where another woman, Tashi Lodoeh, works.  I explained that I actually had made the 
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appointment to speak with Pema Tsering, and Lhamo Tso replied, “Pema Tsering won't have very 
much to tell you because she wasn't in prison.  She didn't know about Tibet when she was in 
Tibet.  Pema Tsering is just like us [from rural Amdo].  You should talk with Tashi Lodoeh 
because she is a former nun and political prisoner.”  However, we kept the appointment with 
Pema Tsering partly because I had, in fact, already spoken with Tashi Lodoeh. 
This exchange, between Lhamo Tso and me, suggests that social dynamics in Dharamsala 
produce a knowledge of Tibet that relates almost exclusively to the political struggle.  Those who 
were unaware of the freedom movement in Tibet “don't know” about Tibet, although they are, in 
fact, Tibetan.  Those who are learning about Tibet, and those who support Tibetans financially 
and ideologically (such as sponsors, journalists, and human rights activists) seem to seek out this 
specific knowledge related to the freedom movement.  And, those who did know about Tibet 
while they were in Tibet are frequently former political prisoners.  That Lhamo Tso reflects upon 
her life history with reference to the prison narrative (in her statement that she did not know 
about Tibet while political prisoners did) points to its hegemonic infiltration of social life.  
Lhamo Tso differentiates herself and Pema Tsering from Tashi Lodoeh, suggesting that political 
imprisonment marks a socially meaningful category.  Lhamo Tso thus points us towards an 
example of Gramsci's (1999[1971]) “subaltern functions of social hegemony” in the form of the 
“'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction 
imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” (145).  The Tibetan community in 
Dharamsala gives Tashi Lodoeh, and other former political prisoners, the authority to represent 
the collectivity.  And, as evidenced in the centrality of the prison narrative in human rights  
discourse and media, communities beyond Dharamsala, both Tibetan and international, likewise 
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support the dominance of former political prisoners.
The following narratives come from three female former political prisoners.  All lived in 
Utzang and were imprisoned in Lhasa, which underscores the fact that the prison narrative is 
most representative of Central Tibetan life.  As the historical locus of monastic administration,  
Lhasa remains the center of political activity.  Central Tibet also maintains the strongest ties to  
the international community and to the Tibetan diaspora (McGranahan 2010a:16-17).  The 
stories that dominate narrative space thus tend to normalize Central Tibetan experiences.  The 
following women's narratives demonstrate consistency with the pervasively circulating 
descriptions of systematic bodily tortures and resulting health problems that arise in human 
rights literature.  The correlation between women's personal narratives and human rights 
literature underlines that the Tibetan prisoner's subjectivity is molded in a social field.  In 
discussing examples of world literature that have been translated into Tibetan, Steven Venturino 
(1995) explains that stories of imprisonment are translated strategically, to address Tibetan 
experience.  He writes, 
An alliance between personal experience and those experiences considered 
tellable, literary, and socially relevant can significantly address the social 
identities of imprisoned Tibetans.  The notion of Tibetan personal identity, which 
has traditionally featured a profoundly Buddhist and admittedly apolitical 
consciousness, now incorporates and negotiates contemporary personal 
experiences recognized as having social and political significance [165]. 
 
In their personal narratives, women define the self in relation to experiences of imprisonment. 
Selves who embody these experiences are granted narrative space, a social dynamic that, as 
Venturino argues, has newly emerged in the exile community.  When they speak about 
imprisonment, Tibetan women socially locate themselves within a world of collective Tibetan 
suffering.  However, through their individual renditions of the prison narrative, they also speak to 
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broader issues of kinship and gender in the Tibetan diaspora.
Tashi Lodoeh
Twenty-nine year old Tashi Lodoeh came to India in 2004, after she was released from prison. 
She now runs a restaurant with two other former nuns and political prisoners, one of whom was 
arrested alongside her during a protest in Tibet.  These “three nuns,” as they were known in 
Dharamsala, seemed almost famous in the community, given the number of people who directed 
me towards them.  But, the nuns themselves were not actually eager to speak with me, which 
demonstrates another key social tension in Dharamsala: whereas the town operates primarily 
through garnering foreign interest in the Tibet cause, certain individuals whose stories exemplify 
Tibetan suffering seem exhausted from giving interviews about their experiences.
However, after I had contacted the nuns a few times over the phone, Tashi Lodoeh agreed 
to speak with me.  My translator, Tenzin Tsering, and I conducted the interview in Tashi 
Lodoeh's restaurant near the Norbulinka Institute over tea.  Tashi Lodoeh tells me, 
After I was released, I was branded as an ex-political prisoner, so my  
employment and everything was restricted.  It was difficult to live with this, and  
I had to flee. I was imprisoned in 1994 after I staged a protest, and I stayed in  
prison for five years.  I had entered a nunnery when I was fifteen, and around  
age seventeen or eighteen I was in prison.  I went to the nunnery because in my  
village, there were so few opportunities to go to school and the nunnery  
provided basic education.  Also, I had a big family.
Tashi Lodoeh opens with a discussion of imprisonment that seems characteristic of the stories I 
have grouped into the genre of the prison narrative.  In interviews, my informants who had 
experienced torture defined themselves, (at least to me, as an American), primarily as “former 
political prisoners.”  That Tashi Lodoeh opens her narrative by explaining the social 
consequences of her imprisonment exemplifies this pattern.  Tashi Lodoeh also, however, 
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highlights her family's specific circumstances as a driving force behind her decision to enter the 
monastery, both through the lack of educational opportunities in her village and the fact that her  
family had a number of other children to support (Tashi Lodoeh has four brothers and four 
sisters).  Removal from the extended family network is a hallmark of monastic life.  And, as 
explained in the previous section, nuns figure as iconic protagonists in the prison narrative.32  By 
recounting her life prior to entering the monastery, Tashi Lodoeh subverts what seems to be a 
conventional plot line of stories I have grouped into the prison narrative.  This narrative 
subversion points to the strength of Tibetan family ties, which Tashi Lodoeh seems to privilege 
over the suffering of the Tibetan nation.
As Tashi continues to speak, however, her narrative weaves together statements about her 
family, the political situation in Tibet, and her imprisonment.  She says,
Generally, everyone knows about the atrocities the Chinese perpetrate against  
Tibetans.  My grandfather was also a political prisoner for twelve years.  Even  
if you are just a farmer, you have to give all the best greens to the government.  
And, I was kicked out of the nunnery because they said you have to be eighteen  
to be a nun.  After I was kicked out of the nunnery my mother had fallen ill and  
had to go to the hospital, but I couldn't go see her because of the restrictions on  
nuns.  My cousins were also put in prison for eight to nine years...So, I decided  
to come to India because the health care was a lot of expenditure to my parents,  
and it's not like you have regained your freedom once you are released from  
prison.  The government follows you, and your opportunities for employment  
are almost nil because employers will be in trouble if they hire ex-prisoners. I  
made the decision to take care of myself because I was a huge burden on my  
family.  Soldiers were following them, and on special events like March 10 th,  
there were restrictions and they couldn't celebrate.  My parents didn't know I  
was preparing to leave, and I left suddenly because if they had known, they  
wouldn't have wanted to part with me.  I can contact them a little bit now, but  
it's scary.  I would love to talk with them every day, but the government has  
taken my family's numbers and can tap into their calls, and if I happen to say  
something that I shouldn't, they could be in huge trouble.
32 Barnett (2005) explains that nuns' protests in the 1980s and 1990s in Lhasa transformed political protest into a 
sort of feminized ritual (322-328).  Barnett also points to specific non-violent forms of protest that seem to have 
been initiated by nuns and other female political prisoners (ibid: 323, 334-355).
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Tashi Lodoeh seems to see her own experience as iconic, since she states that all Tibetans 
understand the political situation in Tibet according to a victim-victimizer paradigm that  
positions Tibetans and Chinese in opposition.  Tashi Lodoeh thus demonstrates a practice of 
synecdoche, common to my informants' narratives, that essentializes nationality and ethnicity. 33 
Although Tashi Lodoeh seems to see her life in Tibet as representative, the majority of my 
informants said that they, like Lhamo Tso, “didn't know about Tibet in Tibet.”  Tashi Lodoeh 
expects that even farmers, who are presumably politically inactive, would understand 
government regulations of crops as an oppression of the Tibetan people.  I found, however, that 
the conception of government regulations as acts of violation of Tibet and Tibetans seems to be 
largely cultivated in exile.  That Tashi Lodoeh takes this attitude toward Chinese agricultural  
policy for granted suggests that the prisoner undergoes a unique process of enculturation in exile. 
By granting former political prisoners symbolic capital, the Tibetan exile and international  
humanitarian communities affirm the experience of imprisonment as characteristically Tibetan.  
Former political prisoners are removed from the process of enculturation in the diaspora since, 
through their imprisonment and political activities in Tibet, they had acquired membership in the  
Tibetan imagined community before migrating; while living in Tibet, they had cultivated  
subjectivities that correlate with those inculcated in Dharamsala.  And, human rights media 
employ accounts of imprisonment to represent Tibet to an international audience.  The prisoner's 
subjectivity thus easily translates across political borders, from Tibet to India to an international  
audience, because her political activism and the suffering she experienced in Tibet represent the 
33 For example, as mentioned in Chapter One, Jangchup had explained that she and her Tibetan classmates told 
other students at her college in Chennai “how China tortured Tibet.” In this statement, Jangchup presented 




Tashi Lodoeh's kinship relations show complex consistencies and inconsistencies with the 
experiences of other Tibetans.  Like other Tibetan women, whose internal displacement 
prefigured their migration to India, Tashi Lodoeh separated from her family when she entered the 
nunnery, due primarily to financial constraints.  Entering the nunnery ultimately led to other  
major life events, including her imprisonment and migration, because, as Tashi Lodoeh will 
explain further, she participated in a protest with the support of her nunnery.  Through common 
experiences of imprisonment, Tashi Lodoeh shared a unique cross-generational understanding 
with her family.  Most Tibetans with whom I spoke, even those who were politically active in 
Tibet, stressed that their parents and grandparents did not speak to them “about Tibet,” because 
disseminating subversive political ideas risks the entire family's safety.  Tashi Lodoeh's family, 
however, presents a cross-generational consciousness of oppression, since her grandfather and 
cousins were also imprisoned.  Other Tibetans, such as Tenzin Yangzom, feared that leaving 
Tibet would create political hardship for their families if they were caught or imprisoned on their  
journey (see p. 58).  Tashi Lodoeh, however, portrays her migration as a means of alleviating the 
suffering that she has already brought upon her family through her imprisonment.  Political 
oppression is a driving force for Tashi Lodoeh's migration, not simply because she has been 
imprisoned but because her family faced continued surveillance and harassment in their daily 
lives.  Kinship therefore figures as the ultimate catalyst for migration in Tashi Lodoeh's narrative.
Tseyang
Thirty-six year old Tseyang and I met by chance.  I had attended an English conversation class 
where I met Tseyang's neighbor, who asked me after class to help her friend learn English.  I 
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agreed, and the next day, the neighbor introduced me to Tseyang.  Tseyang and I met a number of 
times over the next month, conversing in broken English and Tibetan.  The first time we met, 
Tseyang told me that she had been imprisoned in Tibet.  We both lived very close to the Dalai 
Lama's temple, so we visited each other's homes multiple times to practice language.  It became 
clear that Tseyang's casual references to her imprisonment summarized a more extensive 
personal narrative she seemed willing to tell.  So, I asked if I could interview her with the help of 
my translator, Tenzin Tsering.  She agreed, and we met at a café near our homes.
We sit down on the bright red stools in the cafe, Tenzin Tsering and Tseyang facing me. 
Tenzin Tsering and I order coffee.  I am worried when Tseyang will not order anything.  I had 
hoped that our previous relationship would position me differently than other Western 
muckrakers, but her unwillingness to let me buy her coffee seems to suggest otherwise.  Once I 
initiate the conversation, however, Tseyang begins to speak naturally, describing her family in 
India and in Tibet.  She tells me,
My husband and I met six years ago in Dharamsala.  He is from Lhasa, also,  
and we have a five year old son.  I have one older brother and three older  
sisters in Tibet.  My parents were farmers.  When you're a farmer, you have a  
pre-determined life.  In the autumn, there is a lot of work planting crops, and in  
the summer you have to water the fields and help the cattle graze.  In the winter,  
all the adults go to other towns to do businesses like selling fruits—mostly  
apples—or to become laborers for the Chinese.  The children and elders would  
stay home.  There was a huge sense of nationalism in Tibet in the 1980s...We  
tried not to interact with the Chinese...Nationalism in exile is almost  
disappearing, which is definitely bad.  It's good if you have a sense of pride in  
your country.34
That Tseyang begins by discussing her family recalls the narrative form of migration stories. 
Kinship ties, in this case, kinship ties actively acquired in exile, serve as a means through which 
she introduces herself.  Also, Tseyang seems to link her family in India and in Tibet (her kinship 
34 Tseyang differentiated “pride” (spobs pa)  from “nationalism” (rg.yal shin) in the original Tibetan.
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ties of affinity and consanguinity), describing both in the same narrative segment.
Tseyang's description of life in Tibet resonates with that of Tashi Lodoeh, since she 
describes political consciousness.  However, as mentioned above, many other informants 
described little to no national sentiment in Tibet.  Tseyang's view of nationalism within Tibet  
clarifies regional difference.  Political activism seems to be localized in the Lhasa area, Tibet's  
historic capital, linking resistance to centralized rule.35 Utzang has been the historical center of 
Tibetan society, since it hosts the majority of institutions including the main monasteries of the  
dge lugs pa (“Gelugpa”) sect and the Dalai Lama lineage.  And, since national mobilization 
occurs frequently through enculturation in monasteries and nunneries (as Tashi Lodoeh will 
further describe), individuals seem to come into contact with nationalist knowledge more readily 
in Central Tibet.  That Central Tibet figures as the focal point of national sentiment within Tibet  
reiterates Lhamo Tso's sense of social division between those who “know” (from Utzang) and 
“don't know”(from Amdo) about Tibet.  The emergence of political prisoners as a hegemonic 
social formation, by virtue of their archetypal representation of Tibet and Tibetans, seems to 
begin within Tibet.  And, their dominance in Dharamsala presents a continuation of historical 
power relationships between the center and peripheries of Tibetan society.
Also, Tseyang explains a sense of alienation from the Chinese through her family history 
and her experience of arrest.  She tells me,
In 1989, when I was sixteen, there was one month where many dance troupes  
were performing operas, and we were protesting during that time.  In my family,  
there was a lot of interest in politics.  I heard from my parents about the  
protests.  They were always talking to their children about Tibet and were very  
politically conscious.  They had cassette tapes of the Dalai Lama's speeches,  
and we would listen to them at night secretly, when all the guests had left.  My  
mother told me, especially, a lot about the Dalai Lama.  She had full confidence  
35 The ongoing protests at the Kirti monastery in Kham is a notable exception.
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in me because I wouldn't talk very much in general.  So, I was in Lhasa and I  
found out about a protest that was happening.  I participated without my  
parents' knowledge, otherwise, they wouldn't have allowed it.  The protest was  
at Norbulinka, and nine people were arrested, including me.
As in narratives of migration, “knowledge” about Tibet and the Dalai Lama circulates through 
kinship relations.  Tseyang seems to remember daily life with her family through their shared 
political “consciousness,” in particular, through the act of listening clandestinely to the Dalai  
Lama's speeches.  And, like many migrants who left Tibet at the resistance of their families or 
without their families' knowledge, Tseyang undertook political risk secretly.  Tseyang provides 
an example of consistent acts of resistance to state oppression in the form of migration and 
political protest.
Also, Tseyang's circumstances of arrest shed light on the ways that political protest in 
Tibet seems to function as a ritual.  Tseyang had explained that the demonstration leading to her 
arrest took place in the context of existing performances.  Barnett (2005) has noted a similar 
dynamic, in which political protesters in Tibet incorporate their demonstrations into religious 
rituals and holidays (325-327).  My informants consistently reported that Tibetans are more 
closely monitored during holidays.  Certain rituals, such as throwing tsampa (a barley flour that 
is the staple food in Tibet) in the air at the Dalai Lama's birthday are banned in Tibet.36 That 
existing Tibetan ritual becomes a mode for the performance of discontent further underlines the 
strength of the ties between Tibetan identity and political resistance.  And, that protest functions 
as performance in Tibet foreshadows its role in humanitarian discourse.  Narrative spectacles of 
suffering in exile preserve the form of political protest in Tibet.
Sangmu
36 Tsampa throwing occurs at many Tibetan celebrations, including the New Year, birthdays, and weddings.  It  
seems to function as a general sort of good luck prayer, as well as an expression of joy.
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Sangmu and I met at the office of Gu Chu Sum, the association of former political prisoners in 
Dharamsala, where she works as a secretary.  Sangmu's job seems to demonstrate another facet 
of former political prisoner's symbolic power.  Apart from Sangmu and the teacher at TTS 
described in the Introduction, all the Tibetans I knew in Dharamsala who worked for NGOs, 
schools, or the exile government were born in India.  That both Sangmu and the teacher are 
former political prisoners suggests that the experience of imprisonment may also allow for 
employment opportunities unavailable to other Tibetans from Tibet.  I visited the office a few 
days after I reached Dharamsala in April, 2011, when I was referred by a friend who told me that 
the organization houses former political prisoners who have “seen” forced abortion and 
sterilization, the starting point of my research.37  When I entered the office, I spoke with an 
employee who pointed me to the office next door, where Sangmu sat.  Sangmu speaks fluent 
Tibetan and Chinese, and knows some English.  She seemed extremely excited to speak with me, 
but I did not yet have a translator.  I came back a day later, with my friend and translator, Tenzin 
Youdon, to help.
Forty-four year old Sangmu was born in Kham, and lived in Tibet until she was 
imprisoned following political activism during her matriculation at Tibet University in Lhasa.  
She tells me,
Now, I am married, but I don't have children.  I wanted children, but it was  
mainly due to my health that I didn't have children.  From age six to twenty-two,  
I went to a Chinese school.  The Chinese started a revolutionary movement  
around this time [the late 1970s and 1980s], and their ideology influenced my  
schooling.  I grew up in a village on the way to Chamdo, and I could see all of  
Chamdo from a hill in the village, and it had the shape of a peacock.  There was  
definitely enough food, everyone was happy.  There was no poverty.  You could 
37 My informants emphasized the notion of “giving witness” to Tibetan suffering, in addition to telling of personal 
experiences of suffering.  This specific vocabulary underscores the ways that Tibetan realities are translated into  
a discursive structure of legal terminology, including “testimony”, “witness,” and “knowledge.”
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eat plants and drink water from everywhere.
Like Tseyang, Sangmu opens her narrative through a discussion of her current kinship ties, 
suggesting that forming a family in exile held significance for her.  And, that she places 
importance on her infertility will become more clear throughout her narrative.  As in women's 
narratives of migration, Sangmu emphasizes the environmental purity of the Tibet, as well as the 
people's happiness, which serves to discount the Chinese government's proclamation of their 
liberation of the Tibetan plateau.  Sangmu's nostalgic remembering paints an idyllic portrait of  
the Tibetan homeland.  And, her nostalgia seems characteristic of diasporic imagining.  As the 
following excerpts suggest, women also employ pictorial retellings of their memories to 
communicate suffering.
Tashi Lodeoh
As Tashi Lodoeh continues to speak, like Sangmu, she vividly portrays her life in Tibet. 
However, rather than nostalgically imagining her previous life, she recounts her experiences of 
torture.  She says,
In prison, men and women lived separately.  But, once you are a political  
prisoner, once you have done anything against the Chinese government or  
demanded human rights, the treatment meted out to men and women is equal.  
In tortures and interrogations, you have to admit that what you said at the  
protest was wrong, and that you believe something different.  The pictures of  
torture they have at Gu Chu Sum, those are completely true.
The pictures of which Tashi Lodoeh is speaking are a series of drawings that hang in the stairwell 
leading to Gu Chu Sum's office, in a manner similar to the photographs of suffering endured 
through migration in the entryway to the reception center.  These pictures depict common torture 
techniques used against Tibetan women, including beating, burning their breasts, hanging them 
from the ceiling by their arms and dragging barbed wire between their legs, and inserting sticks 
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into their vaginas (Fig. 11).  In addition to describing these tortures themselves, political 
prisoners pointed me towards such images, demonstrating the ways that both visual and narrative 
spectacle communicates embodied suffering.  When describing specific tortures, translators also 
added in their own references to the images at Gu Chu Sum, and gestured vividly as they spoke.
These overlapping visual and narrative performances complicate the examination of the 
emergence of the prison narrative in multiple contexts.  It is not simply that women reiterate the 
claims found in human rights literature and vice versa.  Rather, the spectacular nature of the 
prison narrative, particularly in its pictorial form suggests a process of scopophilic exoticizing 
that furthers the “narrative dispossession” (McGranahan 2010b) of former political prisoners. 
Given the sexual nature of images of the torture of female political prisoners, this narrative 
dispossession seems explicitly gendered according to a trend in consuming images of the female 
body.  The sexualization of the prison narrative points to a discord between the representation of 
torture and its lived experience; as Tashi Lodoeh suggests, Tibetan women reflect upon torture, 
including sexual violence, as an experience shared across gender.  Additionally, as described in 
the Introduction, narrative spectacles of bodily suffering seem to present an aesthetic similar to 
and work in concert with diasporic imaginings (see p. 23-24).  Although narratives of torture 
portray atrocity while nostalgic rememberings detail happiness, both seem to assert the Tibetan 
people's claims to the homeland.  That is, diasporic imaginings of Tibet suggest an inherent, 
naturalized connection between the Tibetan people and the physical territory of Tibet, while vivid 
representations of torture communicate the moral imperative of reuniting the Tibetan people with  
their homeland.
As Tashi Lodoeh continues to speak, she juxtaposes gender and ethnicity while discussing 
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the social dynamics in prison.  She says,
Generally, the soldiers who are in charge of the prison operations are female,  
but during interrogations and torture it is always men, because they are more  
fierce and they can beat harder.  In prison there weren't many Tibetans--only a  
handful.  The Chinese prisoners weren't beaten or put through torture.  They are  
not political prisoners, but had had disagreements with their superiors or  
something like that.  Tibetans worked for the Chinese government in the prisons,  
but those who gave the commands were Chinese.  Sometimes the Tibetan guards  
beat us, but they didn't beat like the Chinese did--like we were animals.  The  
Tibetans beat us because they have to do it, otherwise they will be in trouble.
Tashi Lodoeh attributes the gendered division of prison labor to innate characteristics of men and 
women.  In this way, gender difference provides a lens through which Tashi Lodoeh seems to 
understand her experiences of torture.  Also, Tashi Lodoeh seems to perceive a sense of solidarity 
among Tibetans, suggesting that Tibetan employees could recognize the prisoners' humanity 
while the Chinese could not.  Tashi Lodoeh therefore describes the social dynamics in prison in a 
manner that mirrors common understandings of the political situation in Tibet.  She suggests that 
the “Chinese” and “Tibetans” are opposed, which harkens back to her earlier reference to “the 
atrocities the Chinese perpetrate against Tibetans.”  Tashi Lodoeh's narrative thus suggests that 
the essentialization of nationality and gender influences prisoners' understandings of their 
torture.
Politicized understanding of ethnic difference seems to lead Tibetans to view 
interpersonal interactions as a microcosm of the political struggle.  Among my informants, it  
seemed that Tibetans more frequently vilified “the Chinese” in discussions of specific human 
rights violations.  Discussions of everyday relations between Tibetans and Chinese in Tibet were 
generally more nuanced.  One woman told me, “We don't hate the Chinese.  It is the Chinese  
government that is our enemy.”  In fact, it was more common for Tibetans in Dharamsala to 
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distinguish populations from their governments when discussing India and China as opposed to 
the West.  A number of Tibetans told me that although they are grateful for the Indian 
government, they dislike Indians.  Tibetans told me that “the Chinese are not bad but their 
government is bad.  In India, it's the opposite: the government is good and the people are bad.” 
And yet, in Tashi Lodoeh's narrative, national difference marks inhumanity; literally, Chinese 
guards treated Tibetans “like animals.”  Avni (2006) writes that a discourse of “human rights 
crowds out other ways of understanding harm and recompense” (207).  That is, humanitarian 
representation presents a framework that colors the interpretation, experience, and memory of 
violence.  It seems that Tashi Lodoeh may understand inter-ethnic interactions from the 
standpoint of such humanitarian representations; she seems acutely aware of national difference 
in exile, and reflects on her imprisonment by expressing alienation from her Chinese guards. 
The heightened essentialization of nationality found in my informants' descriptions of human 
rights violations may reflect a normative international discourse.  And, former political prisoners'  
statements that position “Tibetans” and “Chinese” in opposition suggest that this normative 
discourse shapes memories of torture, blurring the lines between personal violence and national 
conflict.
Tseyang
Like Tashi Lodoeh, Tseyang also highlights gender and ethnic difference in prison.  She says 
that, upon arrest,
First, we were each put in a separate room.  It was a Friday, and we weren't  
given anything because they said that the shift would change on Monday and  
we had to do with what we had until then.  I was only sixteen when I was in  
prison, so I didn't think, “ok, I'm a girl, so I'm treated badly.”  I was in prison  
for three years, and there were Chinese and Tibetans, and men and women,  
working.  During the torture for each prisoner there would be one Chinese and  
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one Tibetan interpreter.  There were two types of Tibetan interpreters: some  
were good and would allow you to go to the toilet to pee and would sometimes  
give you food, and some were bad.  Usually, the Chinese would beat us during  
interrogations.  My Tibetan interpreter was quite cruel and contributed to the  
beatings.  Maybe this was because he grew up in an environment where his  
parents didn't care about him, an environment that was not religious38 enough.
Tseyang's description of Chinese and Tibetan interrogators demonstrates that ethnic difference 
colors the ways that prisoners make sense of interpersonal manifestations of the political conflict 
in Tibet (a pattern that Tashi Lodoeh's narrative also suggests).  Tseyang seems to suggest that 
Tibetan interrogators may act with more kindness.  And, she articulates the cruelty of her Tibetan 
interpreter by referencing family and religious upbringing, pointing to a sense of affiliation. 
Tseyang seems to view Tibetan enculturation (religious and familial) as a means of cultivating 
compassion.  Retelling the prison narrative, therefore, provides testimony of the broader political  
and social conflict between the Tibetan and Chinese nations; she seems to present her Tibetan 
interpreter's violent acts as a result of a degrading religious climate in Tibet, caused by Chinese 
repression.
Noting Tseyang's statement she did not consider her gender in prison because of her age, I 
wonder if she thinks about gender difference now.  I ask if prison would have been different if 
she were male, and she says,
There was no difference, no separate treatment for men and women.  Whatever  
men had to undergo, I had to also.  It wasn't that you would have women guards  
or interrogators because you were female.
With this statement, Tseyang seems to reiterateTibetan notions of gender difference, such as the 
idea that women can tolerate less suffering than men (see p. 54, 80).  Like Tashi Lodoeh, she 
hints at an implied norm of gender differentiation between men and women that the prison 
38 It was unclear if she was speaking of specifically Buddhist religious thought, or religion in general.
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guards violated.  By emphasizing that she underwent the same suffering as male prisoners at the 
hands of male prison guards, Tseyang intensifies her description of atrocity.  The torture of 
female political prisoners represents a transgression against what seems to be a Tibetan social 
norm of protecting women from pain.
Sangmu
As Sangmu continues speaking, describes her imprisonment, echoing Tashi Lodoeh and 
Tseyang's explanations of torture.  She says,   
In 1989, I was imprisoned because I participated in an uprising from the  
Tibetan people against the Chinese.  I didn't have a major role, the Chinese just  
used the usual argument to imprison me.  It was like I was being framed.  In  
prison, the torture was not less for girls, but totally equal between genders.  
They put electric shocks and barbed wire in our vaginas, but I never felt  
vulnerable or like I got extra pain.  Everyone had pain, and the torture was  
equal.  But, I felt that because I'm doing this for Tibet, I can do anything.  
Because I'm suffering for Tibet, I can handle everything.  And I firmly believe  
that I am suffering now due to previous life cycles.
As described above, the prison narrative involves a generic plot.  Narrative imagery orders key 
moments into this generic plot: imprisonment, sexual violence through torture, and ultimately,  
empowerment through Buddhist philosophy and connection to a Tibetan collectivity.  Sangmu's 
narrative exemplifies this generic plot, since it ties together somewhat disjointed memories into  
the standardized form.  This narrative form translates memory into testimony.  Therefore, the 
framework of a humanitarian discourse seems to drive the ways that Tibetan women recall 
imprisonment.  Scholars of humanitarianism argue that narrative testimony is the key mechanism 
through which human rights media make moral claims.  McLagan (2005) writes of narrative 
testimony in human rights media as “a kind of intercultural technology, a mode of producing 
solidarity” between audience members and victims.  Sangmu's description of torture points to the 
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dynamics of embodiment in the prison narrative's performative testimony.  Narratives of 
embodied suffering serve to achieve an embodied response in a culturally distinct audience. 
Political prisoners' embodiment of Tibetan suffering thus highlights the values of universal 
humanism that mobilize human rights discourse and action.  And, it seems that the manner in 
which women such as Sangmu narrate their experiences of torture responds to the humanitarian 
notion that bodily pain is universally comprehensible.
Sangmu continues to speak about gender, describing conditions different than those in the 
prisons where Tashi Lodoeh and Tseyang were held.  She says,
In the 1980s, there were three major demonstrations in Tibet and they took many  
political prisoners.  The jails were over-crowded, so they put boys and girls  
together.  Both men and women guards tortured us, and there was no difference.  
There were Tibetan and Chinese guards, and the Tibetan guards got angry more  
easily.  
Sangmu inverts the dynamic that Tashi Lodoeh described explicitly and that Tsyeang hinted at,  
asserting that Tibetan guards, rather than Chinese guards, treated the prisoners with less 
humanity.  That each woman mentions ethnicity yet discusses it differently complicates the 
prison narrative's portrayal of the micro-interactional manifestations of the political conflict.  As  
described above, the prison narrative seems to project essentialized notions of national difference 
onto interpersonal interactions.  However, women's individual experiences of torture, under the 
legal framework of the Chinese state, reveal inconsistencies with the prison narrative's standard 
plot.  It seems that that ethnic difference provides a lens through which women interpret their 
experiences of imprisonment, although these interpretations seem idiosyncratic.  Additionally,  
like Tseyang, Sangmu describes both male and female torturers, attesting to the depth of her 
suffering.  Sangmu clarifies Tseyang's hints about gender separation, portraying unisex facilities 
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as a perversion of social and institutional norms brought about by the intensity of Chinese 
oppression (i.e. the number of arrests).  Sangmu extends the notion of perversion to her 
experience of torture, explaining that both male and female guards tortured her.  In these three 
women's narratives, discussions of gender, although consistent with the plots of English language 
human rights reports, seem to communicate different notions of sexual violence.  Whereas in 
human rights reports, sexual violence seems motivated by efforts to achieve an embodied 
audience response, these women negate the sexual nature of this violence in order to articulate 
the depth of their suffering.  And, since suffering seems to produce cultural capital, describing 
sexual violence as a form of gender equality may provide a means for women to assert their 
symbolic power.  As described in Chapter One, Tibetans sometimes competitively wield 
narratives of the suffering incurred through migration (see p. 68-69).  Women's accounts of 
sexual violence may present a similar dynamic.  Since women are supposedly weaker than men, 
their insistence that they endured torture as intense as the violence to which men were subjected 
may bolster the symbolic capital associated with their narratives of imprisonment.
Also, Sangmu describes Buddhist philosophy as a source of empowerment during her 
imprisonment.  She explains that, as well as understanding her pain to be the result of karmic 
consequences, she feels that she suffered for the Tibetan collectivity.  As Tashi Lodoeh will 
further explain, former political prisoners embody collective suffering in a manner that both 
endows them with symbolic power and validates belief in a Buddhist collectivity.
Tashi Lodoeh
Tashi Lodoeh echoes the idea that Tibetans have the strength to survive suffering because of their 
Buddhist faith.  She tells me,
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Generally, when you are put in extreme conditions and have to undergo torture,  
sickness, and mental trauma, many would consider suicide.  But, when we went  
to protest, we were prepared [by other nuns and our teachers].  We knew that  
we were doing everything for a cause, for all of Tibet, and that gave us  
confidence.  We kept praying to the Dalai Lama, and our faith in him kept us  
alive.
Tashi Lodoeh participated in the protest along with other members of her nunnery.  She mentions 
two friends, in particular, one of whom remains in Tibet.  The other shares responsibility for 
Tashi Lodoeh's restaurant.  Friendship seems to have strengthened Tashi Lodoeh's understanding 
of the collective nature of her personal pain.  As Tashi Lodoeh continues to speak, the strength of 
her personal connection to a Tibetan collectivity becomes even more salient.  She says,
I have always wished that the torture I went through was worthy of other  
Tibetans.  We have the ability to not get defeated in crises.  Even if you are not  
educated, as a Tibetan you can overcome crises.  We listen to the Dalai Lama's  
speeches and to his advice, and that helps.  I'm happy [in India] (laughing).  I  
miss my parents and that's a huge disadvantage, but it is better to stay outside a  
Chinese environment.
As in narratives of migration, Tashi Lodoeh reiterates normative messages that have become 
institutionalized.  For example, Tashi Lodoeh expresses the sense that she possesses the strength 
to undergo suffering because of her faith in the Dalai Lama, and that she views torture as a 
sacrifice undertaken for the good of “Tibet” and “Tibetans.”  Despite the pain (“disadvantage”) 
of social rupture she experiences from being separated from her parents, Tashi Lodoeh seems to 
feel empowered by her connection to the Dalai Lama and to the Buddhist community in exile.  
The message of Tibetans' collective strength in suffering circulates from those 
representing institutions, such as Dolkar at the Torture Survivor's Unit (see p. 85).  And, it is 
wielded, through the prison narrative, as a means of achieving international support based, in 
part, on romantic, almost mythical, ideas about Buddhism.  For example, an entire industry of 
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Buddhist psychology has arisen in Europe and America.39  An American activist for Tibet living 
in Kathmandu told me that “practicing Dharma” was the only therapeutic technique that 
ultimately pulled her out of depression.  The prison narrative is materially profitable because it  
has been incorporated into a humanitarian regime, international media, and Western 
understandings of Tibetan Buddhism.  With the institutionalization and international 
dissemination of the prison narrative, ex-political prisoners' symbolic capital translates into 
symbolic power, since their suffering both mobilizes political action and strengthens the 
cohesion of collective Tibetan identity.
The connection between the prison narrative and nationalism in Dharamsala demonstrates 
the ways that Tibetan attitudes seem to have been molded within a liberal humanist discourse 
that frames the political tenets of human rights.  Baumann (1997) asserts that, in the exile 
community, basic elements of Buddhist philosophy have shifted.  He explains that “chos [the 
notion of faith in Tibetan Buddhism] now 'suddenly' also encompasses concepts like equality and 
justice, whereas, for centuries, monastic power monopolization and various sociopolitical 
inequalities were similarly justified by religious interpretations of chos” (381).  The conceptual 
links between Buddhist thought and liberal humanist ideologies suggest that the religious 
convictions underlying the trope of collective suffering may be influenced by the discourse of an 
international humanitarian regime.  As Venturino (1995) explains, the very meaning of “Tibet” 
has shifted drastically in response to the diaspora's formation.  And, individual Tibetans, 
espousing a sort of “global consciousness” grapple with this shifting national identity (Nowak 
1984: 103).  Venturino writes,
39 Lopez (1998) traces this industry to Carl Jung's use of the Tibetan Book of the Dead in developing his theories of 
analytical psychology (59).
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Tibetans cannot engage their traditions from outside the narratives of events and 
structures that determine their identities and futures.  Tibetan identities already  
exist within competing ideologies and narratives...and Tibetans are directing 
their struggle for freedom toward the negotiation of these strands of narrative 
[1995: 156].
Venturino argues that imaginings of Tibetanness are molded in an international context. 
Individual Tibetans navigate within and between shifting notions of what is “Tibetan,” molding 
their personal history in response to these competing discourses.  For example, given that Tibetan 
Buddhism has throughout history institutionally structured Tibetan societies (Avedon 1984: 14), 
changing interpretations of its tenets suggest a profound cultural shift, which plays out on the 
level of the individual and can be traced in personal narratives.  Tashi Lodoeh's performance of 
the prison narrative points to a social practice of fitting personal experiences of suffering into an 
existing economy of suffering that reflects the structure of international engagement with the 
political conflict in Tibet.  And, as described above, this international engagement involves  
Western fascination with Buddhism, as well as human rights discourse.
Tseyang
As Tseyang continues to speak, she also describes the significance of the Dalai Lama to Tibetan 
prisoners.  She says,
When I was in prison, the Chinese would occasionally ask about holidays, like  
the National Uprising Day (March 10th) and the Dalai Lama's birthday and ask,  
“Do you think they are still relevant?”  If you give answers they want to hear,  
you can get through your sentence.  But, there was one question they asked me,  
“If the Dalai Lama were to come back to Tibet, we would welcome him.  Would  
you welcome him?”  And I said that I'm not ready to welcome him, if the  
Chinese are the head of Tibet.  If Tibetans and Chinese lived separately, then I  
would welcome him.  I was put in solitary confinement.  If you are about to enter  
prison and they interrogate you this way, it might prolong your sentence.
By highlighting the connection between performances of Tibetanness and political oppression, 
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Tseyang mirrors the circumstances of her arrest.  Tseyang's narrative suggests that the Chinese 
government seeks to eliminate Tibetan traditions and destabilize the relationship between 
Tibetans and the Dalai Lama in order to gain political control of the Tibetan population.  Openly 
expressing--that is, performing—Tibetanness in Tibet leads to political oppression.  However, the 
prison narrative offers another rendition of the performance of the Tibetan collectivity.  Like 
protesting within Tibet, telling the prison narrative presents a performative form of resistance, 
which employs the suffering that results from political oppression to affirm diasporic 
subjectivity.
Also, Tseyang speaks of her decision to migrate to India in a manner similar to Tashi 
Lodoeh.  She explains,
Once you are a political prisoner, society looks down on you.  It is very difficult  
to find employment...The main reason I protested was for the Dalai Lama, and  
since I had no means of living in Tibet, I came to India so that I could at least  
meet the Dalai Lama....My parents were not aware when I had fled, and they  
came to know only when I was in India, through a friend's relatives.
According to her narrative, Tseyang chose to migrate due to the practical difficulties of 
supporting herself in Tibet.  Her status as a former political prisoner created hardship in her daily 
life in Tibet, although it translates into symbolic power in exile.  And, Tseyang's choice to 
migrate without her family's knowledge parallels her experience of arrest.  In both 
circumstances, although her political knowledge (including her reverence for the Dalai Lama) 
was cultivated primarily through her family relationships, she made a singular decision to engage 
in political subversion.  Tseyang's story thus presents a tension between different forms of 
belonging to the Tibetan collectivity—both familial and diasporic.  By participating in the  
performance and spectacle of Tibetan suffering, Tseyang is displaced from a close-knit, familial,  
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social world at the same time that she is emplaced within a broader diasporic community. 40  In 
the following excerpt, Tashi Lodoeh likewise explains difficulties that have arisen after her 
release from prison.
Tashi Lodoeh
Tashi Lodoeh had stated that men and women face equal torture.  However, she emphasizes 
women's health problems, in particular, following imprisonment.  She says,
As a woman, once you are an ex-political prisoner, it is guaranteed that you will  
have physical problems.  Some have gone blind, or they go to the hospital for  
constant migraines.  Many have kidney problems, and everyone has back  
problems.  I have gone to the hospital many times, and I am taking Tibetan  
herbal medicine now.  I just got back from the hospital in Chandigarh because I  
have severe backaches and pain around my waist and hips.  It is because in  
prison during the winter, we were made to stand in frozen water and beaten with  
electric batons.  In winter now, my lower half is stone cold.  Something  
happened to my nerves.
Tashi Lodoeh therefore seems to understand her present illnesses to be the result of specific 
tortures she experienced in prison.  She embodies the remnants of torture in her present suffering, 
suggesting that gendered embodiment  does play a role in women's experiences of torture.  That 
Tashi Lodoeh discusses gender in the context of health suggests that this embodiment aligns with 
the notion of inherent physical difference between men and women that women highlighted in 
their stories of migration.  As described in Chapter One, my informants seemed to make sense of 
gendered disparities in migration patterns by highlighting men's strength.  One woman, who 
migrated with her family of four girls, told me it would have been easier for them if they had had 
a brother to help them endure the physical struggle of crossing the Himalayan plateau.  It seems, 
40  Tseyang's particular position within this new-found community also allows her access to the international 
community not available to all members of the Tibetan diaspora.  Tseyang had mentioned to me at one of our 
first meetings that she had traveled to Belgium in 2008 with Gu Chu Sum to participate in demonstrations 
against China in the context of the upcoming the Beijing Olympics.  In addition to the international 
dissemination of the prison narrative, therefore, former political prisoners' symbolic power allows them to 
navigate a wider geographical space.
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therefore, that understandings of illness—an embodied effect of torture—follows Tibetan notions 
of gender difference that center on perceptions of physical strength.
Sangmu
As Sangmu continues to speak, she also describes the illnesses she has suffered following her 
imprisonment. She explains,
I had a three year sentence, but I was released after one year.  I was sick from  
the torture and I went to the hospital.  Another prisoner had pleaded to the head  
of the prison to take me to the hospital.  The prisoners had made sort of uprising  
in the prison before, so that I could get medical care, but that had failed.41  In 
general, the guards don't care about our health, but torture is illegal in China.  
Many prisoners just die if they are deeply sick, like Lopa Tsering who died by  
torture.
With her last statement,  Sangmu opens a file on her desk devoted to Lopa Tsering, a male 
political prisoner whose death Gu Chu Sum is investigating, and shows me his picture.  That she 
discusses torture and its illegality with reference to a specific individual corresponds to the use of 
personal testimony in human rights discourse.  She communicates the immorality of torture by 
painting it as a legal violation against an individual victim.  Additionally, that Sangmu describes  
this suffering in the context of health and health care demonstrates a conceptual overlap between 
illness and torture as forms of embodied suffering.  She articulates both through images of the 
suffering body, both hinge on identification with individual suffering, and both correspond to a 
discourse of human rights.
As Sangmu continues to speak, she shifts to describe life in India.  She tells me,
In India, there are problems for Tibetans who come from Tibet.  I know five  
people who cannot have babies because of drastic changes in the environment  
because Tibet is so high.  It's a problem for political prisoners, but for normal  
41 The dynamics of uprising and protest that Sangmu describes within the prison have been documented in 
scholarly literature.  Barnett (2005) notes that such uprisings were a specifically “feminized” form of protest, and  
often took the form of singing (334-355).  Sangmu, however, does not say more about the prison uprising.
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people, also.  Coming to India affects our bodies, we go to the hospital and find  
that we have infections.
Sangmu expresses that the embodied suffering resulting from migration unites Tibetans from 
Tibet.  In exploring conversation among Moscow's intelligentsia, Ries (1997) found that 
the categories people employ with regularity...are experienced as natural and 
essential, both to the users of those terms and to those who hear them.  This 
constant and ubiquitous discursive naturalization of socially constructed 
categories accounts, in large measure, for the perception that ethnicity is 
biologically, genetically, or even climatologically reproduced [25].
Tibetan narratives, such as Sangmu's, portray the physical pain associated with migration as 
medical illnesses.  Beyond symbolizing the collective suffering of the Tibetan people, illnesses 
associated with migration serve to naturalize the social division in Dharamsala between Tibetans 
born in India and Tibetans from Tibet.  By describing common experiences of illness, Sangmu's 
narrative further demonstrates the ways that the prison narrative speaks to broader concerns of 
Tibetans living in exile.  The prison narrative typically ends with a description of protracted 
illness, which, Sangmu asserts, many migrants face.  The prison narrative thus streamlines a 
common Tibetan experience of corporeal suffering, expressing it in an extremist form (that is, as 
illness resulting from torture rather than migration) that carries symbolic efficacy in an 
international humanitarian regime.
As Sangmu continues to speak, she directs us towards reproduction as a central concern 
in the realm of health and illness.  Sangmu opened her narrative by discussing her infertility, and 
continues to speak of this medical condition.  She says,
I was always willing to have a baby after I was released from prison, and I  
visited the hospital for fertility.  I found that I have a lower back problem, but I  
never came to know the real problem.  I had many relations with boys after  
prison, but it is because of all the pressures in prison that I couldn't have babies.  
I have never used any birth control, not even condoms.  In prison, I was kicked  
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all the time.  I have problems in my intestines, ovaries, and joints.  Even after  
coming to India and living with my partner, we have tried every possibility, but  
now I cannot have a baby because of menopause.  And, even forty-four is young  
for menopause.
That Sangmu focuses on her infertility over the other health problems she lists points to the 
importance of reproduction in Tibetan women's lives.  And, that she links her infertility to her 
experience of torture draws a connection between different forms of somatic suffering.
Conclusions
This chapter has analyzed the circulation of human rights discourse in Dharamsala in both 
English language human rights reports and Tibetan women's personal narratives.  Through this 
analysis, I have sought to demonstrate the ways that hegemony operates to produce normative 
knowledge in Dharamsala.  Human rights organizations and the exile government communicate a 
humanitarian framing of the political conflict in Tibet through narrative testimonies of  
imprisonment.  This humanitarian framing seems to be hegemonic, since Tibetans women 
themselves invoke generic narratives of imprisonment that mirror those found in human rights 
literature.  And, the genre of the prison narrative seems to have provided a pathway for Tibetan 
women's emergence into the narrative space of Dharamsala, granting them symbolic power 
unavailable to many other Tibetan women in Dharamsala.  The prevalence of women's renditions 
of the prison narrative, in particular, suggests that the gendered use of spectacle in an 
international regime of human rights has profoundly shaped the narrative climate of Dharamsala. 
McGranahan (2010b) explains, for example, that, in narratives of women who fought in the 
Khampa guerrilla movement,
It is not solely gender that is eclipsed in the Tibetan literature [on the war], but 
women as well...[Likewise,] in the Tibetan refugee community, there is neither a 
literary nor popular tradition of women's history.  There is not a special genre of 
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or for women's history, nor do Tibetan women disguise their histories in other 
privately or publicly acceptable genres.  Instead, most of those with whom I 
spoke tell their stories infrequently.  When they do tell them, it is in the genre of 
straightforward, first-person historical narration [774].
McGranahan found that Khampa women rarely narrated their lives even when they had 
experienced the key scenario of political resistance.  In contrast, it seemed that my informants 
felt I could access an authoritative knowledge of Tibet through former political prisoners, 
including women.  That the exile community has granted to female former political prisoners the 
power to represent the Tibetan collectivity suggests a new performative possibility for women in 
Dharamsala.  As in stories of migration, which link personal narratives to Tibet's mythico-history, 
the women cited in this chapter seem to communicate a moral ordering of the world by 
incorporating their life stories into the prison narrative.  When women frame their personal 
narratives according to the generic conventions of the prison narrative, they seem to personally 
petition for Tibetan independence.  This moral ordering figures as a sort of geopolitical strategy; 
since the exile community asserts moral claims to nationhood through a humanitarian discourse,  
it is through the international humanitarian regime that Tibet enters a world of nation states.
The narratives of female former political prisoners also clarify the ways that gender 
operates as a “hidden social infrastructure” in Dharamsala (Turner 1980:154).   I spoke with 
male political prisoners, as well, whose stories were similar to those of women in their 
deployment of archetypes of raw, physical pain.  But, I found that when women spoke of 
experiences of torture, they also mentioned gender by overtly denying its importance.  That 
women mention gender while men do not suggests that it does, in fact, influence experiences of 
torture.  Women's ability to speak of their imprisonment seems to result from a symbolic power 
that constructs them as a hegemonic social group in Dharamsala.  As a unique social formation, 
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the emergent hegemony of female political prisoners is projected into the existing hegemony of 
an international humanitarian regime. This international humanitarian regime capitalizes upon  
gender difference, and women narrate their stories by invoking gendered imagery.  And yet, 
hegemonies do not represent rigid structures of domination (Lowe 2003).  As Tibetan women tell 
of their imprisonment, they seem to negate the Euro-American emphasis on sexual violence, a 
process of narrative repossession which seems to be influenced by a sense of collective 
embodiment.
Collective Embodiment and Sexual Violence
As described above, women's renditions of the prison narrative present a central contradiction: 
they explicitly detail sexual violence, while stating directly that this violence is not gendered.  I  
argue that this contradiction responds to the dynamics of hegemony.  The greater Tibetan society 
grants female political prisoners narrative space within a humanitarian discourse.  But, in 
performing narrative testimony, women express their own understandings of gender.  And, these 
understandings of gender seem to contradict the intended impacts of sexual imagery in human 
rights media.  In a case study on political activism in the Philippines, Gregory (2006) writes that, 
in human rights media, the “efficacy and achievement of 'impact' may clash with ethical or 
truthful representation of the origins of the testimony or the context of a situation” (197).  The 
sexualized imagery of the Tibetan prison narrative seems to exemplify this process of 
misrepresentation, since it directly contradicts the ways that women describe these experiences.  
Like Gregory, Torchin (2006) argues that commercialization leads human rights media to 
capitalize upon an audience's “titillation.”  Torchin argues that “political advocacy can be carried  
out through sexual stimulation, not despite it.  Sensation provides an excellent mode of 
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publicity” (217).  Since human rights literature, and the discourse that constructs it, operates in a 
neoliberal global political economy, we can locate its intended impact within processes of  
publicity and consumption that seem to be driven by sexual imagery. 
However, the contradictions in women's narratives of imprisonment reach beyond simple 
misrepresentation.  As Barnett (2005) argues, the violence perpetrated against female political  
prisoners in Tibet “seems, as far as those of us involved in the morbid archaeology of chronicling 
these events can tell, to have been gendered: prison interrogators in Tibet appear to have 
developed special forms of abuse for these women that were not recorded by the male prisoners” 
(348).  As they tell the prison narrative, women seem to overlook the infrastructure of gender 
while they also respond to the demands of a Euro-American discourse.  Das, Kleinman, and 
Lock (1997) speak of “the role of the speech genre of a society in molding the experience of 
suffering so that certain experiences of pain and grieving become expressible while others are 
shrouded in silence” (xiv).  It seems that a humanitarian discourse has shifted the genre of 
tellable narratives in Dharamsala, rendering publicly expressible women's experiences of certain 
key scenarios.  While women's suffering through political imprisonment confers to them 
symbolic power, other lived experiences of gendered suffering in key scenarios remain 
untellable.  Women's migration narratives, which are less prevalent in human rights discourse 
and media on Tibet, obliterate the risk of sexual violence (see pp. 53-55, 59-60).  Given the 
contrasting expressions of gendered violence in the narratives of these two key scenarios, it 
seems that the influence of Euro-American discourse on linguistic performances in Dharamsala 
has allowed for women's open expressions of sexual violence during torture.  
It also seems that advocating gender sameness provides an avenue for Tibetan women's 
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empowerment.  As they tell the prison narrative, women cope with seemingly unbearable 
suffering by highlighting the collective suffering of the Tibetan people.  They abstract individual,  
bodily pain into a symbolic marker of Tibetanness.  Asserting equal suffering across genders thus 
further articulates a sense of belonging.  And, individuals seem to make sense of their 
experiences of atrocity through this sense of belonging.  The systematic nature of torture 
accentuates this dynamic; systematic enactment of the same tortures aims to produce the same 
pain.  In this way, the resulting suffering is embodied collectively.  Additionally, since Tibetan 
understandings of gender seem to position women as inherently weaker and more vulnerable 
than men, women who have survived the same tortures as men can be seen as having 
experienced greater suffering.  Because individuals seem to competitively wield narratives of 
suffering in Dharamsala, equating morality and social status with the intensity of suffering, 
women may seek to morally legitimate their symbolic power by describing pain superior to the 
suffering men have experienced.
Human rights discourse portrays collectively embodied suffering in an attempt to 
universalize bodily pain.  However, through their statements about gender equality, Tibetan 
women explain torture in a culturally specific manner.  In this way, the circulation of the prison 
narrative demonstrates a wider trend of the “globalization of local images stripped of their  
meaning” in human rights media (Gregory 2006: 201).  For example, Adams (1998) writes that, 
in testimonies of human rights violations against Tibetans, “suffering has to be made into 
something that...results from a presumed universally shared suffering.  Suffering is asked to 
speak in the language of the one who is perceived as being able to alleviate it” (82).  Adams 
argues that human rights discourse communicates suffering through a process of translation that 
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privileges Euro-American modes of expression.  Tibetan women themselves seem to respond to 
this translation, since they portray torture in accordance with Euro-American representations of 
sexual violence.  They order individual experiences of torture into a gendered narrative spectacle 
that seems structured by a Western humanitarian discourse.  And yet, they reflect upon these 
instances of violence by denying the importance of gender, emphasizing instead their belonging 
to a collectivity of suffering people.
 The prison narrative thus presents the interactions between various hegemonies, both in 
Dharamsala, and abroad.  Women seem to narrate their individual Tibetan selves within the 
structure of an existing hegemonic discourse—that of human rights.  In describing this dynamic, 
Venturino (1995) argues that, 
the Tibetan 'prisoner-self,' developed in reaction to oppression...is an undeniable 
agent of Tibetan protest and cannot be dismissed...[But it] reveals a 
powerlessness when extracted as an essence, and its logic only tends to realize 
oppressive ideology [166-167].
The narratives in this chapter demonstrate, however, that women do not remain powerless 
against colonizing, hegemonic representations of their imprisonment.  Asserting gender sameness 
presents a form of resistance to the discursive oppression that “dispossesses” women of their 
experiences of torture.  Since suffering seems to produce value in Dharamsala, women morally 
legitimate their subjectivities by asserting that they, as presumably weaker incarnations, survived 
equal torture to men.  Female former political prisoner have thus become a hegemonic group in 
Dharamsala, by structuring their symbolic power within the existing hegemony of an 
international humanitarian regime.  The following chapter continues to examine the interaction  
between personal narrative and human rights discourse, in the realm of reproductive rights.
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Chapter 3: Displaced People, Emplaced Births: Childbirth between Tibet and Dharamsala
Introduction
The previous chapters have demonstrated that as my informants tell their personal narratives, 
they (re)produce Tibet as an imagined community marked by suffering, through plots of 
migration and imprisonment.  Through these common plots, the women with whom I spoke 
employ personal experiences of suffering to communicate the collective suffering of the Tibetan 
people.  In this way, they shift between personal and collective history in a dynamic that seems 
to both affirm membership to the Tibetan collectivity and perpetuate a moral framing of the 
political conflict in Tibet.  Narrating suffering becomes socially reproductive, since it allows 
individuals cultivate, disseminate, and internalize collective and individual subjectivities.
This chapter extends the discussion of narratives of suffering to the realm of physical 
reproduction, by examining the ways that the narratives of reproductive suffering carry 
metaphorical and moral overtones. Structured around narratives of childbirth that arose during 
four extensive interviews, the chapter also intertwines shorter narrative segments that were 
collected in both formal and informal contexts with English language human rights reports from 
the Tibetan Women's Association.  In these diverse narratives, discussions of reproduction seem 
directed towards Tibet.  When I spoke with women in Dharamsala about reproduction, they 
reiterated claims of genocide, enacted through forced abortion and sterilization, that are also 
found in English language human rights literature.  Through these claims of genocide, women 
seemed to respond to a humanitarian framing of the political conflict in Tibet.  These 
descriptions of forced abortions and sterilizations seemed to operate similarly to the prison 
narrative.  In both cases, narratives of atrocity convey a moral ordering of the Tibetan conflict 
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that communicates the imperative of Tibetan freedom.  My informants politicize discussions of 
childbirth and reproduction, in a manner that demonstrates a central concern with national and 
cultural renewal in the diaspora.  In this way, even physical reproduction becomes a metaphor 
which my informants deploy as they shape and are shaped by exilic imaginings of the Tibetan 
nation and subject.
These politicized discussions of reproduction give women agency to counteract political 
conflict through their reproductive capacities.  In an overview of symbolic representations of 
reproduction, Paxson (2004) notes a similar trend in political discourses on population.  She 
explains that “Stories of fertility control and having children convey wider messages...[that] 
comment on the well-being or weakness of a population or nation” (30).  That is, in different 
cultural contexts, birthrate symbolizes the health of the collectivity.  In Dharamsala, it seems that  
concerns with population decline express broader anxieties about the annihilation of the Tibetan 
collectivity due to threats from China within Tibet, as well as population dispersal and birth 
limiting in exile.  Pronatalism, as it operates in Dharamsala, involves rhetoric that directs women 
to reproduce multiple children by portraying a radically declining Tibetan population.  However,  
this rhetoric rarely leads to action, since families prefer to limit births due to financial constraints  
(Childs and Barkin 2006).  I know of no Tibetan families living in Dharamsala who have more 
than three children.  In addition to my observations of family composition, demographic data 
suggest that the fertility rate in exile is much lower than in Tibet.  The most recent demographic  
survey of exiled Tibetans (2009) notes that the fertility rate has declined to an average of 1.18 
from an estimated 4.9 in 1987-1989.42  In response to the declining fertility rate, politicians and 
human rights organizations call on women to reproduce the collectivity.  For example, Diki, a 
42 Tibetan Planning Comission: http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=28666&t=1
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female nurse working in Dharamsala explained to me that “We hear that the population is 
decreasing from talks on the Tibetan news channel, by discussions with the Prime Minister 
during the elections.  The majority [of Tibetans] think that the declining population is a 
problem.”  By circulating testimony of genocide, human rights organizations also seem to play a 
key role in constructing knowledge of a declining population.  In Dharamsala, therefore, 
pronatalist rhetoric arises in the context of the exile government's political discourse, in 
discussions with NGO and health workers, and in personal narrative.
This chapter examines how the pervasive political discourse on reproduction that I 
encountered in Dharamsala influences women's attitudes towards and lived experiences of 
physical reproduction.  Women's personal narratives of childbirth in Dharamsala and Tibet 
complicate the connections between regulated reproduction and atrocity.  As women discuss their 
own experiences of childbirth in Dharamsala, they speak also of memories of childbirth, 
commonly of their parents and siblings, in Tibet.  As will become clear throughout the chapter, 
these memories are rife with first hand accounts of maternal and infant death, which women 
attribute to a lack of access to biomedical care.  And yet, the Chinese state enacts coercive 
reproductive regulation through biomedical establishments.  In response, women's narratives 
seem to construct biomedical reproductive intervention as a tool in the execution of genocide.  
Women's narratives thus present what seem to be conflicting attitudes biomedical reproductive 
health care in Tibet, in the contexts of childbirth and state-mandated birth limiting.  And, women 
also contrast encounters with biomedical reproductive health care in India and Tibet.  This 
chapter grapples with paradoxes in narratives of childbirth and reproduction between Tibet and 
India.
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I first encountered the framing of the political conflict in Tibet as a genocide in January, 
2011, when reading John Avedon's history of the Tibetan diaspora, In Exile from the Land of  
Snows (1984), before my departure for Kathmandu, where I would be studying with the School 
for International Training.  It was the only required reading in preparation for the program. 
Avedon's work was the first lengthy source I had read on Tibet, and I remember being struck by 
Avedon's description of a 1959 report by the International Commission of Jurists which 
“determined that Red China was guilty of 'the gravest crime of which any person or nation can 
be accused—the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group 
as such'--genocide” (79-80).  As I read this sentence, I felt shocked that I had not known about 
the severity of the conflict in Tibet.  I was extremely surprised, then, when I brought up the term 
in a meeting with my academic director at SIT, and she immediately questioned whether or not  
the conflict in Tibet really was a genocide.  Our Tibetan language teacher was in the room, and 
she turned to him asking whether he believed it was a genocide.  He looked towards the floor and 
stated simply, “Yes.”  From this interaction, it became clear to me that the deployment of the  
term is contested.  I nonetheless continued to be struck by the term's persistent circulation, so I 
explicitly asked Tibetans for their understanding of the term.  Shortly after meeting Tenzin 
Tsering, the twenty-seven year old woman who worked as my translator, we were drinking 
coffee at a café near my home, and I asked her if she considered the conflict in Tibet to be a 
genocide.  She responded,
We say when someone kills more than one million people, it's definitely a 
genocide.  Currently, they might not be shooting people, just like that, but there 
is definitely a cultural genocide, to remove the very existence of Tibetan identity 
in Tibet itself.  They are trying to sinicize everything...So there is an attempt at 
cultural genocide...because what sets us apart from the Chinese is that we are 
Tibetans, they are Chinese, we are different.  We have different history, totally 
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different our culture, traditions, folk stories, everything we have it in our own 
Tibetan way.  So if they can remove that, then we can be any other person.  They 
can mold us into being a Chinese.
In Tenzin Tsering's response, “genocide” connotes not physical, but cultural destruction.  She 
explains that, rather than “shooting people,” the Chinese state has perpetrated a “cultural 
genocide” by forcing Tibetans to become Chinese.  To me, the notion of a “cultural genocide” 
presented an oxymoron, since I associate genocide with physical annihilation.  Barnett (2001) 
has likewise noted that the use of the term “cultural genocide” does not hold up in the realm of 
(Western) international law or scholarship (284-285).  At first, I regarded the use of this term as a 
blatant misrepresentation of the political conflict in Tibet provoked by the demands of the 
international humanitarian regime in an attempt to garner sympathies for the Tibetan cause.  If  
the Chinese government, in fact, intended to annihilate the Tibetan population, why would they 
enforce more stringent regulations on Han women (Zhu et al. 2009)?  And, if local enforcement 
of the Chinese state's reproductive regulations proceeded in a discriminatory manner, how is it 
that demographers have noted increasing fertility rates on the Tibetan plateau (Childs et. al.  
2005, Goldstein and Beall 1991, Goldstein et. al. 2002: 34-45)?  It seems that culturally specific 
understandings of an overlap between the physical and spiritual realms contributes to the belief 
in a genocide.  Also, it seems that this overlap bolsters the symbolic dimensions of reproduction 
and reproductive suffering that, as will be further examined below, employ women's bodies as 
symbols of the conflict in Tibet.
Reproducing the Collectivity
In late May, one week after I spoke with Tenzin Yangzom, the twenty-two year old nun from 
Utzang living at the Tibetan Reception Center (TRC), I returned to the TRC with Tenzin Tsering 
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to conduct more interviews.  I found myself participating in a conversation among four Tibetan 
women who, through their interactions, articulated the specific ways that reproduction manifests 
itself as a collective concern in Dharamsala.  Since Mingyur, the TRC's director, gave Tenzin 
Tsering and I permission to enter the buildings and speak with whomever was willing, we 
climbed the stairs in the women's dormitory, one among several concrete block buildings, 
painted green and yellow, that make up the TRC's campus.  We found a group of four women, 
sitting on the floor of the balcony that lines the building and chatting, three dressed in jeans and 
t-shirts and one wearing a nun's red robes.  As we approached, I noticed two individuals who I 
had previously interviewed, Tenzin Yangzom, the nun whose narrative was cited in Chapter One, 
and Tsewang, a twenty-three year old woman from Amdo.  I asked the other two women if they 
would be willing to speak with me about their lives.  They agreed, after Tenzin Yangzom and 
Tsewang encouraged them.  I sat down with Tenzin Tsering, and we began to speak.
The two women whom I had not met introduced themselves as Dawa Youdon and Tsering 
Dolma.   At twenty years old, Tsering Dolma is the youngest.  A small woman from Kham, she 
has a darker complexion said to be characteristic of Tibetans from this region.  Tsering Dolma 
seemed particularly shy.  She added intermittently to the following conversation, but seemed 
reluctant to speak directly to me, sometimes even turning her body slightly away from the circle 
we had formed on the floor.  Also, Tsering Dolma speaks a particular dialect that was difficult for 
the other women, including Tenzin Tsering to understand.  The women sometimes switched to 
speak in Mandarin amongst each other, and then summarized their words in Central Tibetan for 
Tenzin Tsering.  Twenty-six year old Dawa Youdon is Tsewang's cousin, and they are visibly 
related; both women have long black hair and pale white skin, their cheeks dotted with freckles. 
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Tenzin Tsering commented to me on how beautiful they are.  Dawa Youdon and Tsewang grew 
up together in Tibet, and migrated together to India.  They reached Dharamsala only one month 
ago, as did Tenzin Yangzom.  At first, Dawa Youdon is hesitant to speak, saying that since I have 
interviewed Tsewang, I have already “heard her story.”  With this statement, Dawa Youdon 
seems to suggest that kin share personal history.  Women seem to express similar sentiments by 
conforming to collective narratives of Tibetan suffering through migration, the prison narrative, 
and, as this chapter will demonstrate, reproductive suffering.  That is, Dawa Youdon's 
understanding of her shared history with her kin seems to mirror the ways that women affirm 
collective belonging to the broader kin group of the Tibetan nation.  However, Tenzing Yangzom 
and Tsewang continue to encourage Dawa Youdon to speak, and she agrees.  I ask her why she 
came to India, and she explains that she left Tibet for the religious and educational opportunities 
that Dharamsala offers.  Dawa Youdon says, “I want to study first because it is more important.  
I want to be self-sufficient, because then you can be on your own.  Then, I will get married.” 
I ask Dawa Youdon if she wants to have children, and she replies, “Yes, I will need to  
have babies.” 
“How many?” I ask.
“One hundred!” Tenzin Yangzom calls out, loudly and jokingly.
Everyone bursts into laughter, except Tsering Dolma, who exclaims, “If you have one  
hundred babies, you will die!”
Dawa Youdon reiterates, “My first hope was to meet the Dalai Lama.  My second was to  
study.  And the third one, I haven't thought about yet, because if you study well, it can only get  
better.”
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Tsering Dolma, quickly adds, in a joking manner, “What if the third is to get married and  
the fourth is to have babies?”
Another woman, possibly Tenzin Yangzom, interjects in a high-pitched voice, almost 
screeching, “She [Tsering Dolma] wants to get married.  She has to contribute to the Tibetan  
population.  She should have one hundred babies!”
We all laugh again.  I ask Tsering Dolma why she wants to get married.  She explains,  “I 
don't know, but I want to get married.  There is a joke about young Tibetans here at the reception  
center: a foreigner came and asked the seventeen to nineteen year olds what their plans were,  
and they all said they wanted to join the monastery.  So, I told them they shouldn't join the  
monastery, that they should contribute to the Tibetan population. I wish, I am hopeful, that the  
Tibetan population will increase.”  Tsering Dolma's description of this “joke” about young 
Tibetans entering the monastery reveals a contradiction in Tibetan discussions of survival.  The 
Chinese state has threatened the Buddhist social order, and the establishment of monastic centers 
in exile encourages young adults to follow a religious path.  By joining the monastery, one 
actively contributes to the survival of Tibetan Buddhist culture.  However,  monastic life requires 
celibacy, putting an increased strain for survival on a (supposedly) decreasing population.  A few 
weeks earlier, I had mentioned this contradiction to Diki, (the nurse mentioned above who works 
in Dharamsala).  Diki responded, “If you weigh it, preserving culture is more important [than 
having children].  Without religion, culture will vanish.”  Such statements suggest that survival 
connotes both “preserving culture” and giving birth to Tibetan children.
I ask Tsering Dolma explicitly if she wants babies, and she says, “Yes, I like babies.  I  
want two minimum, five maximum.  Because five is not a really big number.  It is just because my  
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mother had five children.  Other families have eleven to twelve children, but, nowadays, most  
families have two to three children, so even five would be a lot.  The [Chinese state's] child  
policy varies from two to three children....I think this is definitely not good, because Tibetans will  
become less.”
I ask Tsering Dolma how women limit their births, and she explains that women have a 
metal IUD (referred to in English as the “Copper T”) inserted in the hospital.  She says, “Every 
year, you have to go to the hospital for a check-up, and if you haven't [gotten an IUD insertion],  
they will give it to you.  It is not done properly, and many women have become sick and died.  
My neighbor died because it was not inside her properly and when they realized, it was too late  
to fix it.  These days, some women also put plastic in their arms.”43
“And,” adds Tenzin Yangzom, “if they do heavy work, it pains them.  For one week, you  
will not be able to move your arm.”
I ask if women ever voluntarily choose to limit their births, and Tsering Dolma replies, “I 
don't think there is any Tibetan woman who doesn't want her own child, because the Chinese  
government has said so strongly that you cannot have children.  It is like a law, so there is no  
one in our race44 who would not want a baby.”
Tenzin Tsering adds (without my prompting), “What if I think I already have too many  
children?”
Tsering Dolma replies, “This wouldn't happen because the Chinese government right  
43 Tsering Dolma is probably speaking of Norplant (levonorgestrel) injections, whose rate of use scholars have 
estimated at up to 19% among Tibetan women aged 25-49 in certain localities (Goldstein et al. 2002:32). From 
my informants' reports, it seems that contraceptive injections and  IUD insertion, are far more common in Tibet 
than oral contraceptive use, a pattern noted by demographers working in Tibet (ibid, Goldstein and Beall 1991).
44 The original Tibetan was mi rigs, a word also used to described the fifty-six population subdivisions in China. 
Tenzin Tsering, Lhamo Tso and Jangchup Choesto consistently translated mi rigs as “race” rather than 
“minority,” “ethnicity” or “nationality.”
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now is saying you cannot have children and we want children. I am the youngest, so my parents  
had to pay the government for me.  I don't know how much, but it must have been expensive.”
This conversation demonstrates the ways that women link political conflict, physical 
reproduction, and cultural survival in their narratives.  All of these women have entered India 
within the last six months, and have lived only in the reception center.  Therefore, their 
statements about reproduction occur in a context closely linked to knowledge and memories of 
reproduction in Tibet.  As will be described throughout the chapter, statements from human 
rights organizations and the Tibetan exile government make similar pronouncements about the 
violation of Tibetan women through coercive reproductive regulation.  That these women have 
not been in long-term contact with statements and publications from these organizations suggests 
that concern with reproduction presents itself from the onset of life in exile, and may also occur 
within Tibet.  However, in addition to implying Tibetans' collective concern with reproduction, 
this conversation points to the ways that women navigate within the community's desire for more 
children. The women seem to advocate pronatalism, asserting that everyone “in the Tibetan race” 
wants children.  At the same time, the women's hyperbolic statements about birthing one hundred 
children seem to deflect personal responsibility for the burden of reproducing the Tibetan “race”. 
That Tenzin Yangzom, a nun, set into motion the women's hyperbolic joking epitomizes this 
dynamic.  She has removed herself from the realm of reproduction, but seems to anxieties about 
the survival of the Tibetan race (which she further describes later in the chapter) by exaggerating 
Dawa Youdon and Tsering Dolma's desire for children.  Tsering Dolma responds by retelling a 
joke of her own about how she discouraged teenagers at the TRC from joining the monastery. 
The women's conversation thus presents contradictions between pronatalism and personal 
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reproductive choice.  The women say that no one in Tibet would voluntarily use birth control, 
“because the Chinese government right now is saying you cannot have children and we want 
children.”  And yet, as they joke with each other, they direct attention away from their own 
reproductive capacities, encouraging other women to carry the burden of physically reproducing 
the nation.
As will be further examined in subsequent sections, such discussions suggest that 
physical reproduction operates symbolically as a key scenario through which Tibetans enact 
political resistance and cultural renewal.  Ortner (1978) describes key scenarios as a class of 
symbols “which both formulate[s] appropriate goals and suggest[s] effective action for achieving 
them; which formulate, in other words, key cultural strategies” (1341).  According to Ortner, key 
scenarios extend values from the realm of cultural consciousness into the field of social action. 
In Dharamsala, discourse on reproduction pushes the topic into the political arena.  Through the 
exile government's (and their associated NGOs') political attention to China's coercive 
reproductive controls, women's bodies become the site of political conflict.  Birthing children, 
then, represents an embodied resistance to Chinese control since physical reproduction works 
towards the exile community's collective goal of freedom.
In addition, physical reproduction presents another trope through which my informants 
communicate collective suffering. The women's attempts to deflect personal responsibility for 
reproduction suggests a two-fold connection between reproduction and suffering.  Birth limiting 
produces bodily suffering through the Chinese government's inadequate and forced biomedical 
reproductive interventions.  Giving birth, however, also leads to a naturalized form of suffering. 
In certain contexts, this suffering seems explicitly gendered.  Some Buddhist rites, for example, 
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are directed towards increasing one's spiritual merits by repaying one's mother for her suffering 
in childbirth.45  Buddhist notions of biologically determined gender difference also highlight 
women's natural, inevitable suffering in childbirth.  As described in Chapter One, certain 
Buddhist philosophies explain women's tribulations in pregnancy and labor as one of the reasons 
that the female body represents a lower incarnation than the male body (see pp. 54-55).  Yet, 
statements from my informants also suggest a universal association of childbirth and pain.  In 
grappling with his future, including the possibility of joining a monastery, Pema, a twenty-eight 
year old man from Amdo explained,
If I live in the city like normal lay people, I will have to have children and a 
family.  But, I'm thinking...maybe I could be a monk...But, I like children, why 
not?  It's also some kind of personal responsibility to have ten or one hundred 
children, but I'm not that strong.
In asserting that he is not “strong” enough to raise many children, Pema suggests that 
reproduction creates suffering for men, as well, extending the naturalized suffering of childbirth 
beyond the confines of gender.  Reproduction therefore seems to operate as a key symbol in two 
contexts. Through physical reproduction, women enact political resistance to China.  At the same 
time, speaking of reproductive suffering (naturalized reproductive suffering, as well as that 
produced through interactions with biomedicine) strengthens connections between Tibetanness 
and suffering.  In both contexts, the symbolic elements of biological reproduction elaborate the 
meanings of physical and cultural renewal in the diaspora.
Reproduction in National Imaginaries
As they construct the Tibetan nation as a community of shared suffering, my informants seem to 
45 In Maratika, a Buddhist pilgrimage site in northeastern Nepal, such rites (which I completed) can be performed 
by crawling through small crevasses in a cave where Padmasambhava (T. pad+ma 'byung gnas), an eighth 
century rinpoche who Tibetans widely regard as the second Buddha, is said to have meditated.
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respond to political imaginings of Tibet that emanate from the China, Euro-American human 
rights discourse, and the exile state.  As demonstrated by the conversation cited above, women in 
Dharamsala seem to internalize the discussions of reproduction that serve as a metaphor for the 
Tibetan-Chinese conflict.  The women with whom I spoke articulate pronatalism and the 
damages of state controlled reproduction as a counter-narrative to the Chinese discourse of 
development that drives reproductive regulation.  Greenhalgh explains that the One Child Policy 
presented a means for the CCP to “modernize” its population according to global norms of 
Western biomedicine and Malthusian population science (2005: 213).  In implementing the 
policy, however, “modernizing agencies inadvertently create the underside of modernity, even as 
they attempt to fabricate modernity alone” (2003:199).  That is, by associating low birth rate with 
modernity, the discourse driving the One Child Policy constructed high fertility as a marker of 
backwardness, and rural women's bodies became the primary target of reproductive regulations 
(ibid: 203, Greenhalgh 2005: 214, Chen 2011).  Many of my informants come from rural areas in 
Tibet, and report direct and indirect physical violence associated with these “modern” biomedical  
interventions.  For example, informants at TTS described Chinese officers who committed 
infanticide against babies born in excess of birth limits.  More commonly, women detailed 
physical illness resulting from forced IUD insertions and injectable contraceptives.
Gender and reproduction also infiltrate more abstract depictions of Chinese intervention 
in Tibet.  Barnett (2001) explains that as Tibet gained international recognition, Western 
discussions of Tibet “focused on the uniqueness and the violation of Tibet...'The rape of Tibet is 
going on,' a politician told a 1999 hearing of the U.S. Congress, articulating an image that lies 
within much of the language of violation found in discussions of Tibet” (274).  Such Western 
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political discourse portrays Tibet as a female sexual innocent violated by a Chinese male 
aggressor.  Barnett points to Chinese texts, which “also speak of Tibet as a sexual innocent. 
There, however, the imagery involves marriage rather than violation, and the innocence is male,  
a result of...a lack of sophistication or modernity” (ibid).  For example, Chinese literature on 
Tibet's relationship with China often employs metaphoric accounts of the marriage between a 
seventh-century Tibetan ruler and a Han Chinese princess who brought arts and technologies 
from the Tang dynasty with her to Tibet.  Barnett argues that these accounts communicate 
China's “civilizing mission toward backward peoples” (ibid).  According to Barnett, both 
Chinese and Western state discourses frame the political conflict in Tibet through the idioms of 
gender and reproduction.  And, as we will now examine, gendered symbolism in political 
discourse seems to provoke contradictions in the ways that women narrate their reproductive 
experiences, hopes, and fears.  These narratives shed light on broader insecurities that underwrite 
cultural and physical reproduction in exilic situations.
Blurred Genres: Torture, Reproduction, and Cultural Genocide
English language human rights literature provides an example of a Western discourse in which 
the violations of individual women, through torture and forced reproductive regulation, serve as 
a metaphor for Tibet's political relations.  And, it seems that women reiterate the specific 
formulations of the political conflict in Tibet that are found in this literature.  Women's narratives 
picture Chinese reproductive regulation as a driving force behind their decreasing population. 
Like the image of the tortured female body that arises in the prison narrative, vivid descriptions 
of the “forced abortion and sterilization” of Tibetan women circulate throughout human rights 
discourse.  I encountered these narrative descriptions of “reproductive rights violations” 
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spontaneously in Dharamsala, much like the prison narrative.  
In fact, human rights organizations' English language reports present overlapping 
narrative testimonies of torture and reproductive rights violations.  Since the Tibetan Women's 
Association (TWA) is responsible for much of the human rights literature that I encountered in 
Dharamsala, and since my informants directed me towards the organization, I sought to speak 
with its employees.  In particular, I was interested in understanding the connections between the 
TWA, the exile government, and Euro-American human rights organizations, as well as how the 
TWA collected the data mobilized in its reports.  I was, however, unable to secure an interview 
with anyone working in the organization.  They seemed both very busy and very tired of 
speaking with foreigners.  Although TWA employees would not take time to speak with me, 
when I explained that I was seeking to learn about women in Tibet, they encouraged me to 
purchase their published reports, including “Tears of Silence,” a booklet devoted exclusively to 
population control in Tibet.  Although the report was published in 1995, copies were available 
for purchase at the TWA's office.46  Like other reports of human rights violations, “Tears of 
Silence” links sexual violence against female political prisoners and forced reproductive 
regulation.  For example, the report recounts “an abortion technique that involves 'inserting 
electrical devices into the vagina of women who are two to three months pregnant, thereby  
killing the baby'” (emphasis in original, TWA 1995).  As described in Chapter Two, Chinese 
prison guards employ this same technique in torturing female political prisoners.  That Chinese 
officials execute torture and forced abortion, as alleged in human rights literature,47 through the 
same mechanisms connects the two phenomena.  In both scenarios, Chinese programs of 
46 Since the report was also available online, I did not purchase it.  All citations come from the online version, 
retrieved from http://tibet.dharmakara.net/tears1.html.
47 Reports from other organizations, including reports from the US based Tibet Justice Center 
(http://www.tibetjustice.org/reports/women/chinas_denial.html) contain similar descriptions of abortion.
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political oppression violate the Tibetan collectivity through women's bodies.  
My informants likewise discussed the overlapping nature of torture and reproductive 
rights violations.  For example, Sangmu, the forty-four year old former political prisoner from 
Kham quoted in Chapter Two, described Chinese birth control policies as “another kind of  
torture.  If you don't have money to pay the fines, you have to go to jail, sell your land, and one  
thing comes after another.”  This statement portrays a repertoire of torture that mirrors the genres 
of suffering that arise in Tibetans' life stories.  That Sangmu relates torture to reproductive 
regulation demonstrates connections between specifically political oppression and women's 
reproductive capacities. Sangmu's statement also demonstrates notions of joint physical and 
cultural violation.  In Chapter One, Jangchup had explained that she tells her Tamil classmates 
“how China tortured Tibet” (p. 66). This statement, which employs the nation as a synecdoche 
for the suffering of the Tibetan people, suggests that “torture” provides a framework through 
which my informants seem to understand personal and political history.
As suggested above, the understanding of the political conflict in Tibet as a genocide 
seems to have arisen through a humanitarian framing of the Tibetan cause (Barnett 2001: 284-
285).  English language human rights literature explicitly portrays “forced abortions and 
sterilizations” as a tool in the execution of genocide.  At the TWA's office, I also picked up a 
report created for a tour of American colleges (2007), because I fit the description of the report's 
intended audience.48  The report alleges “an organized and systematic approach to abortion and 
sterilization of Tibetan women...One woman reports a 'special abortion and sterilization unit for 
Tibetan women' in a Lhasa hospital.”  In this description of atrocity in Tibet, the Chinese state 
48 The report is also available online, at http://www.tibetanwomen.org/news/2007/2007.03.26-
usa_college_tour_handout.html. 
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deploys reproductive technologies as weapons of genocide.  And, the narrator links hospitals and 
the abortion procedures they perform to this genocide.  The TWA thus portrays China's 
reproductive controls as systematic attempts to prevent Tibetan women from reproducing. 
Tibetans with whom I spoke reiterated these connections between the Chinese biomedical 
establishment and collective suffering.   As explained above, Tsering Dolma had said that 
“Tibetans will become less” as a result of Chinese state controlled reproduction, and that “There 
is no one in our race who would not want a baby.”  These statements articulate a similar 
understanding of reproductive regulation as a struggle between races that threatens the physical 
survival of the Tibetan people.
At the same time, Tibetans seem to imagine this genocide to be a joint physical and 
cultural assault.  As described above, Tenzin Tsering explicitly referred to Chinese intervention 
in Tibet as a “cultural genocide.”  Buddhist notions of reproduction may influence my 
informants' understanding of the conflict as a unified physical and cultural violation.  In Buddhist 
terms, as opposed to the framework of international law, a cultural genocide seems logical.  As 
medical anthropologist Vincanne Adams (1998) writes, “the physical body for Tibetans is the site 
for social relationships among people who are believed to be connected to one another as a 
physical rather than a sociological fact” (89). Karma maintains this physical connection, and also 
governs the process of birth.  According to Tibetan scriptural embryology (as explained by 
Adams), a life-force (srog) combines with consciousness (sems), and both become bound to the 
physical form of the fetus.  Karma catalyzes the combination of srog and sems, and leads to 
physical conception at the moment that these spiritual elements join each other (ibid).  Since it is  
a system of ethics, karma operates in the social field; karma is characterized by the results of an 
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individual's actions on other sentient beings.  Therefore, Adams explains that “at rebirth, social 
relations with other persons become embodied in the physical presence of the person” (Ibid: 90). 
The effects of countless past social interactions are thus written on the body from the moment of 
conception.  From Adams' description of embryology, scriptural understandings of reproduction 
seem to unite physical bodies to social worlds.
This understanding of karma seems to arise in women's narratives of reproductive 
regulation.49  During our interview at the TRC, Tenzin Yangzom explained reproduction and the 
moral consequences of state mandated birth control with reference to Buddhist embryology. 
While discussing her family composition, Tenzin Yangzom said,
The Chinese government has said you cannot have many babies. They will get  
rid of the babies, give hysterectomies...[This] is very sinful, even worse than a  
mother killing something, because there are so many spirits waiting for  
bodies....When people have twins and triplets, that is because there are so many  
spirits who are desperate for human lives.  Nowadays, you can have either two  
or three children, I'm not sure which, and then after that you have to get an  
injection and are fined.  Even if you are not put in jail, you are still  
punished...There are announcements from the village head that it is the day to  
get the injection, and the women have to go to Shang to have it done.  This  
happened to my sister-in law, and it was not her choice.  In Tibet, if you are a  
nomad, you are always in need of more family members, so it is definitely not  
our choice...My mother's friend had more than the desired number of children  
given by the Chinese, and had to tell the Chinese government that her child  
belonged to a nomad friend who was far away.  The village chief comes through  
to get the census and all the people are listed in a book.  I was not very aware of  
the motivations while I was in Tibet, but now I see what it is, and it is definitely  
to decrease the Tibetan population, to make it less and less and to increase the  
Chinese population in Tibet.
49 My informants also invoked the notion of karma in discussions of torture.  Presenting an institutionalized version 
of the prison narrative, Dolkar, the employee at the Torture Survivor's Unit, had asserted that former political  
prisoners have very high coping mechanisms because “we believe in karmic relations, so we think that we might 
have done something wrong in a past life and that is the reason we are experiencing hardship now” (see p. 85).  
In what seemed to be accordance with this normative framing of coping with torture, Sangmu had asserted, “I  
firmly believe that I am suffering now due to previous life cycles” (see p.112).  In these statements, “karma” 
provides a channel through which my informants seem to understand trauma and misfortune; as Dolkar and 
Sangmu articulate the function of the shared belief, it provides a relief from suffering.
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In this statement, Tenzin Yangzom describes birth restrictions as a social transgression against 
the future generation of Tibetans; she makes a moral statement while engaging with what seem 
to be Buddhist theories of conception, such as those described by Adams.  This religious 
proscription against Chinese birth regulation supports the interpretation of the political conflict in  
Tibet as a collective violation.  Tenzin Yangzom portrays birth prevention as a form of violence 
against the spiritual world, which (as Adams suggests) Buddhist philosophies link to the social 
world.  This unity between social and spiritual violation may influence understandings of 
individual and collective violation.  Individual reproductive capacity, even when not exercised, 
provides an avenue for others' spiritual advancement (through their potential to obtain a human 
incarnation).  Notions of karma seem to join the violation of individual women's reproductive 
capacities to collective suffering.
The pronomial structure of Tenzin Yangzom's narrative excerpt seems to further evidence 
the ways that reproductive regulation presents a collective trauma.  When speaking of her sister-
in-law's experience of forced contraceptive use, Tenzin Yangzom first emphasizes that “it was 
not her choice.”  She then provides an example of nomad who wishes to have children, saying 
“If you are a nomad, you are always in need of more family members, so it is definitely not our 
choice.”  Within the same sentence, Tenzin Yangzom shifts from third-person to second-person 
to first-person plural.50  Tenzin Yangzom's pronomial switching demonstrates a pattern that 
50 I analyzed Tenzin Yangzom's speech only from the translated English transcript, rather than the original Tibetan.  
However, this pattern of pronomial switching seemed consistent across narratives in both English and Tibetan. 
Consider, for example, Sonam's (English) narrative of going to college.  She says, “I led a very protected, 
cocooned Tibetan life, but when you leave, that is when you really have to assert your identity as a Tibetan,” 
switching between first- and second-person when describing a generalized, hypothetical situation (see p. 71).  
Likewise, Jangchup switched between first-person singular, first-person plural, and third person when discussing 
(in English) her classmates at college: “They don't know much English, and the first time they met us, they 
called us Chinese because they had never seen our [Tibetan] faces.  We talked about Tibet in class, how Tibet  
looks, differences between Tibet and India, and about how China tortured Tibet and how people suffered under 
the Chinese.  I have never been to Tibet, but we used to get information from Tibet and we know how people are 
suffering at the Kirti Monastery.  All this news we got.  We heard much about how Tibetan people suffer” (see p.  
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constructs second-hand narratives and hypothetical circumstances as collective experiences (“our 
choice”).  Ries (1997) noted a similar dynamic in conversational litanies during Perestroika in 
Moscow.  In such litanies, speakers would begin telling a personal narrative through the first-
person singular, but would switch to employ first-person plural pronouns within a single speech 
event.  Ries argues that this pronomial switching serves to communicate “the fantasized bond of 
connection to and belonging in some kind of moral community—a community of shared 
suffering” (87).  Since Tibetans in Dharamsala likewise express a membership to a moral 
community of suffering, my informants' pronomial switching may function in a similar manner 
to that of Ries' informants.
Tenzin Yangzom's use of pronouns also mirrors human rights literature's deployment of 
narrative testimony.  Human rights reports multiply first- and second- person narratives to 
compile testimonies of systematic violation.  “Tears of Silence,” for example, quotes women 
who have undergone abortion or sterilization in hospitals in Tibet, as well as doctors, nurses and 
other Tibetans who report knowledge of these procedures being forced upon women.  Barnett 
(2001) names this form of humanitarian engagement with the Tibetan cause, in which human 
rights reports paint narrative testimonies as common-place occurrences, a “totalizing trend” 
(284-285).  Barnett seems to argue that multiplying singular events into a general trend 
invalidates personal experience and misrepresents the reality of conflict.  However, although 
human rights literature blurs individual and collective trauma, it seems that Tibetan 
understandings of violence and violation, informed by Buddhist philosophies and exemplified in 
speech patterns, do as well.  
65).  Jangchup seems to communicate a division between Tibetans and Indians (“they” and “we”), at the same 
time marking her membership to the Tibetan collectivity (she seems to employ “I” and “we” interchangeably).  
Tibetan speakers differentiate self and other through both pronouns and cases, so it does not seem that these 
English speech events would arise from structural differences between English and Tibetan.
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Descriptions of reproductive regulation as a collective violation seem to correlate with 
Tibetan women's narrative accounts of this particular violence.  When discussing the health 
services provided at the Tibetan Reception Center, Mingyur tells me, 
in Tibet, sterilization is expensive, so women use the “Copper T” [a metal IUD]. 
The material is really bad, so it starts infecting the uterus.  One woman came to 
us, and, in Tibet, the doctor did not give much attention to her when she got 
sick-- only some pain killers.  We referred the woman to another hospital.  At 
first, the doctor couldn't figure out what was wrong, and then she had to have a 
full hysterectomy.  She was really emotional and crying so much, because one of 
her closest friends died from the Copper T.
Mingyur asserts that the woman views her illness with reference to another's death, suggesting 
that individuals make sense of personal ailments in the context of a collective social suffering.  
Mingyur's narrative presents the woman's affective reaction to her illness as a response to her 
friend's death.  In this case, second-hand experience seems to produce first-hand trauma.  In the 
context of South African women's testimonies before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
Ross (2001) noticed that female witnesses “do not directly impute victimhood to the self,” 
describing their personal suffering through violence that their male family members have 
experienced (259).  It seems that narrative testimony operates similarly in Dharamsala, since 
individuals recount second-hand tales of violence.  My informants' narrative testimonies, 
however, present gender differently than those of Ross' informants: reproductive violations of 
individual women symbolize the collectivity.  Women, including representatives of institutions 
such as Mingyur, recount collective suffering by telling other women's stories.  And, it seems 
that women's stories figure as collective suffering because they produce personal suffering.
Over the past two decades, demographic analyses have countered claims of genocide 
(Childs et. al. 2005, Goldstein and Beall 1991).  Goldstein et. al. (2002) assert that birth rates in 
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Tibet “blatantly demonstrate a lack of fertility control” (20).  Other scholars have pointed to the 
official state policy of allowing two children per family among minority populations, which is in 
fact less stringent than birth restrictions on Han women (Zhu et. al. 2009).  The use of the term 
“genocide” nonetheless persists with reference to reproductive rights violations in human rights 
literature and in my informants personal narratives.  Ross (2001) argues that, in understanding 
responses to mass atrocity, “A focus solely on the body and its violation fixes an experience of 
violence in time, in an event, and draws attention away from ways of understanding that 
experience as a process that endures through time” (271).  Both human rights literature and the 
demographic studies that counter their claims seem to focus bodily suffering in this manner. 
Since they employ individual bodily suffering as a communicative channel, human rights 
organizations' reports of violation may inaccurately portray the demographic reality of fertility  
control.  This misrepresentation may influence women's belief in a genocide.  And yet, as 
described above, it seems that the effects of state-mandated birth control linger, since women 
invoke them in descriptions of personal illness.  Analyzing testimony of reproductive rights 
violations from a demographic perspective risks obliterating Tibetan experiences of violation.  A 
focus on whether or not fertility rates correlate with allegations of systematic genocide overlooks 
women's reactions to violent acts as well as to their encounters with widely circulating narrative 
testimonies.
Sacrifice and Suffering through Reproduction
In addition to highlighting the unity of the Tibetan social and spiritual collectivity, my informants  
express culturally specific understandings of reproduction that naturalize suffering.  As explained 
in Chapter Two, Sangmu had opened her narrative by explaining that she wanted children but 
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could not give birth due to health complications.  She then described her infertility as a result of  
the torture she experienced in prison (see p. 121-122).  In this way, Sangmu linked her concern 
with reproduction to violation, a connection also found in human rights literature. Sangmu 
demonstrates a narrative pattern in which women speak of reproductive violation as they recount 
a repertoire of tortures against the Tibetan people.  
Sangmu explains that she and her partner “have tried every possibility” to have children. 
But, since Sangmu is now experiencing menopause, childbirth is no longer an option.  She 
explains that forty-four is young for menopause, suggesting that early menopause may also be a 
result of the torture she suffered in prison.  I ask Sangmu why she wants a baby, and she 
explains, “It's very natural to feel this way.  Women like beautiful things, like small animals and  
babies.  It's like a sacrifice for your partner.  If I think my partner is really good, and I give my  
whole body to him, the baby is like a blessing, the result of this sacrifice.”  The notion of 
intimacy (presumably sexual intimacy) as a sacrifice highlights yet another conceptual 
connection between reproduction and suffering.  Sangmu portrays a biologically determined 
desire for children.  At the same time, her reference to birth as a sacrifice articulates an inherent  
suffering associated with reproduction.  Other informants likewise hinted at the suffering women 
must undergo through reproduction.  Before coming to India, Dolma Dechen, whose migration 
narrative was presented in Chapter One, had joined a nunnery briefly.  She told me, “One day, 
my mother's sister's sister is a nun, so I told my mother that I wanted to be a nun...Because a 
nun's life is very happy, you don't need to give birth or have a husband, you only worry about 
yourself.”  Dolma Dechen portrays the act of removing oneself from the realm of reproduction as 
a path towards a more opportune, presumably less painful life; “giving birth” and “having a 
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husband” seem to detract from potential “happiness.”  Giving birth seems to create suffering with 
or without medical care.  How, then, do women describe suffering in their personal narratives of 
childbirth?
Childbirth Narratives
This section examines the tensions that arise between women's narratives of hospitalized 
childbirth in India and their portrayals of biomedical birth control as a tool of genocide.  From 
my informants' reports, it seems that women in Tibet largely give birth at home, with the 
assistance of kin and neighbors.  Despite extensive medical texts on pregnancy and childbirth, it 
seems that Tibetan medical practices lack attention to women's experiences of birth.  Notions of 
ritual cleanliness may produce this dynamic.  Amchis (practitioners of Tibetan medicine) do not 
attend births, possibly because the pollution (grib) associated with childbirth may negate the 
sacredness of Tibetan medicines (Craig 2009: 149, 153 and Gutschow 2010: 203).  Additionally, 
ethnographers have noted that beliefs influencing cultural proscriptions surrounding Tibetan 
medical care during childbirth extend to biomedical obstetrics.  Gutschow (2010) explains that 
many ethnically Tibetan women in rural Ladakh avoid hospitals because they are embarrassed to 
give birth in front of strangers and fear ritual pollution (201).  Likewise, in Lhasa, Craig 
encountered “fears—comprehensible in both cultural and epidemiological terms—about 
hospitals being places of pollution, death, and further cycles of disease” (forthcoming: 20). 
However, Gutschow's work also demonstrates that birthing practices can change rapidly.  In 
1990, most of Gutschow's informants had never given birth with a skilled attendant, but by 2007 
73% had (2010: 192).  That my informants' accounts of childbirth in India lack discussions of 
any proscriptions against hospitalized birth highlights the cultural specificity of reproduction in 
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Dharamsala.  As Craig (2011) notes, different spaces are culturally and logistically conducive to 
different medical practices.  The space of Dharamsala seems to ease tensions between the danger 
of giving birth without biomedical care and the strong ideological stances against biomedical  
reproductive care that women express in narratives of reproductive rights violations.  Rather than 
associating biomedicine with Chinese reproductive controls, women seem to emphasize “choice” 
and “freedom” when discussing biomedical reproductive intervention in India.  At the same time, 
women also seem to employ narratives of childbirth to express social displacement.  By 
contrasting home births in Tibet with hospitalized births in Dharamsala, women articulate 
common political ideals and social realities of life in the diaspora.
Women in Dharamsala typically seek health care from two biomedical establishments: 
the Tibetan Delek Hospital, a privately funded institution located in McLeod Ganj, which 
operates for the Tibetan community (but is available to all in the Dharamsala area), and Rajendra 
Prasad Government Medical College, an Indian government hospital located in Kangra, about 
two hours away by bus and rickshaw (Fig. 5).  Until recently, the Indian government ran another 
hospital, Zonal Hospital, in lower Dharamsala, about a twenty minute bus ride from McLeod 
Ganj.  Delek Hospital seems to be the first choice for medical care,  possibly because it is located 
closer to most Tibetan homes in Dharamsala, and is staffed mostly by Tibetans.  However, Delek 
Hospital does not have a gynecologist and, while they perform routine births, many women seek 
care at or are referred to Rajendra Prasad and (in the past) Zonal instead.  The following 
narratives trace women's experiences of reproduction in these hospitals, as well as their 
memories of family members' home births in Tibet.
Rinchen Dolma
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Thirty-four year old Rinchen Dolma and I met at the Tibetan Reception Center, where she works 
cleaning and maintaining the dormitories and offices.  Rinchen Dolma came to India in 1998, 
and studied at the Tibetan Transit School (TTS).  She married four years ago, to a man she met at 
TTS.  I ask Rinchen Dolma why she got married, and she explains,
In Tibet, there are so many restrictions on childbirth and the population, so we  
thought we would get married, but we realized that we cannot have children.  I  
have been really sick, and it may be because of a previous illness that I cannot  
have babies.  I haven't been to the doctor for fertility, but I used to have problems  
with menstrual cycles when I didn't get my period and had blood clots.  This  
problem arose in India, not Tibet.  I went to different hospitals, not just Tibetan  
herbal medicine, and Indian doctors51 told me it was the changes in the weather  
that had caused the problem, from moving to a hot climate from Tibet.  The  
physician to the Dalai Lama has passed away now, but I saw him first and he told  
me I already had a blood clot, and it might not be cured instantly, but medicine  
could help.  I didn't get my period for one year, but now I do.  I took the medicine  
for six months, and I think it worked because it helped lessen the pain.  It used to  
be intolerable.
Rinchen Dolma articulates pronatalism as the factor driving her decision to marry.  In a sense, 
Rinchen Dolma marries for the collective health of the Tibetan population, which has been 
threatened by the Chinese state's birth restrictions.  According to this logic, her marriage 
provides an example of personal resistance to systematic violence.  In this case, the symbolic 
role of women's bodies as a locus of the political conflict in Tibet transforms reproductive 
agency into political agency.
I ask Rinchen Dolma if she is still trying to have children.  She answers, “We are still  
trying to have children, and praying for children.”  Since Rinchen Dolma explains that she has 
not sought medical care for her infertility in particular, she demonstrates that Tibetan women 
address problems with childbirth through religion, as well as medicine.  Also, Rinchen Dolma 
51 When my informants speak of “Indian doctors” and “Chinese doctors,” they are referring to biomedical  
practitioners in these two countries.
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emphasized that she sought care for her reproductive health issues from a variety of treatment 
options.  Gutschow (2010) likewise found that, among ethnically Tibetan women in Ladakh, 
“biomedical discourse has displaced rather than replaced both Tibetan medical and Buddhist  
discourses on birth in Ladakh...[since women] continue to employ both biomedical and Buddhist 
narratives around childbirth as each offers valid explanations for disastrous or dangerous events” 
(186).  As Rinchen Dolma further explains below, she seems to view biomedical obstetrics as the 
most logical system through which to seek assistance with childbirth, which points to a sort of 
biomedical monopoly over pregnancy and labor.  And yet, Rinchen Dolma also describes 
syncretic understandings of reproductive health and illness, involving Tibetan medicine, 
Buddhist ritual (prayer) and Western (“Indian”) biomedicine.  Rinchen Dolma's choice to pray 
rather than to seek biomedical treatment for infertility suggests that a sense of being out of place 
alters understandings of illness.  She makes sense of her illness with reference to climatological 
factors that reduce her control over her well-being.  Rinchen Dolma does not seek treatment for 
infertility, possibly because she believes that the condition is connected to another illness created 
by the stress of India's climate.  In this way, Rinchen Doma embodies geographic displacement.
Rinchen Dolma continues by describing her family in Tibet and complex birthing 
practices related to gender.  She says,
My sister has two sons.  I was in Tibet when they were both born, both at home.  
My parents were still alive, so my mother was there, and another woman from the  
neighborhood, and a maternal uncle's wife.  During the pregnancy, my mother  
took care of her, gave her a lot of meat, and she was not allowed to do work, and  
we took her for walks.  There was no special room for delivery, she just gave  
birth in her bedroom.  I was young and I don't remember, but there is a belief that  
if the baby is a boy it will feel shy because of the presence of female siblings52 
and will hesitate to come out.  I saw my sister while she was in labor, but then not  
again until after the baby was born.  When I was allowed to come in after the  
52 It was unclear if she meant the mother's female siblings or the baby's female siblings.
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baby was born, they just showed me the baby's face.
In Rinchen Dolma's experience, gender difference influences birthing practices in accordance 
with understandings of modesty.  Also, birthing practices engage a gendered kinship network, to 
which Rinchen Dolma alludes as she continues to speak.  I ask Rinchen Dolma if she would 
want a hospital or home birth, and she explains, “Definitely, in the hospital, because there is no  
one at home to take care of me except my husband, who doesn't have experience.”  Many of my 
informants likewise emphasized that their kin networks in India “do not have experience” with 
birthing, which presents an increased danger to displaced mothers living in India.  In this way, 
women such as Rinchen Dolma portray the hospital as filling a social role performed by kin in 
Tibet, from whom they are separated in India.
Rinchen Dolma juxtaposes this discussion of hospitalized birth by reiterating claims of 
genocide enacted through reproductive technologies.  She says,
 It should be entirely upon you whether you want to have children.  You know  
when you are financially sound and mentally ready.  The motivation of the  
Chinese is to slowly diminish the Tibetan population.  They do sterilizations and  
make announcements for the operation...I know so many women because once  
you get married, after you have two children, it's like you go for your turn...The  
experience is horrible. They all had a lopsided posture, their shoulders were  
tilted.  Women in India who have the operation tend to gain weight after a year or  
so but they can still stand straight.  Doctors here are very good and professional.  
But the doctors who perform these surgeries in Tibet have different motivations.  
They work for the Chinese government.  They want not only to do sterilizations  
but to slowly weaken Tibetan women.
Rinchen Dolma draws clear parallels between the biomedical establishment in Tibet and a 
genocide enacted by violating Tibetan women.  She also contrasts motivations of doctors in Tibet 
with those of doctors in India, implicating Chinese doctors in the government's destruction of 
Tibet and Tibetans.  I ask Rinchen Dolma if birth control in Tibet is ever voluntary, and she 
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responds,
In Tibet, I haven't met Tibetan women who were considering preventing births.  In  
the village, everything was in abundance, so women wanted to have as many  
children as possible.  In India, I have met Tibetan women who have had enough  
after one to two children.  It is financially difficult, you have to send your kids to  
college and pay the tuition fee.  But, they never do permanent sterilizations.  They  
insert a metal device inside, but they can take it out if they want to have  
children...The Chinese government's intention is to permanently prevent Tibetan  
women from having babies, to diminish the population. China has already  
occupied the land, but there are still Tibetans living there.  They want to bring in  
Chinese people, make the Tibetans a minority and eventually invisible...When I  
was in Tibet, I didn't know what the Chinese government was doing.  My  
knowledge was minimal compared to what I know now.  I thought that maybe it  
was just in my village, because I did not know that the Chinese were doing this  
all over Tibetan lands.  From the news, I came to know that it is in all of Tibet, I  
was more aware of China's policies and design over Tibet.  It is far worse than I  
thought while I was in Tibet.
 In this description of systematic violation, Rinchen Dolma again contrasts temporary birth 
control technologies in India with the Chinese governments' permanent responses to (perceived) 
over-fertility.  She explains her awareness of systematic forced fertility control as part of a 
political consciousness cultivated in exile.  In this way, narratives of reproductive violation seem 
to shape Rinchen Dolma's political consciousness, influencing her logics of family planning and 
kinship formation in exile.
Tenzin Dolma
Tenzin Dolma and I had spoken on a few occasions, since she works at a “cyber” (internet café) 
near the apartment where I was living.  I realized we had a mutual friend, Rinchen Tsetan, when 
Rinchen Tsetan came to my apartment one day and stopped in to see his “older sister” at the 
cyber.  I came with him, and he introduced us.  Rinchen Tsetan and Tenzin Dolma had grown up 
in nearby villages in rural Amdo. They had, however, not known each other before coming to 
Dharamsala.  Nonetheless, the geographic location of their natal villages seemed to create the 
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sense of kinship that Rinchen Tsetan expressed.  I found that many of my informants from Amdo 
described similar kinship ties, which are forged from the physical closeness of their homes in 
Tibet, but arise only in exile.  A few days after we had been introduced, Rinchen Tsetan 
suggested that I interview Tenzin Dolma for my project.  I did not have any interviews planned 
for that afternoon, so I went to the cyber to see if Tenzin Dolma was available to speak with me. 
The cyber was not busy, and her colleague was working as well, so Tenzin Dolma and I sat on a 
bench outside and began to speak.
Tenzin Dolma is twenty-eight years old, and came to India when she was “seventeen or 
eighteen.”53  She had studied at TCV Suja upon coming to India, where she learned English.  She 
has one older sister, one younger sister, and one younger stepsister, all of whom live in Tibet. 
Although Tenzin Dolma has not experienced childbirth in India, she describes memories of 
childbirth complications that profoundly shaped her life course.  In addition, Tenzin Dolma 
speaks of complex family bonds that shed light on culturally specific notions of gender and 
reproduction.  Tenzin Dolma tells me,
My mother had died, and at that time, I got lots of problems.  I was just five or 
six and my sister was three or four. From age six to ten, I was just farming in the 
village.  I helped my father with the farm.  We had a big field, and my sister 
didn't know anything about farming.  She just tried to make food and bring it to 
my father...My grandmother looked after me and my younger sister.  My father 
went to Lhasa—I don't know why—and he didn't come back for one year.  And, 
when he came back, he had one lady.  She was a stepmother, from Lhasa, but 
she didn't speak Amdo and we didn't speak Lhasa. She lived for three months 
with our family and then went back to Lhasa with my father.  After three 
months, my father brought back another woman [laughing]--it's funny, right? 
53 When recalling past events, my informants commonly referred to their ages within a one year range.  This could 
be because Tibetans frequently count the gestation period into a child's age, so that a babies are one year old 
when they are born.  As Childs (2004) notes in his study of life among ethnic Tibetans in the Nubri Valley, “To 
Tibetans, life does not begin at birth, but rather at conception” (38).  Also, I was told that all birthdays are 
traditionally marked by the new year, rather than the specific date of birth.  However, it seemed that the practice  
of celebrating individuals' days of birth was becoming common (I attended three birthday parties for Tibetan 
children during my time in Dharamsala and Kathmandu).
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She is good, and she is still living with my father.  She had a baby boy, but he 
died because we were not lucky to have a boy.  He died because of some 
sickness.  He lived for eight months in Tibet.
With her statements about her baby step-brother's death, Tenzin Dolma seems to be referring to 
common Tibetan understandings of the ways that karma governs the birth of new children. 
Scholars have noted that in Buddhist philosophies, conception occurs when a semi-conscious 
being (the combined srog and sems Adams described 1998: 89) is “impelled by the forces of its 
own karma to enter a womb at the instant of conception” (Childs 2004: 38).  The parents' karma 
likewise influences which being will be drawn to their family.54  In Chapter One, Dolma Dechen 
had described a particularly strong relationship with her mother, because she is the only daughter. 
In her description of her family composition, Tenzin Dolma seems to express the same notions of 
gender in family relationships—namely, that it is important for families to include both male and 
female children.  And, Tenzin Dolma suggests that it is due to her family's karma that her parents 
did not give birth to a male child that survived past infancy.
Tenzin Dolma also shares her first-hand experience of maternal mortality in Tibet.  I ask 
Tenzin Dolma how her mother died, and she explains,
There was one grandmother in the village, and when there are births, she used to 
help by tearing and pushing.  Women can't go to the hospitals.  The conditions 
are very poor and there are no hospitals around, so women mostly give birth at 
home.  There were two rooms in my house--one for my mother and father, their 
bedroom--where my mother gave birth.  My father was there, but I can't 
remember exactly what happened.  My mother died in childbirth.  There was 
Tibetan medicine in my village, but not a big hospital.  There was one very old 
grandfather who was good in Tibetan medicine, who was maybe seventy to 
eighty years old.  He got medicine from plants in the mountains and made 
medicine at home.
54 As Garrett (2009) explains, within Indian and Tibetan Buddhist writings on embryology, “All accounts of human 
development agree that conception is caused by three main factors: the joining of the two healthy reproductive 
substances of a man and a woman in intercourse and the consciousness of the transmigrating sentient being, 
which is generally said to be propelled toward that particular copulating man and woman by its own karmic 
imprints” (109).
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Tenzin Dolma ascribes kinship terms to both the woman who helped during births, as well as to 
the Tibetan medical practitioner.  That she describes them as a “grandmother” and “grandfather” 
suggests that they provide a form of social support, in addition to medical care.  Also, Tenzin 
Dolma seems to connect her mother's death to the lack of biomedical care in the village.  She 
emphasizes that women are not able to give birth in hospitals because of poor infrastructure. 
Further, Tenzin Dolma contrasts Tibetan medicine with “hospitals,” suggesting that she views 
Tibetan medicine to be an inadequate response to complications related to childbirth. 55  And yet, 
as Tenzin Dolma continues to speak, she also draws connections between biomedical 
establishments in Tibet and coercive reproductive regulation.
I ask about common health problems in the village, and Tenzin Dolma says,
If we are sick, we have to go ourselves to the hospital.  Some women go to the 
hospital to put metal in [their uterus].  Some women don't know how to not have 
children, but if they do they will get fined.  All operations are forced by the 
government.  It is a right to live, nobody wants this right to be controlled, but the 
Chinese government just controls everything.
At the same time that Tenzin Dolma associates the lack of biomedical care with her mother's  
death, she also draws connections between coercive reproductive regulation and Chinese 
biomedicine.  She states that in Tibet, women frequently access biomedical care in order to avoid 
the fines imposed by the Chinese government, spontaneously reiterating the claims of English 
language human rights reports.  She speaks of reproduction as a “right to live,” employing the 
liberal humanist vocabulary of human rights discourse.  However, Tenzin Dolma's descriptions 
of her mother's and baby stepbrother's deaths complicate these statements about forced 
55 Tibetan medical practitioners in Nepal  likewise told me that Tibetan medicine is ineffective for child and 
maternal health problems, and explained that the maternal mortality rate has drastically decreased with the 
introduction of Western biomedicine in Tibet.
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reproductive regulation and biomedicine.  On the one hand, hospitals provide a possible means 
of alleviating the suffering associated with maternal and infant mortality.  On the other, hospitals  
are the sites of the Chinese state's violent control of Tibetan women's bodies.
Tseyang
As explained in Chapter Two, Tseyang married and gave birth to one son in Dharamsala, who is 
now five years old.  She had opened her narrative by discussing her family, then proceeded to 
describe the circumstances surrounding her imprisonment (see p. 102).  After she describes the 
contact she currently has with her sister in Tibet, Tseyang begins to speak of her family in India 
again.  She says,
I don't want any more children because it's very difficult with one child...In exile,  
it's very difficult to have many children because it is expensive...But, it's different  
in Tibet because you are being denied the right to give birth...In my opinion, the  
motivation is just to annihilate the Tibetan race.  They already have the land  
occupied, so the next step is to get rid of the Tibetan people.  Then, the freedom  
struggle in exile would be very difficult.
Like Rinchen Dolma, Tseyang joins discussions of her personal reproductive decision-making in 
India and of reproductive regulations in Tibet.  As in narratives of migration, women seem to 
unite their personal lives with collective memory.  In this case, Tseyang shifts from a discussion 
of the general life conditions in exile to a politicized description of the conflict in Tibet as she  
describes her logics of birth planning.  Mirroring human rights literature, Tseyang speaks of 
reproductive regulation as a genocide, meant to “annihilate the Tibetan race.”  Tseyang contrasts  
the situations in Tibet and India through a focus on “the right” to give birth.  Whereas Rinchen 
Dolma had explicitly stated that she hoped to marry and have children in response to the political  
conflict, Tseyang portrays a more generalized concern with political and reproductive freedom.
Since Tseyang says she has chosen (at this moment) to only have one child, I wonder if 
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women in Tibet voluntarily limit their births.  I ask if women ever choose to have fewer children 
in Tibet.  Tseyang answers, “When I was in Tibet, I had not heard of voluntary contraception  
because once you have two children, you are forced to be sterilized before you can have a third.” 
It seems that, for Tseyang, there is no question of choice in relation to birth control in Tibet.  She 
uniformly associates birth limiting in Tibet with medicalized birth control.   And, these forms of  
birth control figure consistently as forced abortion and sterilization.  I ask how women are 
forced, and Tseyang replies, “They do operations.  When you are pregnant and have to go to the  
hospital, if they come to know you already have three children, they will forcibly abort the baby.  
I have heard of instances when they kill the baby past when you should do an abortion.”  With 
this statement, Tseyang seems to be reiterating a general politicized knowledge about human 
rights atrocities in Tibet.  Like Tseyang's first-hand account of imprisonment, her discussion of 
forced abortion presents a simplified conflict between “them” (the Chinese perpetrators) and 
Tibetan women.  However, in contrast to her vivid personal narrative of imprisonment, Tseyang 
details unspecified “instances” of reproductive rights violations.  Her descriptions of 
imprisonment and of reproductive rights violations are, in a sense, generic; both follow what 
seems to be a consistent narrative pattern, meant to communicate the same message, of the moral  
imperative of humanitarian intervention in Tibet with the ultimate goal of Tibetan independence.  
I ask about Tseyang's experience of giving birth in exile, and she explains, 
During my parents' time, all deliveries were at home.  Now, all women have to  
go to the hospital to get a birth certificate that they need later in life for their  
children. Women are supposed to do monthly check-ups.  When my sister was  
pregnant, she didn't do the monthly check-ups, but only went if she thought there  
was something wrong.  I went for check-ups at Delek hospital, but I went to  
Zonal hospital for my delivery because they couldn't handle the situation at  
Delek.  The baby excreted in my stomach and he was swallowing the stool and  
couldn't breathe, so they told us to go to Zonal hospital because they had 
161
equipment for that.  My son was in the hospital for eighteen days after birth.  In  
Zonal, they are maybe more qualified.  There are also female doctors to deliver.  
At Delek, there are new, young doctors, but I decided to give birth there  
anyways because it was supposed to be a normal delivery.
Tseyang portrays compulsory birthing practices that differ by generation.  Tseyang explains her 
decision to give birth in a hospital by asserting the importance of birth certificates.  According to 
my informants, parents need birth certificates from the exile government in order to register their  
children in schools, as well as to receive the necessary residency permits from the Indian 
government.56  She emphasizes that all women need birth certificates for their children.  This 
statement seems to apply to women in Tibet as well as in India.  Tseyang describes a significance 
of birth certificates beyond the fact that they present a means of achieving official identification 
as a Tibetan refugee.  Her discussion points to a heightened concern with bureaucratic 
citizenship, in general.  It seems that this concern responds to the association of birth certificates 
with geographic mobility.  Birth certificates allow a freedom of movement across the borders of 
nation-states that alleviates the suffering of migration.  For example, one day, I was eating dinner 
with a group of three friends from Amdo.  There was another young man with them, whom I had 
not met.  With a joking, somewhat sarcastic tone, my friend told me, “Ask him how he came to 
India, how he crossed the snow mountains.”  The young man responded, “I flew from Beijing to 
Delhi,” and everyone burst into laughter.  I asked how he could have flown, and he explained 
that since his father is Chinese, he grew up mostly in Beijing and was able to get a passport with 
his birth certificate.57 Government policies towards citizenship and movement seem to give new 
56 According to their website, the Indian Immigration Bureau requires a birth certificate, the registration certificates  
of both parents, proof of residence, and a recommendation letter from a Tibetan settlement officer in order for  
individuals born in India to receive their own registration certificate 
(http://www.immigrationindia.nic.in/Instr_Tibetans2.htm).
57 However, an informant explained to me that even Tibetans with passports often choose to migrate illegally 
because if one has a registered visa and does not return to China before the visa expires, “there will be  
problems.”
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significance to bureaucratic identification, which, in turn, influences birthing practices.
Pema Tsering
Like Tenzin Dolma, Pema Tsering and I met through my friend, Rinchen Tsetan.  Pema Tsering is 
from Chabja, the same county in Amdo as Rinchen Tsetan and Tenzin Dolma.  She and Rinchen 
met when they worked together at a restaurant run by Sonam Dolma, their “older sister” from a 
nearby county in Amdo.58  Pema Tsering lives with her husband and daughter (eight months old 
at the time of the interview [Fig. 12]), in their home, which also functions as a restaurant, near 
the Norbulinka Institute.  We met for the first time when Rinchen and I stopped in to her 
restaurant after visiting Norbulinka.  At this point in my research, I recognized a persistent 
emphasis on reproduction among my informants.  But, I had not met any women who had 
actually given birth in India.  So, I asked Pema Tsering if she would be willing to speak with me 
about her life, and about her family, in particular.  Pema Tsering agreed.  Pema Tsering studied 
English at TCV Suja for a few years, but was not confident in her ability to conduct the interview 
without a translator.  I enlisted the help of my friend, Lhamo Tso, and we made an appointment 
with Pema Tsering to conduct the interview in her home a few days later.
Pema Tsering's home consists of a main room with a television and tables, where guests 
at the restaurant can eat, in addition to a large kitchen, and a bedroom.  When Lhamo Tso and I 
arrive, we head into the bedroom with Pema Tsering and her daughter, while Pema Tsering's 
husband stays in the main room to look after the restaurant.  Pema Tsering begins her narrative 
by speaking about her family in Tibet.  She explains,
I am the youngest in my family.  I have an older brother, and two older sisters. 
58 While Rinchen Tsetan refers to Tenzin Dolma and Sonam Dolma as his “older sisters,” Pema Tsering is his 
“friend.”  The difference in kinship titles may be based on age.  Pema Tsering and Rinchen Tsetan are both 
twenty-five years old, but Sonam Dolma and Tenzin Dolma are older.
163
From when I was fourteen until I came to India, I was a singer, dancer, and a  
waitress [in Tibetan cultural shows].  I moved away from my family to Chinese  
cities, like Beijing and Shanghai.  I earned money for my sisters' school fees,  
and my brother stayed at home.  I was very happy at this time.  I would call my  
family every day, and every few months I would visit home.  Then, I would  
return to the city.  It was my first time with the Chinese, so at first there were  
many problems because I couldn't speak Chinese.  But, after some years, I could  
speak.  After I had been to many cities, I realized that if we don't have  
education, we cannot go anywhere and speak and make friends.  In the city, I  
realized that this was the problem.  Also, I didn't know about Tibetan culture  
and society.  My older sister told me that if I came here, I would understand so  
much about Tibet.  I also wanted to see the Dalai Lama.
Pema Tsering's experience as a dancer exemplifies the ways that the Chinese state builds an 
image of diversity through gendered performance.  Gladney (1994) explains that Chinese 
nationality discourse constructs identity in “binary” terms such that, 
Minority is to the majority as female is to male...The widespread definition and 
representation of the “minority” as exotic, colorful, and “primitive” homogenizes 
the undefined majority as united, monoethnic, and modern...[Therefore,] the 
objectified portrayal of minorities as exoticized, and even eroticized, is essential  
to the construction of the Han Chinese majority, the very formulation of the 
Chinese “nation” itself [93-94].  
Whereas Barnett had traced masculinity in Chinese representations of Tibet, Pema Tsering's 
employment in Tibetan cultural shows suggests that feminine portrayals of Tibetans likewise 
influence the Chinese state's purported union between Tibet and China.  Furthermore, working as 
a dancer and singer positions Pema Tsering as a symbol of the Tibetan nationality, objectifying 
her femininity.59  As Pema Tsering and I speak, I wonder to myself if her understandings of 
gender and reproduction respond to these different politics of representation.
Pema Tsering continues her narrative by discussing her marriage in India.  She explains,
I met my husband after three days in India.  We became friends because he is a 
59 As Gladney further explains, in addition to their roles in cultural performances, “The commodification of 
minorities is accomplished through the representing, packaging, and selling of their images, artworks, and 
'costumes' in the many pictorial-gazeteers...as well as in museum displays,” all of which are explicitly feminized 
(1994:97).
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singer in a group and he called me to do a dance performance with them.  He  
helped me a lot when I was in school.  He would give me money and bring me  
medicine when I was sick.  So, we married in November, 2009.  Then, we had  
our daughter.  I want more children, one boy and one girl, because when  
parents pass away, children are left with no family.  If they have no siblings, they  
will feel alone.  But, in Tibet, now you can only have one child, and if you give  
birth to two, you must pay a fine because the Chinese government decided that  
they don't want people to have so many children...But, I don't like the policy,  
because we need at least two children so that siblings can help each other.
Pema Tsering speaks about the logics of kinship formation in exile.  For Pema Tsering, financial 
and social support influenced her decision to marry, and experiences with familial death seem to 
drive her desire for multiple children.  And, Pema Tsering juxtaposes Chinese government-
mandated reproductive controls with her own logics of family planning, like Rinchen Dolma and 
Tseyang.  She suggests that these reproductive restraints place additional strain on families, 
because of the prevalence of familial death in Tibet.  It therefore seems that micro-dynamics of  
kinship, in addition to the broader imagined kinship ties that unite the Tibetan population,  
influence individual resistance to the One Child Policy, since birth restrictions present threaten 
the survival of the individual family, as well as of the population.
As Pema Tsering continues to speak, she describes her own pregnancy and childbirth. 
She explains,
When I was pregnant, I ate lots of apples and watermelon and drank milk—I ate  
nicer food than usual, and I also ate in restaurants.  Then, when the baby came,  
I had to give birth in a hospital to get a birth certificate.  It was the only way I  
could get a birth certificate for my daughter.  I went to an Indian hospital in  
lower Dharamsala.  I did a check up after one month, and then after nine  
months, I went every week.  But, the care was not good.  When I was giving  
birth, the doctors told me not to shout, and pressed down on my body.
I ask if she plans to go to the hospital for her next birth, and she explains, “I will go to the 
hospital, because it's safe.”  Even though she seems to have had a negative experience with her 
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first birth, she considers home births to be dangerous.  And, like Tseyang, Pema Tsering 
emphasizes that she “had” to obtain a birth certificate, and that a hospitalized birth “was the only  
way” to do so.
Lhamo Tso adds, in English, “Here, there are no old people, no experienced people to 
help with giving birth.”  Lhamo Tso suggests that it is a generational division, rather than simply 
ruptured kinship ties, that complicate birthing practices.  However, with this statement, Lhamo 
Tso seems to overlook earlier generations of Tibetans born in India, whose parents and 
grandparents also gave birth at home.  For example, twenty-seven year old Tenzin Youdon told 
me that her mother (who was also born in India) gave birth to all the children in her family at 
their home in Dharamsala.  She compared her mother to the Dalai Lama's elder sister, who 
Tenzin Youdon said was known to carry scissors in her chuba to assist mothers during birth. 
That Lhamo Tso makes sense of widespread hospitalized births by citing a generational gap 
points to the differing life experiences of Tibetans from Tibet and Tibetans born in India.  For 
Lhamo Tso, the immediacy of ruptured kinship ties means that she does not have contact with 
“old people” to the same extent as multi-generational families settled in India.  In this way,  
women's attitudes towards birthing practices reveal their broader life circumstances of social 
displacement.
As Lhamo Tso spoke, I remembered that, in our interview, Dolma Dechen had clarified 
the connections between the experience of social displacement and childbirth practices that Pema 
Tsering and Lhamo Tso suggest.  As described in Chapter One, Dolma Dechen has first-hand 
experience with infant mortality, explaining that two of her siblings died shortly after birth (see 
p. 41).  However, Dolma Dechen does not link the lack of biomedical care to infant death, as did 
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other women.  Rather, Dolma Dechen explains that, when giving birth, women in Tibet stay at 
home, since
they don't need to go to the hospital.  I saw my aunt when she was having a 
baby.  She was screaming and making noise and was very hurt.  Every girl in 
India should go to the hospital, because they don't have experience giving birth. 
Mothers and fathers in Tibet have experience, but some women should go to the 
hospital.  Sometimes it's very difficult.  Sometimes the mother dies, sometimes 
the baby dies, sometimes both die.  There was one woman in my village, and 
after the baby came out, blood was coming out and the floor was covered in 
blood.  She died...In India, most go to Delek hospital.  One day, I saw a woman 
who was looking after another woman who was pregnant.  The woman was 
screaming and said there was no husband, no family, just her friend.
Dolma Dechen's description of these three different births (of her aunt, a woman in her village, 
and a woman at Delek hospital) highlights the ways that women in Dharamsala invoke a trope of 
kinship when describing labor practices.  Like Lhamo Tso, Dolma Dechen suggests that social 
displacement in India necessitates hospitalized birth.  But, she also speaks of the death of her 
village mate, despite the “mothers and fathers in Tibet” who “have experience” assisting women 
in labor, demonstrating that, even with the support of kin, reproduction carries the potential for 
profound suffering.  As described above, Dolma Dechen explained that she had joined a nunnery 
briefly because removing oneself from the realm of marriage and reproduction—that is, from a 
heteronormative life path—can lead to happiness (see p. 150).  Additionally, that Dolma Dechen 
associates Delek hospital with a woman who gave birth without her husband or family again 
demonstrates that hospitalized birth seems to connote social displacement in women's narratives 
in Dharamsala.  Dolma Dechen describes the woman's kinship situation in contradictory terms, 
first saying that the woman “said there was no husband,” then recounting that the friend “said 
that the baby had many fathers,” then asserting that if women engage in intercourse with 
multiple partners, “there is no father.”  In these statements, Dolma Dechen seems to normalize 
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the association between marriage and reproduction, using “husband” and “father” synonymously. 
Since the woman had no husband, the child had no father, and the woman was left to give birth 
in the hospital without any kin, with “just her friend.”  In this story, Dolma Dechen 
communicates social rupture through the idiom of childbirth, like Lhamo Tso.  She also, 
however, points to a seemingly inevitable suffering associated with reproduction, and, by 
extension, with compulsory heteronormativity.  Chapter Four will examine the ways that women 
navigate their own hopes for the future in the context of normative processes of kinship 
formation in exile.
Conclusions
My informants' narratives of childbirth complicate the conceptual connections between genocide,  
reproduction, and the biomedical establishment in Tibet.  Like English language human rights 
reports which portray China's One Child Policy as a genocide, my informants' descriptions of 
medical care in Tibet focus on coercive interventions in reproductive health, including 
involuntary abortion and sterilization.  Human rights reports, and the narrative testimony that my 
informants reiterate, portray hospitals as the site of genocidal controls of Tibetan women's 
bodies.  And, this persistent emphasis on forced abortion and sterilization implies a collective 
embodiment.  As in narratives of migration and imprisonment, discussions of reproductive 
suffering highlight the shared affect of imagined community.  In their work on social suffering, 
Das, Kleinman, and Lock (1997) argue that “Cultural representations of suffering—images, 
prototypical tales, metaphors, models—can be (and frequently are) appropriated in the popular 
culture or by particular social institutions for political and moral purposes.  For this reason, 
suffering has a social use” (xi).  Like the prison narrative, narrative testimony of reproductive 
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rights violations seems to serve a political purpose, since experiences of suffering carry symbolic 
capital in Dharamsala and symbolic efficacy in Western humanitarian discourse.  Women's 
narratives of reproductive suffering present a social reality, although scholars contest the 
authenticity of these allegations.  Regardless of whether or not the Chinese state has perpetrated 
a genocide, women say that they have witnessed medicalized reproductive violations in Tibet 
about which they “now know.”  Normative understandings cultivated in Dharamsala therefore 
seem to influence a collective affect marked by reproductive suffering.
Culturally specific notions of health, illness, and reproduction also play into these 
understandings of collective suffering.  My informants' descriptions of karma bolster the 
possibility of collective embodiment, especially in the realm of reproduction.  Karma creates  
embodied connections between individuals, since the results of previous social interactions 
influence the kin group into which one is born.  Also, in discussions of karma, my informants 
emphasize the importance of reproductive potential.  For example, although Sangmu portrays 
reproduction as a “sacrifice” that involves suffering, she expresses great concern with infertility. 
Likewise, Tenzin Yangzom describes compulsory birth control as a violation against “spirits 
waiting for bodies.”   These understandings of karma suggest that the violation of individual 
Tibetan women's reproductive capacities produces suffering in the social and spiritual worlds. 
Since my informants describe specific instances of suffering related to the political conflict  
between China and Tibet, they paint reproductive suffering as uniquely Tibetan.  However, as 
will be examined in Chapter Four, my informants also seem to feel an embodied connection to 
social worlds beyond the Tibetan community, in particular, to Western nations.
In his study of women working in politics (as both dissidents and government officials) in 
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Lhasa, Barnett (2005) noticed similar evidence of collective embodiment related to political  
violence.  Barnett argues, 
The connection of women's bodies with their political experience does not reside 
in specific incidents, or even in the alleged practices of forced abortion and 
sterilization...It manifests as an endemic condition of somatic connectedness...
[For example,] negative political experiences, such as betraying compatriots or 
witnessing the abuse of others, express themselves as bodily or mental illness 
[362].
In the case of my informants, however, it seems that this “endemic condition of somatic 
connectedness” relates explicitly to reproduction, including narrative testimony of reproductive 
rights violations.  And, it seems that individual experiences of various “tortures”, including 
reproductive violation, communicate a uniquely Tibetan suffering that bolsters collective 
identity.  Although human rights reports speak of “forced abortion and sterilization,” my 
informants seem to understand reproductive technologies, in general, to be part of China's 
violation of the Tibetans.   Women seem not only to experience distress from memories of their 
friends' encounters with reproductive biomedicine, but also to make sense of personal health and 
illness through these memories.  And, human rights reports order such memories into narratives 
of political violation that women seem to reiterate.  In his work on political imaginings of Tibet  
(2001), Barnett challenges the narrative authority of human rights reports, explaining, for 
instance, that allegations of forced abortion and sterilization “provoked independent scholars, 
obliged by academic conventions to contest evident inaccuracies, to disprove the claims.  This 
was childishly easy to do when campaigners had described abuses as occurring systematically 
throughout Tibet” (285).  However, although scholarly, demographic data makes clear that the 
Chinese state has not successfully decimated the Tibetan population, Barnett seems to overlook 
the consequences of widespread belief in genocide.  The production of knowledge of systematic 
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violation shapes Tibetans' understandings of the political conflict.  Cultural representations of 
suffering influence the lived experience of social suffering.  And, in diaspora, these cultural 
representations hinge on the notion of joint physical and cultural violation.
Additionally, women's collective embodiment can be traced through experiences of 
maternal and infant death in Tibet.  Despite the social suffering associated with biomedicine in 
China, my informants cite the lack of access to hospital facilities as a factor driving the deaths of 
family members and friends during birth and infancy.  In this way, women's narratives both 
naturalize and pathologize the suffering associated with childbirth.  And, memories of maternal 
and infant death in Tibet and attitudes towards birthing practices in India present biomedical care 
as a means of alleviating this suffering.  Women's narratives thus reveal contradicting stances 
towards biomedicine that seem to be shaped by the cultural and political realities of life in Tibet  
and India.  In India, women emphasize their “choice” to limit births, positioning political  
freedom in line with reproduction in a manner that correlates with the association between 
political oppression and reproductive regulation in Tibet.  In Dharamsala, women's attitudes 
towards biomedical reproductive care thus seem to mirror political sentiments.
The processes that construct official Tibetan exilic subjectivities also seem to produce 
birthing practices specific to Dharamsala.  From descriptions of childbirth in personal narratives,  
it seems that women in exile choose hospitalized births in order to obtain birth certificates.  
Through their emphasis on birth certificates, women highlight the importance of bureaucratic 
identification as a Tibetan refugee.  Hospitalized births provide an avenue for children to become 
officially emplaced in the exile community.  However, although displaced women describe 
heightened concern with obtaining birth certificates for their children, from my observations, it  
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seems that most adults in Dharamsala do not possess any official identification apart from their 
registration certificates.  This dynamic suggests experiences of migration (and, as Chapter Four 
will examine, hopes for continued geographic movement) may enhance the importance of birth 
certificates.
The absence of kinship ties also seems to influence women's decisions to access 
biomedical obstetric care.  Many Tibetan women living in the diaspora lack the assistance of 
their kin throughout pregnancy and childbirth.  They access this assistance, instead, through 
biomedical establishments in Dharamsala, emplacing themselves in new systems of care. 
Therefore, the biomedical establishment in India demonstrates new configurations of kinship and 
citizenship that have emerged in Dharamsala.  Hospitals provide an avenue towards obtaining 
bureaucratic diasporic citizenship, at the same time, filling a social role left empty in diasporic  
kinship networks.  Foucault (1973) traces the connection between illness and the institution of 
the family, asserting that, “The natural locus of disease is the natural locus of life—the family:  
gentle, spontaneous care, expressive of love and a common desire for a cure...allows the illness 
itself to attain its own truth” (17).  My informants seemed to similarly naturalize care within 
kinship networks, especially during childbirth (which figures as a sort of illness given the 
prevalence of maternal and infant mortality in Tibet).  In describing scholarship on diaspora, 
Anand (2003) directs us towards the concept of “displacement as productive of, and not a 
hindrance to, structures and practices constituting diasporic culture and identity” (219).  In 
Dharamsala, displacement seems to shape understandings of reproduction and practices of 
childbirth through social and political forces.  Ruptured kinship ties, that is, social displacement,  
may lead women to view hospitalized childbirth as a response to a lack of social support.  At the 
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same time, discussions of reproduction consistently turn towards the conflict in Tibet, producing 
another narrative genre of Tibetan suffering that relies upon the national sentiments cultivated in 
exile.
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Chapter 4: Migrant Futures and the Status of Tibet
Introduction
Chapter Three demonstrated the centrality of childbirth and reproductive health in women's life 
narratives, suggesting that physical reproduction provides a powerful metaphor through which 
my informants articulate key anxieties of diasporic existence.  These anxieties center around the 
future of Tibet and Tibetans.  Given this concern with the future of the collectivity, how do 
individuals plan for their own futures?  Chapter Three examined notions of cultural and physical 
survival and associated aspects of family planning in (relatively) stable kinship networks; 
women's narratives of childbirth were set in the context of heterosexual partnerships60 in 
Dharamsala or in families in Tibet.  This chapter extends the examination of Tibetan diasporic 
kinship and citizenship ties to the narratives of young, unmarried Tibetan migrants who have not 
settled in India.  As these individuals grapple with their futures and look towards their own 
romantic, marital, and reproductive prospects, they express hopes and fears about the 
reproduction of the Tibetan people and nation, clarifying connections between the reality of 
protracted liminality in the diaspora and narrative emphasis on the survival of the Tibetan 
imagined community.  In my informants' narratives, the survival of Tibet and Tibetans is 
contingent upon both personal and collective responsibilities.  Some women express that they 
hope to give birth to and nurture children, at the same time emphasizing the importance of stable 
kinship networks to achieving this goal.  Others show resistance to marriage and reproduction, 
while they acknowledge that these processes form a normal life course.
60 I am refraining from characterizing these partnerships as marriages.  Although the four women cited in Chapter  
Three are married, many women have no formal marriage ceremony and consider themselves unmarried.  For  
example, one woman explained that there was no reason for her and her partner to get married because they do  
not have family in India who could organize the marriage celebrations.  Marriage seems to connote connections  
to an extended kin network which is not present for many in Dharamsala
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Also, as they consider their own futures, my informants articulate collective concern with 
the future of the Tibetan nation.  Sometimes, they portray this concern to be outside the realm of 
personal agency.  In these cases, political developments and the movements of kin seem to drive 
their plans to migrate beyond Dharamsala, either back to Tibet or to “the West.”  This continued 
migration reinforces the form of Tibet as a diasporic nation.  Even when individuals return to 
Tibet, they communicate information about the exile community, which in turn impels new 
migrants to journey to South Asia.  Given that nationalist sentiment communicates the moral  
imperative of realigning the Tibetan people with the Tibetan territory, perpetual migration calls  
into question understandings of “Tibet” and of the freedom movement.  At the same time, some 
women seem to see the reproduction of the Tibetan nation in diaspora as a personal responsibility 
that they can uphold by disseminating the commitment to Tibetan freedom to an international  
audience as well as to future generations.  Tibetan migrants' futures are thus bound to the 
reproduction of the Tibetan nation, a dynamic which can be traced in narrative expressions.
Narrating the Future: Imagining Communities through Continued Migration
Many of my informants live in institutions that represent and solidify a liminal state.  Given that  
their time in these institutions is limited (the Tibetan Reception Center finds new institutions to  
house the recent arrivals, students at TTS can matriculate for a maximum of five years, and 
students at branches of TCV and ES Trust either graduate or leave before finishing their 
degrees), I found myself wondering about my informants' futures.  As I spoke with them, I found 
that my informants who live at the TRC or who are in their early years at TTS focus more on the 
present.  For example, as described in Chapter One, those living at the TRC articulate their goals 
according to the normative narrative of dual motivations for migration—firstly to meet the Dalai  
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Lama, and secondly to study—possibly because they have not yet fully realized these goals. 
Students at TTS likewise explain that they remain focused largely on their education, seeing 
graduation as a concrete aim that drives their daily lives.  In contrast, students who have 
graduated or will graduate soon express longer-term goals that intersect with memories of life in 
Tibet.  In this way, examining my informants' narrative expressions of their hopes and plans 
illuminates the connections between memory, that is, imagined pasts, and imagined futures.  
These connections seem particularly relevant to the diasporic situation, in which understandings 
of “Tibet” and the future of the nation is in question.  How do individuals situate themselves 
within their personal hopes and memories, while simultaneously remaining committed to Tibetan 
freedom?
The following narratives come from three young women who have not married or given 
birth.  Two of these women, Kunchang Dolma and Tenzin Sonam, were born in Tibet.  One 
woman, Pasang, was born in Dharamsala.  I present the chapter as a conversation between 
Kunchang Dolma and Tenzin Sonam, followed by Pasang's narrative.  By juxtaposing Pasang's 
narrative with those of the women who have migrated from Tibet, I hope to illuminate 
similarities and differences in notions of national and cultural renewal across a central social  
division in the exile community.  As described in Chapter One, Tibetans born in India and Tibet 
seem to identify as migrants, either through personal experiences or family and mythico-histories 
of journeying between Tibet and India.  Despite my informants' common identification with 
migration and a sense of collective displacement, it seems that place of birth profoundly 
influences their world views. Tibetans born in Tibet and those born in exile are subject to 
different dynamics of social displacement and have different educational and political 
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backgrounds.  This chapter explores contrasting understandings of the diaspora that these 
different life experiences seem to engender.  All three narratives clarify and extend the 
metaphoric dimensions of biological reproduction introduced in Chapter Three.  In addition, 
Kunchang Dolma, Tenzin Sonam, and Pasang explain their future goals in terms of gendered 
notions of nurturance that seem to link nation-building to the formation of individual families.  
Although their attitudes towards gender and nurturance seem diverse, all three women highlight 
a concern with nurturing the Tibetan imagined community in the diaspora.
Kunchang Dolma
After meeting Dolma Dechen in McLeod Ganj, she invited me to visit her school, Education 
Support Trust (ES Trust), to interview her classmates.  Dolma Dechen described the community 
at ES Trust as her “family.”  This family encompasses twenty-four students who live together in 
one house with English teachers and a few Tibetan administrative workers.  All students 
matriculate together for two years and therefore progress through their education together. 
Among the schools in Dharamsala, ES Trust is unique because it operates through donations 
from a Swiss NGO rather than through the exile government.  Also, the school focuses 
exclusively on the English language, and all the teachers are native English speakers, who stay 
for a few months until their visas expire (and sometimes return).  By contrast, the teachers at the 
exile government schools are mostly Tibetan.  Since many individuals in Dharamsala seemed 
desperate to continue their English studies, the spots at ES Trust are coveted among graduates of 
other institutions who must take an entrance exam as part of the admissions process.  Students at 
ES Trust complete the Cambridge Primary School exam upon graduation, and receive 
certification of their English abilities.  Since the school is not related to the exile government,  
177
this certification can be used to find employment in Chinese government jobs in Tibet.
ES Trust is located near the Norbulinka Institute, so, as instructed by Dolma Dechen, I 
boarded the bus that hobbled down one of the two main mountain roads leading out of McLeod 
Ganj, getting off at the stop nearest Norbulinka where she met me.  Together, we walked down a 
dusty road dotted with a few large, fenced-in houses for about twenty minutes.  I was struck by 
these homes, which seemed more characteristic of suburban America than rural India.  As we 
walked, Dolma Dechen explained to me the landscape, pointing out the well from which the 
students sometimes must fetch water when the pipes are not working. It seems that, despite the 
impressive architecture, the area's infrastructure was similar to that of McLeod Ganj.  We 
reached a white house, its roof lined with Tibetan prayer flags, and entered.
I met the school's director briefly, who knew of my plan to visit and interview students 
through Dolma Dechen.  After we had spoken, Dolma Dechen gave me a short tour of the two 
storey house, which included a large room lined with bunk beds where male students stayed, and 
two smaller dorm rooms for female students located upstairs.  Dolma Dechen and I spent some 
time chatting in her dorm room, whispering as three other students napped on nearby bunks. 
Since the women in the upstairs dorms all seemed to be sleeping, Dolma Dechen led me back 
downstairs, to a room where students were finishing what she referred to as “art projects” that 
they had begun earlier in the day.  She pointed me towards three students, two young men and a 
young woman, who were scratching away with colored pencils on white paper.  Dolma Dechen 
instructed me to enter and speak with the students, and then walked back up the stairs.
I walked over to the young woman, who was drawing what appeared to be a map of the 
Dharamsala area.  I introduced myself as Dolma Dechen's friend, and asked what she was doing. 
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She did not seem surprised to see me.  Perhaps Dolma Dechen had told her classmates (as she 
had told the director) that I would be coming.  Also, since the students at ES Trust speak English 
quite fluently and form friendships with their Euro-American teachers, they have more 
experience interacting with foreigners than individuals at the reception center and TTS.  Also, it  
is possible that other students have cultivated friendships with foreigners, since, like Dolma 
Dechen, they sometimes travel to McLeod Ganj on their weekends.  The young woman, named 
Kunchang Dolma, confirmed that she was, in fact, drawing a map of Dharamsala.  I explained 
that I was conducting a project for my school, and asked if she would be willing to speak with 
me about her life.  She agreed.  Although she seemed shy and spoke quietly, Kunchang Dolma 
shared with me a narrative that included many short, vivid sketches of her life in Tibet and in 
India.  I asked few prompting questions.  She continued to color throughout the interview while I 
took notes, both of our hands continuously moving across papers laid out in front of us.
Kunchang Dolma is twenty-two years old, and comes from a rural area of Kham.  She has 
six siblings, including “two sets of twins, one sister, and one brother.”  Her brother is older, and 
migrated with her to India in the winter of 2008.  Kunchang Dolma and her older brother both 
entered TCV Suja together.  Kunchang Dolma has graduated and is finishing her second year at 
ES Trust, while her brother continues to matriculate at TCV Suja.  Kunchang Dolma and her 
brother left Tibet without their family's knowledge, after living by themselves in Lhasa.  In 
Lhasa, her brother worked and she attended school, performing labor as needed to help pay for 
the school fees.  As she speaks, Kunchang Dolma joins temporally distant moments, juxtaposing 
memories of Tibet with her future hopes.  She says,
Our parents gave us school fees, then we used them to pay a guide and just came 
here.  When we reached Nepal, we phoned our parents.  Of course, they are very 
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sad.  They can't believe it.  My mom cried so much.  I said that I came here to 
study, for no other reason, and that the rest is free.  Because of that, they are quite 
relieved.  I plan to go back, but right now it is quite difficult to go back because 
the Chinese don't want us to come...Even I tried to go back after I finished class 
eight at TCV, but when I got to Nepal, I could not get a visa.  My parents are 
afraid we won't see each other again because they are quite old.  If the situation is 
easy, I will go back, but everything depends on the situation.
Since she was unable to return to Tibet when she could not get a visa, political management of 
migration has shaped Kunchang Dolma's life course.  She portrays her personal future to be 
caught up in that of the Tibetan nation.  She hopes to return to Tibet in order to be reunited with 
her parents before their deaths.  And yet, she says that “everything depends on the situation,” 
imagining her future to be limited within the confines of political stability and instability.  In this  
narrative excerpt, the Chinese state governs Kunchang Dolma's personal sense of stability and 
instability; Kunchang Dolma explains that her uncertainty about returning to Tibet arises 
“because the Chinese don't want us to come”.  In this case, therefore, political conflict drives 
Kunchang Dolma's protracted liminality, which she hopes to alleviate in being reunited with her 
family.
Kunchang Dolma continues to speak about her family, explaining that her brother 
and sister are married in Tibet.  Then, she tells me,
Really, I want to get married, but not now.  In the future I want to be a good wife 
and mother.  That is my aim, because for girls it is very important to be a good 
wife and mother because then your children will be good, too.  I can't say how 
many children I want because if I have very good conditions and work, then I will 
need probably three or four.  It all depends on my conditions in the future. 
Because, my mother already has seven children, and right now she is very happy. 
My brothers and sister61 are all very good to my parents.  My mother always tells 
me this on the phone.  One day I asked her if she regrets having seven children. 
She said that when we were small, she had some problems, but now she is happy 
and she never regrets it.  During that time, the Chinese came to our place and 
61 Kunchang Dolma did not clarify whether the two sets of twins in her family are male or female, but since she 
pluralized “brothers” and not “sister,” it seems that they are all male.
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decided to control our place.  They made a revolution.62....It was very difficult for 
my mother to take care of us.
Again, Kunchang Dolma seems to connect personal well-being (“conditions”) with the political 
situation in Tibet.  She compares the difficulties her mother faced in nurturing her family to her 
own future, which remains uncertain due to ongoing political conflict.  She explains that these 
conditions will dictate the number of children to whom she plans to give birth.  Through her 
description of birth planning, Kunchang Dolma draws connections between the status of the 
Tibetan nation and her personal family formation.  Additionally, she emphasizes that forming a 
family carries significance because of her gender.  Kunchang Dolma thus naturalizes conceptual 
connections between gender and childbirth.63  As Kunchang Dolma explains, being female 
endows her with the responsibility to build a “good” family.  She describes personal agency, but 
also a potential burden, in her hopes to raise and nurture a family, which she again links to 
political conflict.  For example, Kunchang Dolma asserts that her mother achieved a present state 
of happiness, despite earlier struggles that resulted from Chinese intervention and were 
exacerbated by her need to provide for seven children.  Through notions of instability and 
nurturance, Kunchang Dolma articulates a specific form of  heteronormative pronatalism that 
idealizes overcoming political conflict in the realm of the family.  As described in Chapter Three,  
pronatalism seems to operate as a form of discursive political resistance in Dharamsala. 
Kunchang Dolma seems to express resistance by emphasizing the eventual merits that can arise 
from struggling to raise many children in the midst of political strife and its resulting material  
hardship. 
62 It was unclear which “revolution” Kunchang Dolma was describing.  She may have been describing the general  
situation in Tibet following the Chinese invasion, or she may have been referring to a number of periods of 
unrest that occurred throughout the 1980s.
63 Sangmu presented a similar dynamic, with her statement that it is “natural” for women to desire children (see p.  
150).
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However, Kunchang Dolma also restricts her imagined future to the confines of a 
normative, gendered life path. Kunchang Dolma seems to sense a duty to have children. 
Although this responsibility presents resistance to Chinese political control over the Tibetan 
population, it also constrains Kunchang Dolma's plans for her future to a heteronormative life 
course.  In contextualizing the occurrence of the issue of population in Greek political discourse, 
Paxson (2004) notes a cross-cultural trend in “the use of a female figure to symbolize, rather than 
represent, nation-states” (177-178).  Through this gendered symbolism, women “have been 
accorded a maternal citizenship that has come at the price of full inclusion in the so-called public  
sphere, or political citizenship” (177-178).  Paxson argues that, rather than being granted 
authoritative power to represent the collectivity, states have appropriated women's bodies as 
symbols. The symbolic use of women's bodies has called on women to carry the burden of 
physically reproducing and nurturing the nation.  “Maternal citizenship,” then, refers to women's 
devotion to the nation through giving birth to children, rather than through political participation.  
Kunchang Dolma describes a similar maternal citizenship, in which her reproductive capacities 
determine her life course, leading her back to the existing institution of the family in Tibet.  She 
seems to sense a duty to enact her commitment to Tibetan freedom through her reproductive 
capacities.  As Paxson further explains, maternal citizenship involves two distinct duties: 
“Qualitatively, women's traditional service in raising children within patriarchal families has 
been harnessed to national interests...Quantitatively, women have been responsible, and 
frequently commended, for birthing new citizens...” (ibid:178).  Kunchang Dolma speaks to both 
aspects of maternal citizenship, highlighting her hope to give to birth many children and to 
nurture them into “good” Tibetans.  And yet, her uncertainty about her future conditions seems to 
182
lead her to doubt her ability to follow through with these gendered responsibilities.
Tenzin Sonam
Tenzin Sonam and I met at TTS after she had participated in the class I interviewed in early May 
(described in the Introduction).  At the conclusion of the class, my translator, Tenzin Tsering, and 
I had asked if any students would be available for individual interviews.  Tenzin Sonam was 
among the students who raised their hands in affirmation.  When Tenzin Tsering and I returned to 
TTS as scheduled a few days later, we found Tenzin Sonam in her dormitory.  We sat together on 
the concrete steps outside with the summer sun, almost oppressively strong before the start of the 
monsoon season, beating down.
As she begins to speak about herself, I learn that nineteen year old Tenzin Sonam is about 
halfway through her education at TTS.  She came to India in 2009 to learn literary Tibetan in an 
exile government school, because although she studied throughout her childhood and 
adolescence in Lhasa, she was unable to find a curriculum that offered the level of Tibetan 
language instruction she sought.  The youngest of eight children, Tenzin Sonam lived with her 
parents in rural Utzang during her early childhood, until they sent her to live with her brother and 
sister in order to attend school in Lhasa.  Like Kunchang Dolma, Tenzin Sonam expresses a 
personal duty to remain committed to Tibetan freedom.  She says,
In my school in Lhasa, there was a senior Tibetan teacher who knew about  
political history, so my interest in and knowledge of Tibet and Tibetan language  
increased.  In school, I heard from friends about the Dalai Lama, and I wanted to  
study more.  My sister and brother contributed money, and that is how I came.  
My parents knew that I was planning to come.  Initially, they were hesitant  
because we had a neighbor who had gone and suffered a lot on the way.  They  
were concerned because I was the youngest, but then they started saying it would  
be good for me to go, because I would be the only one working for the Tibetan  
cause, since my brothers and sisters are busy with their own lives. Once I went to  
Lhasa, my father was no more, but when I left, those were the words my mom 
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said.
Tenzin Sonam articulates the importance of working towards the Tibetan freedom through a story 
about leaving and losing family members.  Through her mother's words, she portrays her exile as 
a sort of sacrifice in response to the political conflict.  Unlike other informants, who “knew” of 
the Tibetan cause only upon arriving in the exile community, Tenzin Sonam's schooling in Lhasa 
provoked a political consciousness that catalyzed her desire to migrate.  And, her mother's 
parting words seem to encourage her political consciousness, granting Tenzin Sonam the 
responsibility to learn for the sake of the Tibetan nation.  Whereas Kunchang Dolma explained 
that political stability and instability will restrict her movement between Tibet and India, Tenzin  
Sonam paints the political conflict as a driving factor behind her decision to migrate.  She 
migrates in spite of political instability, and, as implied in her mother's charge to “work for the 
Tibetan cause,” she expresses a sense of agency in alleviating Tibetans' collective suffering.  In 
contrast to Kunchang Dolma, who seems to see her own reproductive capacity as her primary 
means of contributing to the Tibetan freedom movement, Tenzin Sonam suggests that education 
can serve a similar goal.  And, like stories of migration, Tenzin Sonam's narrative communicates 
the political conflict in Tibet through the idiom of ruptured familial relationships—that is,  
through her father's death and her own migration.  
Tenzin Sonam's description of her father's death seems to coincide (in the form of her 
narrative, if not in the temporal sequencing of lived experience) with her moment of departure 
from her family.  The way that Tenzin Sonam raises her father's death as she describes leaving 
her family constructs a clear plot line. In this plot, Tenzin Sonam seems to associate political  
conflict with personal agency, as she will further explain when discussing her future plans.  And, 
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she marks her dissociation from her family—from her father upon his death and from her other 
family members through migration—in political terms.  I ask how her father died, and she 
explains,
He was not well when I was in Lhasa.  There was no doctor in my village, they  
had just one for six villages.  He had a disease, something to do with the lungs.  
He was coughing a lot.  The fee for the hospital was very high—of course it was  
expensive because it was a Chinese hospital, and it was difficult for us to take  
him to the hospital every day.  I didn't know about it for a year, and then five to  
six months after I found out, he just passed away.  I am very attached to my  
parents, very attached to my parents.  In the hospital we took him to, they have  
Chinese medicines.64  There is a Tibetan doctor, but it is difficult for him to  
practice Tibetan medicine. You can only take Tibetan medicine for private use,  
because the Chinese have laid restrictions.  Tibetans generally feel that Tibetan  
medicine is better, so otherwise they would stop going to Chinese hospitals.  And,  
I've heard that the Chinese medicines distributed to Tibet are all expired.  They  
are dumped to Tibet from the cities because no one there will take them, and  
Tibetans think that if it is expired less than one month or one year it is ok.
Tenzin Sonam's description of medical practices in Tibet presents a microcosm of the political  
conflict, like the plot of the prison narrative.  She positions Chinese medicine and doctors in 
conflict with Tibetan patients.  This excerpt thus reiterates women's mistrust of Chinese 
biomedical interventions in the realm of reproduction (described in Chapter Three).  Tenzin 
Sonam portrays practices such as restricting access to Tibetan medicine, charging high fees, and 
distributing expired medication as intentional marginalizations of the Tibetan people.  And, that  
Tenzin Sonam had linked her father's death to a description of the Tibetan cause again draws 
personal experiences of familial illness and loss into the political realm. 
Kunchang Dolma
As Kunchang Dolma continues to speak, she further explains why she hopes to return to Tibet. 
64 As described in Chapter Three, my informants often referred to Western biomedicine as “Chinese” or “Indian”  
depending on the country in which they accessed it.  Tenzin Sonam is most likely referring to Western 
biomedicine practiced in a Chinese hospital, rather than other forms of (“traditional”) Chinese medicine.
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However, she begins to articulate insecurities in this plan.  She says,
 I don't want to marry here, but everything is possible, everything is 
changing...I'm quite afraid, whether or not that man would be good to me...We are 
girls, and if you meet a boy who doesn't take responsibility for you after you're 
married, it's quite difficult.  If we had a baby, and he left me, my life would be 
over, I think.  Here, we have lots of different people together, but in Tibet, if we 
were married we would probably know each other well, and if he treated me 
badly he would have problems, also.  But here, you hear so many stories that first 
they love each other, then they get married without telling their parents.  They just 
stay together, get a baby, and then they get divorced and the girl has so many 
problems.  I can love someone, but for me it's very difficult to get married...We 
don't have parents or relatives here, so if we get problems, there is no one to go 
to, nowhere to go to, no one to tell our problems to.
Kunchang Dolma seems to consider her future through her present state of liminality (that arises 
from ruptured kinship ties).  Although she hopes to marry in Tibet, Kunchang Dolma seems to 
express anxiety about her possibility for return.  This anxiety leads to further concerns about her 
life course in exile, since marriage and reproduction are fraught with uncertainty without the 
support of the extended family.  And, Kunchang Dolma's attitudes towards marriage portray the 
necessity of producing new kinship ties within the existing infrastructure of the Tibetan family, 
which serves as a form of social reproduction.  For Kunchang Dolma, the social reproduction of 
the extended family carries significance because of its security.  And, since she expresses a 
desire to return to Tibet for the purposes of physical and social reproduction, she communicates 
the importance of reproducing the Tibetan imagined community (an extension of the kinship ties 
of the family) in the physical territory of Tibet.  She seems to view social and physical 
reproduction, tied to the place of Tibet, as a pathway to resolving her present liminality.  Given 
that Kunchang Dolma ties her hopes to the physical territory of Tibet, she seems to envision an 
end to her personal state of diaspora, emplacing her within her natal kinship network, as well as 
within that of her future husband.  Additionally, since Kunchang Dolma portrays migrating back 
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to Tibet to be contingent upon political stability, she links her future to that of the nation.  In her  
narrative, political instability and social displacement intertwine.  Due to these intertwining  
political and social forces, Kunchang Dolma's desired return to her homeland alleviates both 
personal and national liminality.  She presents an unfinished narrative plot, whose denouement 
depends upon the future of the Tibetan nation.
Kunchang Dolma's explanation of her desire to marry in Tibet can be understood in the 
context of changing patterns of heterosexual partnership, romance, and marriage in exile.  Many 
marriages in Tibet seem to be initiated and settled through the extended family, which informants  
often referred to as “arranged.”  According to my informants, arranged marriages are particularly 
common in rural areas, whereas, in Lhasa, “love marriages” are becoming more common.  In 
“love marriages,” the couple may meet through the extended family, but decides to marry 
without official consultation, or economic transaction, between their families.65  My informants 
explain that, in exile, “love marriages” are the norm, among both Tibetans born in exile and 
Tibetans from Tibet.  The dichotomy between arranged marriages and love marriages correlates 
with notions of modernity and cultural change that are associated with migration, both internal 
and transnational.  In contrast to Kunchang Dolma's hope that her family in Tibet would arrange 
a suitable match for her, other informants portrayed parental involvement in marriage less 
positively.  Some women presented a diachronic alteration in marriage patterns, associating 
arranged marriages with the past.  Some women drew distinctions between arranged marriages as 
economic contracts (as one woman described them, “the same like selling”), and marriage as an 
65 In addition to “love” and “arranged” marriages, my informants described a form of marriage (rogs aphrad la 
song) in which a woman purposefully leaves her window open, and a man with whom she is acquainted enters 
through the window and “kidnaps” her, taking her to his home.  The couple then spends the night together at the 
man's home, and in the morning, his family is obligated to negotiate a marriage with the woman's family.  Lhamo 
Tso told me that these marriages are rare, and occur mainly in Amdo.
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affective bond.  And yet, economic transactions continue to figure in love marriages.  For 
example, it seemed common for husbands to work in Europe and America, sending remittances 
to their wives in Dharamsala who hope to eventually join them abroad.
Additionally, like Tenzin Yangzom, Kunchang Dolma demonstrates the tendency to mark 
collective identity through shifting pronomial use (see p. 146-7).  While Tenzin Yangzom spoke 
in Tibetan, Kunchang Dolma spoke in English, suggesting a pattern of pronoun switching 
between languages (see p. 147n50).  Kunchang Dolma said, for example, “we are girls,” “if you 
meet a boy who doesn't take responsibility for you,” “I can love someone but for me it's very 
difficult to get married,” and “we don't have our parents here.”  Since Kunchang Dolma 
communicates her attitudes towards marriage through personal (first-personal singular) 
statements and collective (first-person plural) experiences, she constructs a collectivity within 
which she emplaces herself.  And, Kunchang Dolma employs hypothetical examples (second-
person), that reiterate the importance of stable heterosexual marriage; even when speaking 
hypothetically, she seems to imagine, or, at least to articulate, a single possible life course.  
Kunchang Dolma thus expresses affiliation with a collectivity of displaced women through 
pronomial shifting.  She seems to highlight women's particular need for an extended kin group as 
they formulate new, romantic kinship ties.  And, she constructs a proper female life course, 
presented as a shared community ideal, which drives the gendered logics behind her hopes of 
where to marry.
Then, Kunchang Dolma interjects a statement that seems to reiterate her reasons for 
wanting multiple children.  She explains,
Many families, even though they have a very good situation, they only want one 
child.  But, I don't think that family is very happy.  Only one child, and that child 
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feels very lonely, with no one to play with.  And, if that child goes to another 
place to work, then in that big house, there is only a father and mother.  It's quite 
lonely in your future.  If you have three to four children, it's quite difficult to give 
them everything, but in the future it will be good.  If your first child doesn't look 
after you, then probably your second child will.  And, in Buddhism, it's very good 
if we give more births.  Because right now, people control births, but if everyone 
controls births, then how can the next people be born?  My mother told me that, 
and she said that when she had twins she got lots of problems, but she still gave 
birth to seven children.  If you have more children, your life will have more 
happiness.  Some of my friends have only one or no siblings, and they told me 
they admired those who have brothers and sisters.  So, for me, one child is not 
enough.
In this excerpt, Kunchang Dolma links “happiness” to giving birth to many children, explaining 
that multiple children create more opportunities for stability, from the perspective of both 
children (since they will have playmates) and parents (since some of their children may leave or 
reject familial responsibilities).  Kunchang Dolma reiterates her earlier portrayal of family  
formation as a struggle through which one can achieve happiness through secure social bonds.  It 
also seems that her own decision to leave her family in Tibet may influence her desire for 
multiple children.  She says, “if that child goes to another place...then in that big house, there is  
only a father and mother.  It's quite lonely in your future.”  Although she articulates a strong 
bond with her mother, and seems to admire her mother's strength in birthing seven children, 
Kunchang Dolma also seems to acknowledge the difficulties that her own separation has brought 
upon her mother.
Kunchang Dolma also expresses what seem to be connections between karma and her 
personal motivation to give birth.  She explains that “in Buddhism, it's very good” to reproduce 
many children, for the sake of “the next people.”66  Again, Kunchang Dolma expresses both 
heteronormative pronatalist sentiments and gender ideals by portraying birth as a woman's 
66 This statement seems to communicate a similar message to Tenzin Yangzom's assertion that birth control 
presents a spiritual dilemma because “there are so many spirits waiting for bodies” (see p. 145)
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spiritual, as well as political, responsibility to the greater collectivity.  Furthermore, by extending  
discussions of pronatalism to spirituality, Kunchang Dolma presents giving birth as a gendered 
virtue.  Paxson (2004) likewise notes the affiliations between ethics, religion, and maternal 
thinking in Greece, explaining that “Athenian women, regardless of whether they have children, 
perceive and inhabit motherhood and womanhood as kinds of technologies—that is, as tools 
with which they craft ethical selves and social relations” (254).  Kunchang Dolma seems to 
similarly engage with notions of motherhood, since she associates her plans to give birth to 
many children with a spiritual ethic of providing human incarnations for future generations. 
Therefore, as Kunchang Dolma articulates her future plans, she seems to perform her femininity 
in line with ideals of motherhood.
Kunchang Dolma continues to speak, explaining that her sister lives with her husband 
and his family.  She tells me,
Of course, I will have to go live with my husband's family.  But, I have a plan: if I 
get a husband and his parents are still living, I will really be good to them. 
Really, I think like that all the time, because I love older men and older women.  I  
don't know the reason.
With this statement, Kunchang Dolma applies the same emphasis on the nurturance of children 
to older people.  She again portrays care and nurturance to be central among her future goals, 
also explaining plans to reproduce the existing infrastructure of the extended family in Tibet.  As 
explained above, Kunchang Dolma depicts nurturance as a struggle which results in a state of 
social stability and personal happiness.  That she extends this formulation of nurturance across 
generations, to the elderly as well as to children, further suggests that this value underlies the 
gendered logics of social reproduction.
Tenzin Sonam
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Tenzin Sonam also explains that she hopes to marry in Tibet, associating marriage with customs 
relating to gender.  She explains,
In Tibet, I want to get married because I already have plans to go back.  I think it  
is good, because in my village, there is no such thing as men being put on a  
pedestal. But, people follow customs, so men do hard work and women do  
household work.  When men come home from work, it is women's duty to pour  
them tea.  In Lhasa, though, everything is equal.  Whatever men can do, women  
can do.  Even if women just want to go and hang out, they can do that.
Tenzin Sonam seems to view marriage as a typical course of action, explaining that she will 
marry in Tibet because she has other plans to return.  In this way, Tenzin Sonam normalizes 
marriage as a part of women's life courses.  In this way, she mirrors Kunchang Dolma's 
naturalization of women's desire to marry, reproduce, and nurture children.  However, rather than 
stressing the necessity of physical reproduction as Kunchang Dolma did, Tenzin Sonam speaks of 
the influence of marriage on existing gender relations.  She describes a division of labor in her 
village different from that in Lhasa.  Nonetheless, Tenzin Sonam does not seem to consider 
marriage to be constraining, explaining that although “people follow customs,” men are not 
positioned as superior to women.  These notions of gender equity seem to drive Tenzin Sonam's 
willingness to marry as part of a normative life course.
As she continues to speak, Tenzin Sonam describes residency patterns and the rituals 
surrounding marriage in Tibet.  She explains,
When people marry, if they are going to stay on their own, the respective families  
will contribute to them building a small house, give them utensils and other  
things.  The ceremony will take place three times: at the bride's house, at the  
groom's house, and then at the couple's new house.  These days, many people  
might live separately because the family is getting too big to accommodate more  
people, but it used to be that they would just live with their families.
These details of familial organization point to ritual adaptation.  Other informants spoke of this  
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three day marriage celebration, which marks the arrival of the bride (namas) into the home of the 
groom's family.  In her narrative description, Tenzin Sonam links notions of change to patterns of 
residency, since she portrays a ritual progression from the homes of each partner to their new 
residence.  The couple's new residence figures as an icon of changing family structure.  This 
changing family structure ironically contrasts with pronatalist sentiments and fears of 
demographic demise that (most) other informants expressed.
Tenzin Sonam's description of marriage rituals can help illuminate the significance of 
kinship ties in Dharamsala because these ceremonies seem to influence patterns of kinship 
formation in exile. Marriage carries a ritual value that Tibetans in Dharamsala seem to 
conceptualize according to the social dynamics of geographic displacement.  It seems that,  
among Tibetans in Dharamsala, marriage connotes specific ritual practices, such as those Tenzin 
Sonam detailed, rather than affective bonds (“love”) or monogamous, heterosexual partnership 
for the purposes of reproduction.  For example, when I was interviewing one woman, Lhamo Ja, 
who lives in McLeod Ganj with her one year old son and her son's father, I assumed that she was 
married.  When I asked about her husband, she replied, “We aren't married.  We didn't have any  
wedding, because, we have no relatives here, so there was no need for a wedding.  Everyone  
does like this—they don't have a wedding, they just live together.”  That marriage seems 
insignificant to Lhamo Ja, while Tenzin Sonam detailed marriage rituals in Tibet, points to the 
ways that displacement seems to contribute to shifting attitudes towards family formation. 
Practices that carry ritual significance in Tibet lack meaning in exile, due to women's isolation 
from their extended kinship networks.
In focusing on customs and ritual, Tenzin Sonam's narrative sheds light on the ways that 
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Tibetans in Dharamsala seem to navigate life in the diaspora with reference to their memories of 
social worlds in Tibet.  For example, Tenzin Sonam portrays her own ruptured kinship ties 
through the political conflict, linking her father's death and her mother's call to work for the 
Tibetan cause to her departure.  In this way, Tenzin Sonam marks her migration as the beginning 
of a journey, whose denouement remains tied to Tibet.  In describing her future plans to marry in 
Tibet, Tenzin Sonam accepts both change and continuity in rituals, gender relations, and the 
division of labor in Tibet.  Although Tenzin Sonam seems to place importance on marrying in 
Tibet and, like Kunchang Dolma, reproducing existing social infrastructures, she also accepts 
change.  She seems less concerned than Kunchang Dolma with reproducing the life paths of 
previous generations.
Kunchang Dolma
Kunchang Dolma seems to have finished her narrative.  So, I ask if she has anything else she 
wants to tell me, and she responds with a lengthy story that draws her past, her future goals, and 
her values of nurturance around the focal point of an anecdote about three children she knew in 
Lhasa.  Kunchang Dolma answers,
One thing is, when I was fourteen or thirteen, because my parents didn't have lots 
of money, all the children would go to school and I wanted to also.  So, that year I 
just went out and found a job during the holidays to pay for the school fee.  A 
group of Chinese people was constructing a building, and I asked to join them, 
and I worked for almost one month.  Sometimes I cooked for them, sometimes I 
made cement—that was really hard.  In my past life, I think that thing [making 
cement] was very hard for me to do and I never forgot that [how hard it 
was].67..My parents told me to quit school, but I saw my friends going to school 
and I always admired them.  I was always in first or second place in my class, but 
these things I don't want to tell here [at ES Trust], I tell only you.  Many people 
67 Kunchang Dolma seems to be referencing a philosophy of karma.  In a study of understandings of karma in an 
ethnically Tibetan area of northern Nepal and among Tibetan refugees in India, Lichter and Epstein (1983) note a  
“version of a Puritan ethic, which insists that real gratification can only be got from earnest effort, and 
undeserved gains can never be as good” (229).  This “Puritan ethic” seems linked to Buddhist understandings of 
causation, in which one must suffer to achieve happiness (ibid: 247-254).
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told me “You are too small, you can't work,” and I just lied and told them I was 
eighteen or nineteen.  Because the school fees were not enough to pay the guide, I 
worked more and earned money.  In a hotel, I worked washing clothes and sheets. 
Many things I want to do, but right now, our place is not free.  I have three aims: 
one, to be a teacher.  I know Chinese language, and I want to learn more English. 
I'm also good at Tibetan.  I'm best at Tibetan, then Chinese, then English.  But, it's 
difficult to work under the Chinese government because they know that I have 
come from here, so if I get a problem, I want to be a social worker.  If that doesn't 
work, a business woman.  And, if I got lots of money, I would construct a school 
for orphans because there are so many in Lhasa.  I had three orphan friends in 
Lhasa...They didn't have a home, they just lived in the streets.  When I was in the 
hotel [working], they would always come and were begging and I gave them 
some food.  I felt pity for them.  My older brother was working in Lhasa, so I 
stayed with him, and these orphans would always come near my home, and if we 
had extra food or clothes, I gave it to them, so they loved me very much.  I told 
these orphans not to beg, to think and try to earn money yourself.  But, they said 
it's hard and they don't have any ability.  People who clean shoes, they earn 
twenty, fifty, or one hundred rupees,68 they probably earn a lot.  So, I told them I 
would prepare boxes for them [with supplies for cleaning shoes].  They said that 
the first day they would clean my shoes, but I said, “No, I don't want to let you 
clean my shoes.  Only our condition is different, but we are the same.” Every day, 
they would get at least twenty to thirty rupees, and they showed me always. 
Really, I felt happy.  I told them that if you get old, begging doesn't work.  For 
your whole life, you can't be a beggar, so you should try to get some knowledge. 
I think that if they get good habits of how to spend their life, then their life will be 
good.  Because my mother, even though she never had the chance to go to school 
and she is illiterate, her thinking is very high.  She always taught us about 
relationships with people, about having a good life.
Kunchang Dolma portrays her interactions with the orphans as a key moment in her narrative, 
connecting the values she acquired from her mother to her future goals to work with children. 
With her anecdote about the orphans, Kunchang Dolma thus unites her past, present, and future 
through the importance of nurturance; she again portrays nurturance as a virtue, through which 
one can achieve merits, including happiness and love.
Tenzin Sonam
Since Tenzin Sonam began by describing her migration, I ask if she likes living in India, and she 
68 Although this story takes place in Lhasa, Kunchang Dolma refers to the currency as “rupees.”
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replies with an expression of physical displacement, tying her future goals and present 
frustrations to Tibet and India as unique places.69  She explains,
There are two ways to look at it: I grew up in Tibet, so I think Tibet is a better  
place for me.  But, I can learn more about Tibet here, so in that way it is good.  
Honestly, it [my life in India] is less than I expected.  It all started in the  
reception center in Nepal...I said my age was eighteen, but I was actually  
seventeen.70  Here, most of the students are older than me [and did not go to  
school in Tibet].  Maybe it's my surroundings, maybe something in myself, but I  
cannot study that much.  It's difficult for me to improve my English.  After I  
learn good English, though, I want to teach in Tibet, but you need a certificate  
from the Chinese government.  It's hard to get the certificate if you've gone to a  
Tibetan school in India.  So, I maybe want to work in an orphanage and teach  
English.  Also, I will try to talk to my students, to teach them about Tibet, unlike  
my childhood. My idea is to study a lot and then work for the Tibetan cause.  
Now, it's like I have lost my opportunities, because you can only stay here five  
years.  I have always loved orphanages, so I want to go back and work in one in  
Lhasa.
Tenzin Sonam expresses a connection to Tibet because she “grew up” in its physical territory.  By 
articulating a personal connection to a physical territory, Tenzin Sonam seems to portray Tibet as 
her homeland, a place to which she is naturally tied by virtue of her birth and childhood.  And 
yet, Tenzin Sonam also explains a contradiction in her imagining of the Tibetan nation: she can 
“learn more about Tibet” outside of her physical homeland.  Tenzin Sonam, however, also 
explains that her idealized notions of life in India have not compared to her experience of life in 
the diaspora, asserting that she has not been able to achieve her academic goals.
Also, Tenzin Sonam presents similar future goals to Kunchang Dolma.  Both hope to 
further their own education and to teach children.  However, Tenzin Sonam explicitly articulates 
a desire to develop political knowledge among her students, whereas Kunchang Dolma seemed 
69 Scholars of diaspora, such as Gupta and Ferguson (1997) have noted the difference between “space” and “place,”  
that is, a geographic space which has been endowed with a specific identity (or identities) (8).
70 Through the exile government's system for managing refugees, students under age eighteen are sent to branches  
of the Tibetan Children's Village, while students aged eighteen to thirty-four are sent to TTS.  From my 
informant's reports, it seems that TCV provides longer-term opportunities for education, including the possibility 
of studying at an Indian university upon graduation.
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more focused on nurturance.  Again, it seems that these differing stances towards a similar life 
path may arise from contrasting ideas of agency and understandings of gender ideals.  While 
Kunchang Dolma explains that her future is dictated by political conflict, Tenzin Sonam hopes to 
reproduce national consciousness by teaching in Tibet, because she personally could develop 
political knowledge only in exile.  Through her statement that she hopes to teach her students 
about Tibet, Tenzin Sonam connects her future plans to the story of ruptured kinship ties with 
which she opened her narrative; she seems to respond to her mother's charge to “work for Tibet”. 
Also, although Tenzin Sonam hopes to marry and have children, she does not express strong 
ideals of feminine virtue, as Kunchang Dolma did.  Like Kunchang Dolma, however, Tenzin 
Sonam's memories and sense of displacement, both social and physical, seem influence the ways 
that she envisions her future.
Pasang
When I first arrived in Dharamsala in early April, 2011, I sought out informants through NGOs 
including Students for a Free Tibet (SFT).  One afternoon, I entered the office of SFT, explaining 
that I wished to speak with Tibetan women about their lives in Dharamsala.  There was only one 
woman who worked in the office, and she was busy organizing events throughout the month. 
But, she gave me a list of five names and phone numbers, among which were those of Tenzin 
Tsering, who became one of my translators, Sonam (quoted in Chapter One) and Pasang.  In 
contrast to the other women quoted in this chapter (and the majority of my informants), twenty-
seven year old Pasang was born and lived for most of her life in Dharamsala.  Since her mother 
was born in Dharamsala, and her father migrated to India with his parents, she has the support of 
an extended kinship group in exile, including parents, grandparents, siblings, and relatives. 
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Pasang's relationship to the diasporic community differs profoundly from women born in Tibet. 
She remains emplaced within her natal kin group in Dharamsala, has had contact with 
Westerners, Indians, and Tibetans from all regions throughout her life, and has grown up amidst 
political activism and strong nationalist sentiments in Dharamsala.
When I called Pasang, I told her that I was studying anthropology at an American college 
and that I hoped to speak with Tibetan women about their lives.  She agreed to meet me the next 
day in a restaurant near the Dalai Lama's temple, where we sipped the rich, milky coffee I had 
become accustomed to throughout my travels in India and Nepal.  As we sit down, Pasang asks, 
“What do you want to know about Tibet?”  I am slightly taken aback and a little unsure as to how 
to answer.  I had just arrived in Dharamsala about a week before, and I feel nervous about asking 
leading questions that will impose my own understandings of “Tibet” on Pasang's.  I start 
explaining my interest in reproduction, stating that I am looking into women's attitudes towards 
childbirth.  As I am describing the connection I have noticed between gender, reproduction and 
narratives of human rights violations, Pasang begins to speak about herself.  She says,
I think I should have one baby, at least, if I marry.  I think it's just the procedure, I 
guess, I'm just going through the procedure. Seriously, I'm not really a huge fan of 
kids and stuff.  I don't know, I have never been fond of kids.  But, everyone, all 
my friends tell me you will change, as things change.  And, as you get older, I 
guess, you change your mind.  Maybe I will.  As of now, I just want to enjoy 
myself.  My friends tell me this because they also experienced the same thing. 
They said like “Oh, we never used to like babies,” but now they are totally into 
children, they just want more, which is weird, I don't know why.  So, I think I will 
marry, even though I don't like babies, right?  My friends say once you marry 
you'll feel that, you'll want babies.  Maybe I'll adopt because I'm not a huge fan of 
being a mother and stuff like that, and there are so many kids who don't have 
homes.  Of course, having your own baby is different.  It just comes from your 
own body, keeping it in your stomach for nine months, feeling that thing for nine 
months coming from you, not just taking the baby from someone. I'm sure it will 
be different, but I'll try as hard as I can not to make the baby feel like I'm not its 
real mother.  So, I'll get married if I fall in love with someone and if [we] want to 
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take the relationship to a different level.  It's not necessarily that you have to 
marry.  I would just rather have a partner, but social norms and everything make 
that difficult.  Once you have the tag of marriage, things become complicated.  If 
that tag is not there, it's more exciting, the relationship keeps building.  But I don't 
know what kind of partner I will have and he might want to marry.
Like Kunchang Dolma, Pasang situates reproduction and marriage as social norms that figure as 
part of the women's life course.  But, she articulates a variety of possibilities for family formation 
that contrast with Kunchang Dolma's description of a proper female life path.  In particular, she 
does not seem to naturalize reproduction in the same manner as Kunchang Dolma, stating that 
she might prefer to form a somewhat unconventional nuclear family, through adoption or long-
term partnership rather than marriage.  And yet, she nonetheless asserts that women's biological 
capacity for reproduction leads to the development of affective ties between children and their  
biological mothers, which are absent in the case of adoption.  That Pasang labels marriage as a 
normative form of kinship and positions her own hopes in opposition suggests that she accepts 
diverse social bonds in the realm of kinship.  At the same time, she seems to recognize the 
constraints posed by social norms, explaining that her future plans will be influenced by her 
partner.  In comparison to Kunchang Dolma and Tenzin Sonam, Pasang seems more comfortable 
considering uncertainty in her future.  Whereas the two women born in India emphasized the 
insecurity that arises from depending on their (hypothetical) husbands for familial support, 
Pasang does not express similar anxieties.  Instead, she articulates an ambivalence towards 
marrying and bearing children.  Pasang communicates a sense of distance from the compulsory 
reproductive heteronormativity implied by social norms and understandings of feminine virtue in 
Dharamsala.
As we speak further, I learn that Pasang attended school at Lower TCV (a branch of TCV 
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almost exclusively for children born in exile) and received a BA in English Honors from Delhi 
University.  She explains that she recently completed a MA in History from Himachal University 
by correspondence, while she was working as a tour guide, leading American groups through 
Nepal, Bhutan, and North India.  Pasang discusses her past and future by focusing on education. 
She explains that when completing her MA,
I was a bit fascinated with Indian history and world history, so I thought maybe 
I'll first focus on where I'm living.  But, I couldn't do much because I was 
working. I couldn't really do the whole study.  I really want to do a PhD in 
anthropology, focusing on the history of Central Asia and Tibet.  I want to go to 
the States for a PhD because here in India it's difficult to get scholarships.  Maybe 
I would work part time and also study, but I don't now how all these things are 
going to happen.  And, I don't think people are really happy there [in America]. 
Here, somehow you kind of survive [even if you don't work].  It just seems 
difficult, life just seems so hectic, you can't really chill out, not as much as we do 
here.
Like Kunchang Dolma and Tenzin Sonam, Pasang presents education as her most immediate 
aim.  However, since she was raised in India, attended TCV throughout her life, and pursued 
higher education, Pasang has come into contact with different educational models than Kunchang 
Dolma and Tenzin Sonam.  In addition to the political values cultivated through her schooling, 
Pasang has come into contact with Western varieties of education and research throughout her 
life in Dharamsala.  Earlier, Pasang had explained that she had worked with anthropologist 
Melvyn Goldstein71 on an oral history project, collecting the life stories of elderly Tibetans in 
exile, but she had to leave the project in order to find a more permanent position.  It is possible 
that Pasang's contact with Western anthropologists has fueled her own interest in the discipline. 
For Pasang, it seems that personal history and academic interest have intertwined, both in her 
71 Goldstein is an American anthropologist who has written extensively on demography and life course in Tibet. 
He is currently employed by the United States National Academy of Sciences, and previously worked in a 
number of appointments at Case Western Reserve University.
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own work and the work of others.  Pasang's narrative suggests that, like tourists and human rights 
activists, Western scholars form bonds and exchange values with Tibetan refugees that shape 
individual lives in Dharamsala.  Western scholarly interest in Tibet, and by extension, in her own 
experiences of living as a refugee in Tibet, seems to have influenced Pasang's hopes.
However, although Pasang explains that she hopes to pursue further education in 
America, she seems to feel more connected to the cultural realities of life in the Tibetan 
community in India.  She expresses uncertainty about her future happiness, if she were to live in 
America.  As she continues to speak, Pasang processes further anxieties about what she views as 
a growing trend of Tibetan migration to the West.  She says,
And, because so many Tibetans are going abroad these days, everyone feels like 
oh my god, it's just finishing.  Even if you have a country it still happens that you 
worry about extinction, but being refugee, in exile, not having a country—a lot of 
Tibetans living here and the amount of progress they are making that's really 
good.  Actually, I won't even nearly call it extinction, not at all.  I think that 
Tibetans are doing really good...What I see is all these young people, my 
classmates who have gone abroad, in the States, when we were in like seventh 
grade together, they left after that and I haven't seen them since then, and they 
come back now to work here.  Isn't that great?...Even though they are abroad they 
are still totally connected to the community and to the cause...But, the fear is  
there, because when you actually see a major amount of Tibetans who always 
wanted to go abroad--not only Tibetans, a lot of Indians want to go abroad, a lot 
of Asians want to go abroad, all these Bhutanese that I meet [through my tour 
company], they want to go abroad--so that's always there and that brings a lot of 
fear among the people.  It's like, oh my god what's going to happen, and you feel 
like everything is going to finish...But, Tibetans marrying with other races or 
cultures is becoming more and more, so the fear is there...You wonder about the 
kind of mixture, and who is that kid going to marry? It totally depends upon the 
parents, if they want them to be Tibetan or not, but so far I've found among cross-
cultural marriages, I've found the kid more Tibetan in many of them, because, I 
don't know why, but even a guy marrying a foreign [Western] girl, maybe like 
those who actually fell for those Tibetans are more into the Tibetan cause 
and...want their kid to be raised up in that way as well...And like my friend, also, 
he was married to this French girl, but his kid was totally Tibetan.  I actually said, 
I know that everyone is moving in and out but I see a big amount coming back 
and working.  And, I'm connected with other people back in the States who are 
200
still totally committed to the cause and who are still doing everything they can 
even when they are abroad, so what's the difference if they are abroad? In a way it 
is helpful because they are in a way trying to spread more news about the cause.
In this excerpt, Pasang focuses on the diasporic reproduction of Tibetans.  Although she seems to 
express some anxiety about the future of Tibet and Tibetans, she also articulates that further 
migration can, in fact, serve the Tibetan cause by disseminating international awareness of 
Tibetans' collective plight.  Because she describes migrants' potential to develop a global network 
of support for Tibetan freedom, Pasang does not link the reproduction of Tibetanness in diaspora 
to a specific location.  Pasang explains that perpetuating the diaspora on a global scale serves to 
renew political interest in Tibetan freedom. In contrast to the women born in Tibet, who 
expressed anxiety about protracted exile, Pasang suggests that refugees can also enact a duty to 
the nation through continued migration, affirming their political identity as a displaced people.
Additionally, Pasang demonstrates that by forging transnational ties through migration, 
refugees can confer a sense of kinship to non-Tibetans living abroad.  In particular, she links 
traveling abroad to exogamous marriages.  Pasang suggests that Tibetanness can be passed on to 
children through the parents' political convictions, explaining that “maybe those who actually fell  
for those Tibetans are more into the Tibetan cause.”  In this way, refugees can reproduce Tibetan 
children in diaspora and with non-Tibetans.  In Pasang's description of physical reproduction and 
enculturation in the Tibetan diaspora abroad (i.e beyond, South Asia), political affiliation seems 
to carry significance beyond biological affiliation.  
The political undertones of Pasang's discussion of exogamy can be contextualized within 
what seem to be norms of cross-cultural marriage in Dharamsala.  Pasang presented the 
hypothetical example of “even a guy marrying a foreign [Western] girl,” and also referenced a 
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male friend who married a French woman.  Marriages and relationships between Western women 
and Tibetan men seem strikingly common in Dharamsala, and to a lesser extent, in Kathmandu, 
as well.72  Apart from these partnerships between Tibetan men and Western women, I knew of 
only two other exogamous marriages, one between a Tibetan woman and an Indian man, the 
other between an Indian woman, Rithu, and a Tibetan man.  I ask Pasang about other exogamous 
arrangements, including Western men settling with Tibetan women, and she replies, “Tibetan 
girls and Indian girls they think like, 'Oh, foreign men, they just come here for a while, maybe 
they'll play with us and they won't necessary live with us.'”  In this statement, Pasang presents a 
common mindset among Tibetan and Indian women, which contrasts sharply with a tendency I 
perceived among Tibetans, especially those born in India, to describe the self in opposition to 
Indians and Indians society.73  Since Pasang seems to be suggesting a mutual understanding 
between Tibetans and Indians, I ask if Tibetans ever marry Indians.  She explains, 
I don't know, I would personally not marry an Indian guy.  I would not at all, it's 
just the character, it just doesn't work out.  Like when we go to college, we feel 
like their words are cheezy, tacky, like you know, we don't want to be with them. 
We have our own choice, we want to be with certain men who are 
understandable.  I'm not saying all Indians are [bad], but the people we come 
across, the way they dress, the way they think, the way they do certain stuff, it's 
totally opposite to us and also the way we carry ourselves and they carry 
themselves and the way they think and we think I think is in many ways 
different, but it's not like it doesn't happen.  We have Tibetans marrying Indian 
men, but it will be like gossip of the town, seriously, people will be like talking 
about it more than a guy marrying a foreign girl.
In this statement, Pasang seems to position Indian men across a social divide from Tibetans; she 
72 In a study of family planning in Dharamsala, Childs and Barkin (2006) noted that the Department of Health 
distributed flip-charts aimed at HIV/AIDS prevention that portrayed Western-Tibetan (but not Tibetan-Tibetan or 
Tibetan-Indian) sexual relationships in cautionary images about the transmission of the virus.  Childs and Barkin 
suggest that this may result from the prevalence of Western-Tibetan relationships and marriages in the city (46-
48).
73 As I've described elsewhere, Tibetans in Dharamsala express binary oppositions between themselves and 
Indians, especially in the realm of family planning (forthcoming).
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asserts that Indians are “totally opposite to us” in their living habits.  But, Pasang does not seem 
to apply this opposition to other forms of exogamy.  Pasang states that Tibetan-Indian marriages 
provoke more “gossip,” suggesting that they present a greater breach of social norms, than 
Tibetan-foreign (“Western”) marriages.  Interested to hear more, I explain that my classmate at  
SIT had met a Tibetan filmmaker who produces documentaries about Tibet with his Indian wife, 
Rithu.  Pasang clarifies,
Oh, yeah, that's one I know, but that's again different.  When I say like Indians in 
general, it's like the typical Indians who are here locally.  Like Rithu is from one 
of the good families who comes from a different background and they are more 
understandable...High class Indian families, they are totally different than the 
usual Indian people.  Rithu is totally different, she's like good family and stuff 
like that, and they are both from this film background, and stuff like that.  So, it 
does happen.  I don't know, of course all human beings think same about stuff, 
but I'm sure he could understand if he were a fully fledged educated young Indian 
man, [if we told him,] “You know what, we lost our country, blah blah blah.” 
Like Rithu, she can totally understand what the hell we are talking about, so I 
think when a mutual understanding will be there between two partners, even 
though they are Indian or foreigner, I think that doesn't matter.  And it's not like 
Tibetan men are not dating Indian women.  Right now in colleges, I'm sure 
Tibetan men are dating Indian girls but they won't necessarily marry.  It's just like 
the culture difference, you know? We just think like this is not going to work. 
They have their Hindu beliefs, we have our Buddhist beliefs, which is different. 
If a relationship exists between a boy and a girl among Tibetans, I'm not saying 
everyone is pure and good and stuff like that, but things are there like 
commitment.  The commitment is there, which I don't think is there in the foreign 
people...So, maybe for men, it's much more easier because they are more cool.  I 
think these are the men who maybe think like they don't necessarily want to get 
into fully committed relationship or they think more from the foreign ideas of 
being open, not like into each others' faces all the time.  I'm not saying all Tibetan 
girls are like that, but some people they just have that kind of mentality and that's 
how it works, I think.
In her description of Rithu, Pasang again portrays a connection between exogamous marriages 
and political ideals.  She characterizes higher class Indians, such as Rithu, as “understandable” 
based on the belief that they can engage with the Tibetan cause in a manner similar to Tibetans 
203
themselves. Pasang explains that shared political knowledge allows for committed relationships 
that can potentially lead to marriage.  Pasang thus suggests that commitment to the Tibetan 
nation intertwines with commitment to one's partner.  However, Pasang articulates clear 
differences in exogamous marriages between Tibetans and individuals from different 
nationalities.  She seems to perceive an essentialized, inherent divide between Indians and 
Tibetans, which she expresses through a list of oppositional qualities: “the way they dress, the 
way they think, the way they do certain stuff...the way we carry ourselves and they carry 
themselves and the way they think and we think I think is in many ways different.”  With the 
example of Rithu, however, Pasang suggests that unified political ideals can bridge this social 
division so that “mutual understanding will be there between two partners, even though they are 
Indian or foreigner, I think that doesn't matter.”  Pasang had described reservations about 
marrying with Westerners (“foreigners”) in terms of a lack of commitment, rather than broad 
cultural differences.  And, her earlier description of the ways that Tibetan-Western couples often 
raise children who are “more Tibetan” out of their commitment to the Tibetan political cause  
suggests that Pasang uniformly associates shared political ideals with acceptable exogamy.
Pasang also reiterates concerns about the instability of long-term relationships in exile. 
She genders this concern with instability, in a manner similar to Kunchang Dolma.  She seems to 
suggest that women, in particular, require security, whereas men can be “more cool” in engaging 
in shorter-term relationships, which makes Tibetan women less likely to form relationships with 
non-Tibetan men.  Additionally, the specific vocabulary through which Pasang describes the 
insecurity a Tibetan woman marrying a Western man faces suggest notions of cultural difference 
distinct from those demarcating Tibetans and Indians.  For example, Pasang described foreigners 
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as “open,” in contrast to the “commitment” that comes more naturally in endogamous 
relationships.  Through her discussion of exogamy, Pasang demonstrates national distinctions 
between Tibetans, Indians, and Westerners, that present strains on diverse configurations of 
exogamy.
Pasang's understandings of exogamy can be contextualized with similar statements from 
other informants.  Like Pasang, Sangmu portrayed unique differences based on culture and 
nationality that make exogamy more common among Tibetans, Chinese, and Westerners than 
among Tibetans and Indians.  During an interview, Sangmu had explained,
In my environment in Tibet, many were into marrying Chinese people.  I grew up 
among mixed married people and children.  But, these families are mainly in 
cities, not in villages, because there is more contact between Tibetans and 
Chinese there.  Tibetan-Indian marriages are very rare.  There are girls who go 
out with Indian men but don't stay together for life.  In Tibet, we feel like we 
actually have a country, feel like it is our land, feel like we belong, so we have 
more choice.  Even though the Indian government has been helpful, kind, and 
generous, thinking [of Indians as] marriage partners blocks us down.  Indians are 
more uptight, and they are difficult to mingle with, just in their way of thinking 
and character. Westerners are more cool, and frank.  They have freedom and 
democracy in person to person interaction, which is more liberal and makes it 
easier to communicate with them.
Like Pasang, Sangmu seems to view Tibetan-Indian marriages as an anomaly in contrast to 
exogamy between Tibetans, Westerners, and Chinese.  In describing these different forms of 
exogamy, Sangmu politicizes national difference, characterizing Westerners according to specific  
ideals of “freedom,” “democracy” and “liberal[ism].”  This political vocabulary, reminiscent of  
Pasang's inference that Westerners who marry Tibetans hold a political commitment to Tibetan 
freedom, highlights the tendency of Tibetans in Dharamsala to essentialize nationality along the 
lines of the political conflict.  Pasang and Sangmu seem to suggest that, even in everyday 
interactions and intimate relationships, Westerners think and behave according to liberal 
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humanist values.
This essentialization is, however, complex, multifaceted, and contested, particularly with 
attitudes towards the Chinese.  I perceived a more generalized tendency to idealize the support of 
Westerners and Western governments for the Tibetan cause (especially among Tibetans born in 
Tibet)74 and to describe Indians through binary oppositions to Tibetans.  On the other hand, while 
individuals proclaimed that the Chinese had violated Tibet and Tibetans, they would sometimes 
within the same statement express that they don't hate all Chinese.  As described in Chapter Two, 
the portrayal of the Chinese as victimizers of the Tibetan people seemed to arise in the context of  
specific narratives of suffering, such as the prison narrative.  In other contexts, I encountered the 
statement, from multiple Tibetans, that “The Chinese government is bad but the people are good, 
but it's the opposite with Indians; the Indian people are bad but the government is good.” 
Therefore, it seems that Tibetans in Dharamsala feel a stronger cultural affiliation with the 
Chinese, and tend to invoke stereotypes of other nationalities more often than of the Chinese. 
When discussing exogamy, in particular, it seems that Tibetans politicize Tibetan-Western 
marriages and Tibetan-Indian marriages more readily that Tibetan-Chinese marriages.
Through narrative, Pasang seems to process her concerns about cultural change and racial 
“mixing” brought about by continued migration.  She seems to ultimately argue that the 
reproduction of Tibetans and Tibetan ideals can occur in the diaspora.  In fact, since the children 
74 Attitudes towards Westerners seem more diverse among Tibetans born in exile.  Whereas I never encountered  
“Tibetans from Tibet” criticizing Western involvement in or appropriation of any aspect of Tibetan culture, 
religion, or politics, Tibetans born in India seem more wary of Western encroachment.  I found that it was more 
difficult to speak with Tibetans born in India; they were more frequently employed and thus had less free time, 
but also seemed less willing to make time for me.  Some of my informants also explicitly expressed discomfort 
with Western fascination with Tibetans.  Tenzin Youdon, for example, told me a story of a friend whose elderly 
mother spontaneously encountered a caricatured photograph of herself praying at the Dalai Lama's temple on a  
postcard being sold at a tourist shop in Delhi.  McLagan (2002) noted similar critiques among young Tibetans 
living in New York, which centered around the appropriation of Tibetan culture as a trope in Western media.
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of mixed marriages are often “more Tibetan,” and since life abroad provides Tibetan individuals 
with the opportunity to garner global support for Tibetan political goals, extending the diaspora 
beyond South Asia strengthens the Tibetan nation.  For Pasang, in addition to (and maybe more 
so than) its physical territory, “Tibet” seems to connote shared values and commitments which 
translate across national, cultural, and “racial” boundaries.  Pasang positions Tibetans as global 
citizens, whose allegiance to Tibet transcends geographic space.
Migrant People, Migrant Citizenships: Clarifying Transnational Ties
Chapter One described migration from Tibet to India as a social drama.  Physically performing 
the social drama of migration emplaces individuals in a diasporic community of Tibetan 
refugees.  In this way, Tibetan refugees share ties of diasporic citizenship that mirror the more 
intimate kinship ties between individuals and families.  Like migration from Tibet to India, which 
confers this diasporic citizenship, continued migration serves to re-affirm membership to the 
Tibetan nation in exile.  The narratives of Kunchang Dolma, Tenzin Sonam and Pasang present 
complex connections between the perpetuation of the diaspora and the reproduction of Tibetans 
and Tibetanness.  All present differing attitudes towards continued migration.  Tenzin Sonam 
asserts a unique connection to Tibet as a homeland, nonetheless describing the benefits of a free 
life in exile.  Kunchang Dolma hopes to return to Tibet, due to the location of her kinship 
network, rather than a unique connection to the physical place of Tibet.  Nonetheless, Kunchang 
Dolma's determination to return presents kinship as localized, in contrast to other women's 
descriptions of global kinship ties.
In contrast to Kunchang Dolma and Tenzin Sonam, Pasang describes the formation of the 
nuclear family through marriage and childbirth simply as a “procedure,” expressing more 
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enthusiasm for a future of continued education.  Nonetheless, Pasang expresses a central concern 
with the reproduction of Tibetan subjects.  She articulates her own hopes to migrate to America 
in search of education, then considers these hopes within the context of what she perceives to be 
a general trend in Tibetans seeking opportunities in the West.  In her narrative, Pasang seems to 
come to the conclusion that continued migration attests to the strength of Tibet and Tibetans.  
Pasang asks, “So what's the difference if they are abroad?” articulating that Tibetans present 
themselves as members of a collectivity based on continued political support which can take 
place on a global scale.  Additionally, my informants explain that the reproduction of diasporic  
citizens occurs through shared political ideals rather than endogamy.  Through continued 
migration, and the formation of kinship bonds across the globe, Tibetan migrants maintain the 
diaspora.  It seems that the transnational situation of Tibetans influences flexibility in the realm 
of marriage and intimacy.
Revisiting the Western-Tibetan connection
Sangmu had referenced political ideals in the realm of intimacy, describing the 
“democratic” interpersonal qualities of Westerners that allow them to easily marry 
Tibetans.  Individuals who had formed exogamous relationships also seem to politicize 
their discussions of marriage, but in a more nuanced manner.  Nyima Tsering, a man from 
Amdo explains, 
Love is free, if I love someone and want my life together with her.  The Dalai 
Lama always says we need originally Tibetans, not mixed.  But, anyone can marry 
anyone.  Even I married one German girl.  We met in the Dalai Lama's temple, 
and we were so in love [sarcastically]. We are completely different, so we got 
divorced.  We were married for four years, and I lived in Germany for six months 
to help look after our baby, but there were a lot of problems.  We couldn't 
understand each other very deeply because she had her way and I had my way. 
Like, if we are among Tibetans, we can understand deeply, but sometimes she or I 
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got jealous and we couldn't communicate.  After that, I promised myself that I will 
marry a real Tibetan, because German and English people, we can't show 
everything with each other.  And, my son is not Tibetan because my wife never 
gave me a chance to look after him.  I would say that he is Tibetan, and she would 
say, “No, he's German.”  But, it's also good for him to live in Germany, because 
here the conditions are poor.  If he stays with his mom, he can get a good 
education, he can know things.
Like Sangmu, Nyima Tsering invokes liberal humanist values when describing intimacy.  Rather 
than characterizing Westerners according to these values, he describes love as “free,” advocating 
an extension of the political ideals to an understanding of human relationships.  However, like 
Pasang, Nyima Tsering also describes difficulties in cross-cultural understanding between 
Tibetans and Westerners that complicated his marriage.  Nyima Tsering emphasized that “if we 
are among Tibetans, we can understand deeply,” constructing an inherent, generalized affiliation 
between Tibetans.  Through his narrative, Nyima Tsering simultaneously advocates freedom in 
the realm of the family, at the same time arguing for a more natural kinship among all Tibetans.
Additionally, it seems that the political descriptions of exogamous marriage sometimes 
refer explicitly to the connection between Western humanitarian aid and the Tibetan freedom 
movement.  For example, Pema, another young man in a relationship with an American woman 
explained, “Since we talk about freedom and human rights, that [exogamy] is part of human 
rights.  You can still marry, you are a same human being, we can still live together, study each 
others' culture and religion.  As long as there is more happiness, you should live that way.”  Pema 
reiterates the liberal humanist notion of “freedom” in love that Nyima Tsering invokes, explicitly  
linking it to “human rights.”  And, as described in previous chapters, the notion of human rights 
plays a key role in the ideological and practical operations of the exile government.
As Pasang explained, exogamous marriages are more common between Tibetan men and 
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Western women.  Such novel gender relations may be influenced understandings of acceptable 
forms of intimacy and gendered concerns with stability.  Pasang had emphasized that it is more 
difficult for women to form transnational relationships, since they suspect that foreign men will  
abandon them (see p. 204).  Similarly, Kunchang Dolma had explained her anxieties about 
surviving with a baby if a the baby's father were to leave her (see p. 212).  These gendered fears 
of abandonment may give rise to gendered patterns of exogamy.  Additionally, notions of 
gendered virtue may influence the importance that women place upon stability.  Women such as 
Kunchang Dolma and Tenzin Sonam suggest that becoming a good mother to Tibetan children is 
virtuous.  It therefore seems that women hold greater responsibility than men for reproducing the 
Tibetan family, which may lead to less flexibility in their choice of marriage partners. Women 
assert that the community in Dharamsala allows for gender equality, at least more so than in their  
natal villages in Tibet (see p. 192).  The gendered trend in exogamy, however, allows Tibetan 
men a greater geographic mobility than Tibetan women.  Since many Tibetans in Dharamsala 
hope to continue traveling, either beyond South Asia or back to Tibet, the opportunity for legal 
mobility presents a significant advantage.  That men can access this advantage more easily,  
possibly by virtue of women's unequal burden for reproduction, presents a central gender 
inequality in Dharamsala.
Tibetan-Western marriages are embedded within complex ties political ties between Tibet 
and Euro-American governments and economies.  As explained above, narratives of exogamy 
articulate the political ties between Tibet and the West in the realm of the intimate.  Notions of  
“freedom,” “democracy” and “openness” in Western micro-interactions mirror broader 
assumptions about the operations of Western governments that I encountered in Dharamsala.  As 
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described throughout the first three chapters, narratives of essentialized Tibetan suffering seem to 
explicitly petition for aid.  These petitions, although they seem to advocate political support for  
the Tibetan “cause” are more often realized in transfers of economic capital between Western 
donors and Tibetan individuals.  Human rights organizations facilitate these economic transfers. 
Scholars have noted that such organizations often operate according to an ethic of salvage 
ethnography, in which the plight of the Tibetan people, as an endangered species, threatens the 
survival of the Tibetan Buddhist faith (Baumann 1997, McLagan 2002, Barnett 2001).  And, 
Euro-American practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism are responsible for a significant amount of the 
total financial contributions to the Tibetan cause (Baumann 1997:383). These spiritual and 
financial exchanges can lead individuals to develop relationships that mirror Tibetan kinship ties,  
of which Euro-American contributors seem unaware.  McLagan notes that through his spiritual 
and (enormous) economic patronage of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan political movement,  
Richard Gere became incorporated into a patron-client relationship known as sbyin-bdag, in 
which a student of Tibetan Buddhism provides material support to his teachers (2002:94).  Since, 
as described in Chapter One, Tibetans trace lineage through such spiritual relationships, Gere has 
entered into Tibetan spiritual kinship ties.  Euro-American sponsors seem to develop similar 
kinship relations with lay Tibetan refugees.  Prost (2006) notes that informal sponsorship often 
occurs through third part intermediaries, who organize a relationship of financial exchange 
between Tibetans and their sponsors.  Such relationships of sponsorship, known as rogs ram, 
mirror an older system of exchange in Tibet (known by the same name), which refers to general 
social or financial support (239).  Among my informants, I observed the translation of rogs ram 
as “sponsorship,” and the seemingly analogous use of the term to describe general financial 
211
support between Tibetan friends as well as their relationship with a Euro-American sponsor. 
Twenty-five year old Rinchen Tsetan, for example, receives money and packages from a French 
couple with two adopted children who he refers to as “my French family”.  While he was 
employed at a restaurant in McLeod Ganj, another French woman asked if he would like a 
sponsor, and asked for his name and address.  For the past few years, Rinchen Tsetan has 
received letters in written in English, photographs, and money from a family to whom the 
woman gave his address.  Other rogs ram practices take place through the exile government's 
schools.  Tamdin Tso, a graduate of the Tibetan Homes Foundation in Mussoorie who currently 
lives with her family in McLeod Ganj, explained that while she was in school, she wrote letters 
to a woman in England, her “sponsor-mother,” who was paying the school to support her. 
“Sponsorship,” however, also operates informally among friends.  When my informants in 
Dharamsala eat together at restaurants, a single person will “sponsor” the meal, meaning that he 
or she will pay for the entire bill.  Tibetans employed this English word in both reciprocal and 
non-reciprocal relationships.  For example, a Tibetan acquaintance once complained to me in 
English that his friend was asking him to “sponsor” his beer every night at the bar.  Through such 
informal social practices, I also “sponsored” Tibetans on a number of occasions (including in 
buying tea or coffee for my informants as I interviewed them), and my Tibetan friends and 
informants “sponsored” me.  Beyond exogamous marriage, therefore, Tibetans living in diaspora 
have cultivated kinship ties with Westerners in a number of contexts.
Understandings of rebirth likewise suggest transnational kinship ties.  A number of 
Europeans and Americans have been self- and officially identified as reincarnated Tibetan 
Buddhist lamas (sprul sku). American action film star Steven Seagal, for example, was identified 
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as a reincarnated Tibetan lama in 1997 by his spiritual teacher (McLagan 2002:94).  McLagan 
argues that such celebrity connections to the Tibet issue that proliferated in the 1990s have 
pushed the cause into mainstream media more effectively than other forms of political activism 
(ibid).  Also, statements from my informants suggest that they view rebirth as a transnational, 
cross-cultural phenomenon.  For example, as Tenzin Dolma and I were chatting outside the cyber 
where she works, I commented on the number of dogs that hang around the area.  In a moment of 
frustration, Tenzin Dolma exclaimed in response, “Tibetans are like stray dogs!  In my next life, I 
want to be born in a free country!”  This statement suggests that Tenzin Dolma considers 
reincarnation to offer the possibility for political freedom.  In explaining place of birth as fluid,  
Tenzin Dolma implies that nationality identity is also fluid.  Given that Tibetans living in  
diaspora grapple with the importance preserving Tibet's unique cultural and national identity in 
response to a political threat, such notions of flexible kinship and fluid identity complicate 
understandings of the reproduction of the Tibetan nation.  
One day, I mentioned to Sangmu that the possibility of rebirth beyond the Tibetan 
community, and the flexible kinship ties that Tibetans form with Euro-Americans, seems to 
contradict the concern with survival that seems so pervasive in Dharamsala.  Sangmu explained 
to me,
There is no threat for our identity.  It is always there.  Being Tibetan has been  
unique, and we have been influenced by other people.  We are trying to preserve  
our culture through this [influence], and if there is no control from above, then  
there is no threat.  Loving kindness is affecting everyone, even people with yellow  
hair.  We are trying to preserve culture that way, so as long as Buddhism  
survives, Tibetan identity won't be lost.  The Chinese have been trying but even if  
there is a single Tibetan who speaks Tibetan and has Buddhism blood in them  
then they can fight.
Sangmu at first asserts that there is no threat to Tibetan identity, but then continues to explain 
213
that language and religion define Tibetan identity.  In communicating the connection between 
Tibetan identity and religion, Sangmu even employs a biological metaphor, of “Buddhism 
blood,” that can foster resistance to political oppression.  It seems, therefore, that notions of 
survival and reproduction in the diaspora are dissonant.  On the one hand, the political conflict in 
Tibet lends itself to a dynamic in which Tibetans imagine themselves and are imagined by others 
as an “endangered species” (Barnett 2001).  However, culturally specific understandings of 
reproduction, which seem rooted in Buddhist concepts of rebirth, and transnational support for 
Tibet (which Sangmu links to “loving kindness,” a central tenet of Tibetan Buddhism), allow for 
the reproduction of Tibetans beyond the ethnic Tibetan community.  Like Pasang's understanding 
of exogamy, in which political attitudes confers “Tibetanness” to children, Sangmu asserts that 
features of “Tibet,” including language and religion, allow for collective survival.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined diverse formations of transnational kinship through which individuals 
seem to consider the reproduction of Tibet and Tibetans.  The chapter opened with a discussion 
of Kunchang Dolma's and Tenzin Sonam's plans for endogamous marriage.  Kunchang Dolma 
and Tenzin Sonam seem to connect marriage and reproduction to the notions of nurturance and 
stability, presenting the formation of the nuclear family as a necessary part of the female life  
course, which upon the achievement of one's educational goals.  The women born in Tibet 
advocate reproducing Tibetans in the realm of the family, upholding social institutions either in  
Tibet or in exile.  Furthermore, both Kunchang Dolma and Tenzin Sonam hope to work in 
orphanages, extending nurturance to the future generation beyond the individual family. 
However, other informants such as Pasang explicitly formulate Tibetans as global, diasporic 
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citizens.  All three women, through their hopes to migrate and form families, have positioned 
themselves among these diasporic citizens, affirming their commitment to nurture future 
Tibetans and the Tibetan nation.  
My Tibetan informants living in diaspora therefore articulate a complex relationship 
between political and personal goals.  While all seem to view freedom in the Tibetan homeland 
as a moral and political imperative, many nonetheless plan to remain outside of the physical  
nation.  Such seemingly discordant attitudes can be understood through scholarship on diaspora, 
which has advocated for a reconceptualization of the relationship between space and identity.  
For example, Gupta and Ferguson (1997) assert, 
Something like a transnational public sphere...has enabled the creation of forms 
of solidarity and identity that do not rest on an appropriation of space where 
contiguity and face-to-face contact are paramount. In the pulverized space of 
postmodernity, space has not become irrelevant: it has been reterritorialized in a 
way that does not conform to the experience of space that characterized the era of 
high modernity [9].
Gupta and Ferguson thus argue that the association of “cultures” with postcolonial nation-states 
can no longer encapsulate cultural phenomena.  Rather, the local is simultaneously global, and 
affiliation between self, culture, and territory has been reconfigured in a way that transcends the 
conceptual, political, and geographic boundaries of the nation-state.  In the case of Tibet, the 
nation has been defined in a fragmented space, as exiles organized in India around the figure of 
the Dalai Lama, with the backing of the Indian and American governments.  And, “Tibet” is 
continually redefined throughout changing political circumstances as Tibetan migrants, officially 
identified as refugees, become simultaneously displaced from kin in Tibet and emplaced within 
the diaspora.  
In describing these dual experiences of displacement and emplacement, my informants' 
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narratives shed light on the reconfiguration of interpersonal affiliation in an interconnected 
world.  By migrating, Tibetans constitute themselves as global citizens.  They are also 
constituted as such by international actors, such as humanitarian workers, Euro-American 
Buddhist practitioners, and political activists, who also formulate (and advocate for) a specific 
imagining of Tibet as a “nation”.  At the same time, my informants cultivate more immediate  
transnational kinship ties, through marriage, economic exchanges, and acquired kinship among 
other Tibetans in Dharamsala and beyond.  Although seemingly discordant with the political goal 
of realigning the Tibetan people with the physical space of Tibet, these immediate kinship ties 
represent another means of ensuring survival.  In a study of kinship and reproduction in Havana 
following the Cuban socialist revolution, Andaya (2006) notes that Cubans deployed kinship as a 
“survival strategy” (255).  Andaya explains that, “In the context of the familial and international  
politics of migration...'doing kinship' not only encompasses the creation, reinforcement and, at 
times, termination of ties to existing persons [but also]...entails the strategic management of 
relationships to the potential persons who may hinder or advance individuals' life prospects” 
(266-267).  That is, Cubans calculated the weight of potential kinship ties, especially those that 
entailed remittances and physical reproduction, with reference to possibilities for social and 
geographic mobility. My informants seem to describe similar dynamics of imagined kinship.  In 
Cuba, many of Andaya's informants lost contact with their transnational families through the 
embargo. Likewise, Tibetans in Dharamsala struggle to maintain relationships with their natal  
kinship networks in Tibet, since the Chinese government seeks to monitor and undermine these 
connections.  Also, potential kinship ties to Westerners through sponsorship and marriage 
provide an avenue for financial support and even carry the possibility of obtaining foreign 
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citizenship.  Few Tibetans seek Indian or Nepali passports, although they travel across state 
borders within South Asia.  However, European and American passports are more desirable, 
possibly because they make it easier to obtain visas to visit Tibet and China.  Acquired kinship 
ties among Tibetans in exile also serve to recreate social supports they have left behind in Tibet.  
And, my informants seem to view physical reproduction strategically, as a means of ensuring 
material sustenance or nonmaterial merits, including happiness and social support.  
The narratives in this chapter suggest that migrant Tibetans' attitudes towards kinship 
formation and family planning intertwine with their future goals.  In discussing their future plans, 
women seem to attend to both collective and personal concerns, strategically negotiating 
between their desires for stability (both material and social), relationships with existing kin, and 
community norms of education, marriage, and reproduction.  Collective concerns also reached 
beyond personal relationships to the Tibetan imagined community.  In mediating between the 
personal and collective, my informants' discussions of their futures illuminate imaginings of the 
diaspora.  While some necessitated returning to their kin in the Tibetan homeland, others sought 
continued global movement.  That motions towards both the local and global simultaneously 
reproduce the Tibetan collectivity brings into question the future of “Tibet” itself.
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Conclusion
On March 26, 2012, I opened my internet browser and the New York Times World News, my 
homepage, appeared on the screen.  The main story of the day concerned Jamphel Yeshi, a 
Tibetan man who had self-immolated in Delhi.  March 2012 marked a full year of ongoing 
conflict at the Kirti Monastery in Kham, where several monks have self-immolated and Chinese 
authorities have mobilized military support to suppress the unrest.  Jamphel Yeshi burned himself 
during a Tibetan-organized demonstration in Delhi that aimed to express discontent with Chinese 
president Hu Jintao's visit to the city for an economic summit in the context of Chinese 
aggression against protestors in Kham.75  On March 30, 2012, Rinchen Tsetan, a friend from 
Amdo who had introduced me to his social network in Dharamsala, called me, explaining that 
the community was holding a funeral for Jamphel Yeshi, whose remains had been transported 
from Delhi.  Rinchen Tsetan told me that Jamphel Yeshi was well known in Dharamsala.  In fact, 
they had been friends and classmates at TTS.  Jamphel Yeshi's death was one among about thirty-
five Tibetan self-immolations that have taken place over the last year.  McGranahan and 
Litzinger (2012) explain that, since, the vast majority of these cases have occurred within 
restricted areas in Tibet, Jamphel Yeshi's death in Delhi provoked novel access to the 
phenomenon for journalists and newscasters, who spread images and reports of his death across 
the globe.76  In addition to holding a funeral, the community in Dharamsala coped with this event 
through political demonstrations calling for an end to Chinese suppression of protests in Tibet 
and, ultimately, for Tibetan freedom (Fig. 13).  As I conclude this study of the performance of 
narratives of suffering, I thus find my work situated within a heightened social drama that 
75 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/world/asia/tibetan-exiles-rally-around-delhi-self-immolator.html  
76 http://culanth.org/?q=node/526  
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reaches from Tibet, through the circuits of international media, to the exile community, and 
which has resonated deeply with my informants in Dharamsala.
The ongoing developments around these self-immolations seem to reflect the themes that 
I have identified in this thesis.  Self-immolation seems to present, in a more extreme form, the 
performances of essentialized Tibetan suffering that arose in my informants' life narratives.  In a 
recent series of articles about Tibetan self-immolation published on the journal Cultural  
Anthropology's blog, “Hot Spots,” Tsering Shakya (2012) explains that “giving one's body is one 
of the key modern idioms of nationalism: the conflating of body and nation.” This form of 
protest, however, is relatively new to Tibet.77  And yet, my informants' narratives of embodied 
suffering, resulting from migration, imprisonment, and reproductive violation, speak to this 
conflation of the individual body and the imagined community.  Tsering Shakya suggests that the 
practice of self-sacrifice in the name of the nation arose in Tibet in response to Chinese political  
intervention.  Rather than being rooted in Tibetan religious traditions, as the deployment of 
images of monks' and nuns' charred bodies in international mainstream media seems to suggest, 
self-sacrifice for the collectivity represents an “alien concept that Tibetans now have 
appropriated from the language of resistance coined and championed by the Communist Party” 
(ibid).  In describing the emergence of self-sacrificing national sentiment, Tsering Shakya 
buttresses the idea that Tibetans' understanding of their selves, their communities, and their 
territories as a “nation” arose only with colonization.  While China seeks to expel and eradicate 
this national sentiment, it flourishes in exile communities such as Dharamsala.  It seems that  
support from Western nations and foreigners contributes to national sentiment.  And, tactics such 
as self-immolation present a performance of suffering that, like the bodily pain portrayed in 
77 http://culanth.org/?q=node/524  
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human rights literature, circulates in Western understandings of political protest and atrocity.  In 
an ethnographic study of the practice of suicide as national protest, Andriolo (2006) traces the 
emergence of self-immolation to Buddhist monks during the Vietnam war (105).  She explains 
that, although self-immolation has historically occurred throughout Asia in different contexts, its  
use as a form of political protest spread across the globe following the anti-colonial movements 
in Vietnam.  Practices of self-immolation in Tibet seem to have developed along with this global  
trend.  Contemporary Tibetan self-immolations thus seem to manifest the Tibetan freedom 
movement's location in a nexus of global political imaginings and activism.
While this thesis has dealt almost exclusively with the linguistic performance, I 
understand self-immolation as an embodied performance of the same key scenario, that of 
resistance, that my informants invoked in narratives.  As described in throughout the thesis, 
women told of embodied suffering as they ordered personal history into generic plots.  The 
women with whom I spoke expressed the pain of geographic and social displacement through the 
illnesses caused by India's hot climate.  They portrayed violence and violation in prison through 
idioms of bodily suffering found in human rights media that seemed inconsistent with their own 
understandings of gender.  They spoke of the collective suffering of a genocide perpetrated 
through their reproductive capacities, at the same time asserting agency to resist annihilation by 
giving birth to future Tibetans.  And yet, the natural suffering associated with reproduction 
seemed to construct birth as a personal sacrifice for the nation.  And, women expressed different 
senses of duty to follow a heteronormative life path, the mode of action implied by the 
deployment of the female body as a symbol in Dharamsala. In the same series of articles on “Hot 
Spots,” Litzinger (2012) calls attention to
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how the self-immolating body, the body that protests through flames and charred 
tissue, a body that is often wrapped in barbed-wire so it can not be saved (cared 
for) by the Public Security or Health official on the ground, is not just giving 
itself to a greater cause.  It is using fire to steal from the state its foundational 
relationship to violence.  It is denying the state...its sovereign claim to determine 
how individuals, in this most precarious of times, will be cared for, how they 
will live, and how they will die.78
Litzinger contextualizes embodied resistance within the Chinese state's violent demonstrations of  
biopower.  Through reproductive regulation and torture, two genres of physical violation that my 
informants described, the Chinese state manages the births and deaths of its Tibetan subjects in a 
manner that violates their spiritual beliefs and their sense of themselves as a unique collectivity.  
That is, Chinese control over Tibet and Tibetans violates a moral community whose members 
seem to perform their affiliation through pronouncements of collective suffering.  And, these 
pronouncements of collective suffering shed light on the gendered nature of the connection 
between the body and the nation.  The symbolic connection of body and nation seems to produce 
a burden for women to ensure the survival of the Tibetan people through their reproductive 
capacities.  Exile heightens the ramifications of gendered symbolism in the portrayal of the 
Tibetan conflict, since diasporic existence, as well as the political conflict in Tibet, threaten the  
survival of the Tibetan people.
Collective suffering and exilic concerns with survival construct an imagined nation. 
Anderson's (1983) treatise on nationalism overlooks the affective ties experienced among 
members of an imagined community.  The ways that my informants employed the notion of 
suffering as a narrative trope exemplifies the role of affect in uniting imagined communities.  
Since narratives of collective suffering bolster the sense of a shared moral community, these 
personal expressions represent the co-construction of the nation.  And, they suggest a perpetual 
78 http://www.culanth.org/?q=node/540  
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process of co-construction that exemplifies what Appadurai (2003) calls “imagination as a social 
practice” (29).  According to Appadurai, it is not simply that collective communities  are 
imagined.  Rather, applying Appadurai's concept to my field site, by telling personal and 
collective narratives, Tibetans living in diaspora imagine and re-imagine a uniquely Tibetan form 
of suffering that defines the Tibetan moral community.  In addition, the shared affect of Tibetan 
suffering functions to legitimize claims to nationhood.  As I have sought to demonstrate, idioms 
of suffering have been an effective channel through which Tibetans can communicate their 
nationalist goals to an international audience.  
Additionally, as suggested above, narratives of collective suffering speak not only to 
political conflict in Tibet, but also to the anxieties and tensions of exilic life.  Due to their liminal  
state, Tibetan refugees continually re-experience suffering in exile.  In this context of protracted 
liminality, the reproduction of suffering as a narrative trope can be understood as a sort of 
survival strategy.  Clifford (1994) writes that, among displaced peoples, 
Experiences of loss, marginality, and exile...[form a] constitutive suffering [that] 
coexists with the skills of survival: strength in adaptive distinction, discrepant 
cosmopolitanism, and stubborn visions of renewal.  Diaspora consciousness 
lives loss and hope as a defining tension [312].  
In Tibetan diasporic consciousness, suffering marks ethnic and political distinction, 
cosmopolitanism associated with social rupture, and renewal predicated on the perpetuation of 
collective suffering. This thesis has revealed narrative expressions of shared affect which bolster 
a discourse of nationhood meant to ensure the survival of the Tibetan people.  And, it seems that 
in Dharamsala, this concern with survival arises not only because of ongoing political strife but 
also because of the daily lived reality of social rupture and liminality that Tibetans experience as  
refugees and exilic citizens.
222
Given my understanding of a discourse of collective suffering, I have attempted to sort 
out the implications of narrative performances (which both reproduce and are produced by this 
discourse), for the narrators themselves.  My field material is comprised of individual linguistic 
expressions that reached beyond the cultural realities I experienced by living in Dharamsala. 
While I encountered the persistence of both memories of Tibet and imaginings of continued 
migration, I neither observed nor participated in wanderings between these localities.  My 
interpretations of my informants' self-reflections led me to understand that subjectivities shift  
between the social worlds through which Tibetan refugees move.  And, my Tibetan informants 
seem to tie these social worlds to geographic places.  This thesis has sought to demonstrate that 
the women with whom I spoke drew distinctions between the freedom, kinship and gender 
relations, and personal knowledge they cultivated in their natal homes, their migrant destinations  
within Tibet, and in Dharamsala.  I hope to extend my understanding of Tibetan migrant worlds 
and subjectivities beyond the realm of elicited narrative.
Questions for Further Research
My time in Dharamsala allowed me to appreciate the ways that refugee subjectivity is shaped in 
this specific locality through political discourse.  For example, my informants described a sort of 
personal rebirth that occurred when they reached the reception center in Kathmandu, viewing the 
flag of the Tibetan nation for the first time.  Although I have traced narrative accounts of this 
transformation, my existing work calls for a more extensive exploration of the specific social 
dynamics that produce a sense of rebirth.  As described throughout the thesis, it seems that the 
institutions that house and care for refugees play a key role in shaping subjectivities.  As 
evidenced in the Introduction, these institutions are sites of knowledge production in which 
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teachers and employees explicitly articulate normative understandings of life in Tibet.  However,  
while in the field, I did not experience life in these institutions and could not fully grasp the ways 
that self-transformation occurs.  A salient question that remains is: how do micro-interactions in 
institutions produce refugee and national identity?  Additionally, while I could trace vestiges of  
liberal humanist ideals in my informants narratives, and I encountered these same ideals in 
human rights media towards which they directed me, I do not fully understand how my 
informants came to internalize them.  Since my informants employed specific vocabularies of 
human rights in their narratives, I am curious about the role of language in shaping bureaucratic 
identity and subjectivity.  I hope to address questions such as: How do institutions put liberal 
humanist ideals into action in managing refugees?  Given linguistic and cultural barriers, how are 
these ideals communicated to refugees?  And, how do refugees understand and resist these ideals 
when they first encounter them?
Long-term participant observation in an institution that houses and cares for refugees 
could provide an opportunity to address these questions.  The Tibetan Reception Center in 
Kathmandu seems an ideal venue, since it is the point at which individuals from Tibet first come 
into contact with the exile community and with international mechanisms of refugee 
management.  The UNHCR operates the refugee reception center in Kathmandu, and works to 
provide refugees with the proper bureaucratic requirements to travel to India or, less commonly, 
to stay in Nepal.79  Although Tibetan refugees have a somewhat secure agreement with the Indian 
government, dating to the Dalai Lama's entry and negotiations with President Nehru (Avedon: 
50), the Nepali government has taken a less accommodating attitude towards Tibetan refugees. 
79 From my experience living in the Tibetan community in Kathmandu, it seems that most Tibetans from Tibet who 
reside in Kathmandu have spent time in Dharamsala before returning to or settling in Nepal.
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Especially following Nepal's civil war, which ended in 2006 with the Maoist party gaining 
prominence in the government, the situation for Tibetans has become complicated.  The escalated 
political tensions within Nepal, including increasing ties to China, have heightened Tibetans'  
reliance on international mechanisms.80 Conducting participant observation in Kathmandu could 
give me further insight into the role of the international humanitarian regime in shaping refugee 
subjectivity.  For example, Malkki (1990) has examined the ways that life in refugee camps in 
Tanzania influences Burudian refugees' understandings of history, both personal and collective. 
Similarly, Lempert (forthcoming) has examined the role of micro-interactions and language in  
disciplining and socializing monks at a Tibetan monastery in India, arguing that liberalism has 
become incorporated into the monastery's ideals.  Research at the reception center in Kathmandu 
could take a similar approach, that my field material encourages, to understanding the 
socialization that Tibetans experience in institutions operated through humanitarian support.
Additionally, from my informants' reports, it seems that the reception center in 
Kathmandu provides refugees with one of the first forums for relatively long-term contact with 
Tibetans from other regions.  As described throughout the thesis, recent arrivals cannot always 
understand the speech of Tibetans from different regions, and they sometimes resort to using 
Mandarin to communicate (see p. 133).  Also, scholars have noted that a pan-Tibetan identity is 
crafted largely in exile, and that the regional distinctions, which I observed in the field, are 
stronger in Tibet.  Again, while I could trace pan-Tibetan and regionalist sentiments in my 
informants narratives, my field material does not address how initial exposure to diversity 
influences refugees.  In this context, examining communication across dialects would provide 
another axis of analysis for understanding the micro-interactional aspects of socialization into the 
80 http://www.savetibet.org/action-center/current-ict-campaigns/tibetan-refugees  
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pan-Tibetan identity associated with the exile community.  While this thesis has dealt largely 
with elicited narrative, longer-term participant observation would give me access to conversation 
and spontaneous narratives.  I am left with questions including: How do language differences 
influence the social dynamics of life at refugee institutions?  What role does gender play in 
shaping changing speech patterns and social interactions?
Also, although I could imagine aspects of life in Tibet from my informants' narratives, I 
have neither experienced nor observed the direct effects of religious repression, internal 
migrations, and the lack of education that my informants describe.  Examining processes of 
socialization within the institution of the Tibetan family could provide an opportunity to examine  
the forces that lead individuals to migrate.  Given that the Chinese state has actively 
marginalized rural Tibetans while simultaneously trying to usher them into modernity (Craig 
2012), how do Tibetans understand these interventions on the ground?  My informants describe 
language as a key marker of Tibetanness, and explain that the monopoly of the Chinese language 
within Tibet actively threatens ethnic survival.  I am left wondering: How do Tibetans 
communicate with Chinese, and how do tensions around language play out in social interactions? 
In this vein, attention among Western scholars has focused upon overt political unrest in Tibet 
(Barnett 2005, 2001).  However, my informants described that while their parents may have 
“known about Tibet,” they, themselves, did not until reaching the exile community.  Of what, 
then, does Tibetan subjectivity consist in Tibet?  Living with a rural family would allow me to 
explore micro-interactions within Tibet, including between Chinese and Tibetans.  And, since my 
informants state that they came into contact with knowledge of Tibetan politics and religion only 
through their families' oral histories, I could explore these oral histories, themselves.  My field 
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material has provoked unexamined questions including: What is the form and content of cross-
generational narratives in Tibet and how do they shape understandings of history?  Since 
religious repression is common, how do families cultivate and communicate cosmology, 
including knowledge of the Dalai Lama?
This thesis has dealt centrally with the ways that women speak of embodied suffering, 
and the ramifications of gendered metaphors of this embodied suffering for women's kinship 
relations.  Since my informants described the collective suffering resulting from reproductive 
regulation, I am left wondering how women speak of and/or resist biopolitical controls such as 
the One Child Policy in Tibet.  Additionally, since reproductive regulation has the potential to  
shift family composition (as ethnographers have noted in studies among Han Chinese [Anagost 
1995, Chen 2011]), how do Tibetan families manage themselves in the context of strict but 
differentially implemented government regulations?  And, how has kinship been reconfigured in 
the context of Chinese biopower including but not limited to reproductive regulations?  Also, 
given that my informants described internal migrations that prefigured their journeys to South 
Asia, how do such internal movements influence family life in Tibet?  And, since most of my 
informants remain in limited contact with their kin in Tibet, how do Tibetans in Tibet experience 
these ruptured kinship ties?
In conclusion, the complex ties among Tibetans in Tibet and Tibetans in exile, as well as 
the political context of the Tibet issue that I have briefly encountered leave important, unresolved 
questions that have broader implications for current anthropology.  The postmodern turn in 
cultural studies has altered understandings of locality, kinship, governance, and gender. 
Ethnographers have attended to the micro-manifestations of politics, for example, in examining 
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the ways that marginalization is produced and internalized through contact between communities  
(Tsing 1993).  Studies of modernity and migration have attended to the reconfigurations of 
gender relations and kinship in internal diasporas and communities changed by industry, such as 
those my informants described in Tibet (Rofel 1999).  In addition, ethnographies of speech have 
addressed the ways that language reproduces gender hierarchies (Inoue 2006) and how linguistic 
practices in communities spanning across borders influence understandings of rootedness and 
tradition (Falconi 2011).  Ethnographic work either at the Tibetan Refugee Reception Center in 
Kathmandu or within Tibet itself could speak to these ongoing scholarly conversations, which 




Fig. 1: Typical Migration Route from Lhasa to Dharamsala
230
Fig. 2: Hillside in Dharamsala
Fig. 3: Tibetan Martyr's Memorial in McLeod Ganj
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Fig. 4: Approximate Location of Institutions
Fig. 5: Greater Dharamsala
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Fig. 6: Aerial Map of McLeod Ganj
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Fig. 7: Map of Tibet (Three Regions Model) (Retrieved from:  
http://tibetantrekking.com/tibet/plateau/)
Fig. 8: Map of Tibet Autonomous Region in Comparison to  
Greater Tibet (Retrieved from:  
http://tibettravelblog.wordpress.com/map-of-tibet/)
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Fig. 9: Advertisement for LIT Tuesday Talk with  
Former Political Prisoners (Retrieved from:  
http://learningandideasfortibet.org/81-photos/)  
Fig. 10: "Thank You Banner" at the Department of Health
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Fig. 11: Drawing of torture similar to those at Gu Chu  
Sum (Retrieved from:http://www.ishr.org/Systematic-
Torture-in-the-People-s-Republic-of-China.1268.0.html) 
Fig. 12: Pema Tsering's Daughter at a  
Birthday Celebration
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Fig. 13: Demonstration in Dharamsala Following Jamphel Yeshi's Death  
(Retrieved from:http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/world/asia/tibetan-exiles-
rally-around-delhi-self-immolator.html?_r=1&hp)
Appendix Two: Referenced Informants
Dawa Youdon: Twenty-six year old female from Amdo; migrated with cousin (Tsewang) three 
months ago; living at Tibetan Reception Center
Diki: Female employee at Delek Hospital in Dharamsala; born in India
Dolkar: Female employee at the Torture Survivors' Unit; born in India
Dolma Dechen: Twenty-six year old female from Uztang; graduate of TTS and student at ES 
Trust; has lived in Dharamsala since 2004; migrated alone
Jangchup: Helped with translation; twenty-two year old female from Kham (Khadtze county); 
graduate of TCV Gopalu; second year college student at Ethiraj Women's College 
(Chennai), studying English Honors;  trilingual in Tibetan (Central), English, and Hindi; 
migrated with village-mate (Metok) in 1998
Kalsang Tsomo: Forty-year old female from Utzang (Lhasa area); married with two daughters; 
left Tibet without family two months ago; living at Tibetan Reception Center; hopes to 
return to family in Tibet
Kunchang Dolma: Twenty-two year old female from Kham; student at ES Trust, graduate of 
TCV Suja; migrated with younger brother in 2008
Lhamo Ja: Twenty-three year old female from Amdo (Rebkhang); has one son and lives with 
son's father; studied at TTS; migrated alone
Lhamo Tso: Helped with translation; female age late-twenties from Amdo (Chabja); migrated 
alone
Metok: Twenty-six year old female from Kham; coffee shop employee in McLeod Ganj; 
migrated with village-mate (Jangchup) in 1998
Mingyur: Director of Tibetan Reception Center; born in India
Nyima Tsering: Male in early-thirties from Amdo (Chabja county); graduate of TTS; divorced 
with one son; was married to woman from Germany for four years; migrated alone
Pasang: Twenty-seven year old female born in Dharamsala; works as tour guide and hopes to 
study in America
Pema: Twenty-eight year old male from Amdo; engaged to American woman from San Francisco 
and hopes to live in America
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Pema Tsering: Twenty-five year old female from Amdo (Chabja county); graduate of TCV Suja; 
married with eight month old daughteri; migrated alone
Sangmu: Forty-four year old female from Kham; studied at Tibet University; former political 
prisoner; employee at Gu Chu Sum (association of former political prisoners)
Rinchen Dolma: Thirty-four year old female; employee at Tibetan Reception Center; studied at  
TTS; married with no children; migrated alone in 1998
Rinchen Tsetan: Twenty-five year old male from Amdo (Chabja county); coffee shop employee; 
unmarried; youngest of five children; migrated alone
Tamdin Tso: Twenty-year old female from Amdo; graduate of Tibetan Homes Foundation in 
Mussoorie; migrated with family who now lives in Dharamsala; studying nursing in 
Bangalore
Tashi Lodoeh: Twenty-nine year old female from Utzang; owns restaurant near Norbulinka; 
former nun and political prisoner;  migrated alone
Tenzin Dolma: Twenty-eight year old female from Amdo (Chabja county); studied at TCV Suja; 
married with no children; hopes to join husband in America; migrated alone
Tenzin Sonam:  Nineteen-year old female; attended school in Lhasa; student at TTS; migrated 
alone in 2009
Tenzin Tsering: Helped with translation; twenty-seven year old female; born in Bylakuppe; 
parents from Utzang
Tenzin Yangzom: Twenty-two year old female from Utzang (Shang county); has lived as a nun 
for three years and plans to join monastery; living at Tibetan Reception Center; migrated 
alone
Tenzin Youdon: Helped with translation; twenty-seven year old female; born in Dharamsala; 
Khampa heritage; program assistant at SIT
Tsewang: Twenty-three year old female from Amdo (Ngaba county); migrated with cousin 
(Dawa Dolma); living at the reception center
Tseyang: Thirty-six year old female from Utzang (Pempa, near Lhasa); former political prisoner; 
married with one son; migrated alone
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Appendix Three: Sample Questions
 Where were you born and where have you lived?
 Why did you come to India?
 Tell me about your family
 What is it like living without your family in India?
 What has your experience with education been like?
 What do you think it means to be Tibetan?
 What is happening now in Tibet?
 How was your life in Tibet different from your life in India?
 What are the main challenges that Tibetan women face?
 What are the main challenges the Tibetan people face?
 Are the challenges in exile different from the challenges in Tibet?
 What would freedom mean for Tibet?
 How are Tibetans in Tibet different from Tibetans born in exile?
 How do Tibetans and Chinese interact in Tibet?
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